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1. Introduction and summary 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and summary 
 
The German food sector is subject to important challenges driven inter alia by policy reforms, 
changing food production conditions and increasing consumer awareness of food quality. 
Segments of the public have become increasingly critical of certain aspects of food produc-
tion; both at the farm and the processing level. Nowadays consumers
1
 are more demanding, 
more critical and more fragmented in their food choices. From the quality perception litera-
ture it is well known that quality is a multi-dimensional construct and usually categorized into 
intrinsic quality cues (part of the physical product) and extrinsic quality cues (everything 
else). One of the reasons why the use of extrinsic cues for quality inference gains increasingly 
importance emanates from the linkage between production processes and health as well as 
food safety (Grunert 2006). Good food quality as it is perceived by consumers revolves 
around four main concepts, which are taste, health, convenience and, at least for some con-
sumers, process characteristics. The diversity of those characteristics is reflected by a large 
number of certification schemes established over the last decade setting out a series of tech-
nical requirements for producing, processing and transporting food (Bredahl et al. 2001). 
Based upon information economics theory, Darby and Karni (1973) provide a classification of 
quality dimensions into search, experience and credence dimensions. Credence dimensions 
are those dimensions for which the average consumer can never ascertain the quality for him-
self, but has to trust the judgement of others. In this context, the key factor that makes an at-
tribute a credence attribute is that it is not practicable for consumers to assess the quality of 
                                                 
1
  In the present dissertation the generic masculine form is used which should be understood also as a reference 
to women. 
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the product. As an instrument to signal quality, informational labelling is used requiring a 
reputable certification agent whom consumers can trust (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). In-
formation remedies in terms of labels can take different forms: for example mandatory disclo-
sure of information about the nature of a product or voluntary claims. Prominent examples are 
the German Bio seal providing legally defined information on the production process or a 
private sector label like the quality and safety Q&S label standing for a cross stage and cross 
company quality assurance scheme (BMELV 2011). Process-oriented schemes are established 
to provide and preserve a certain product quality throughout the entire supply chain (Fischer 
et al. 2010). The currently most prominent examples of process qualities that affect the Ger-
man agricultural sector are animal-friendly livestock handling and the abandoning of genet-
ically modified feedstuffs. Although many people are critical towards modern agricultural 
practices and some consumers are willing to pay price increments for certain process quali-
ties, the availability of milk that is produced without using GMO and high-welfare meat re-
main limited. There is a perception that incentives for farmers are not sufficient to encourage 
the desired changes of farming practices. Determinants of farmers’ decision behavior to ap-
prove or disapprove process quality schemes are central to the present dissertation. 
A key methodology used in this dissertation is discrete choice experiments (DCE). DCE have 
been applied primarily to elicit consumers’ preferences for product attributes in marketing 
research (McFadden 1986). With growing popularity, the methodology has also spread into 
other fields of application. Nowadays discrete choice analysis is widely used across diverse 
areas to study the behavioral responses of individuals, households and other organizations 
covering topics like health care services (Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008), transportation demand 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 2000) to mention but a few. In agricultural economics the application 
of the DCE method is still rare. Birol et al. (2008) provide a review on studies employing 
DCEs on issues related to agricultural and food policies in Europe including an investigation 
of farmers’ trade-offs between water pollution from agricultural sources and investment in 
environmental efforts in a rural region of Romania (Toma and Mathijs 2004). Another study 
deals with German consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for improved food safety in meat 
production signaled through quality labels (Enneking 2004). The present dissertation presents 
discrete choice studies applied to issues related to farmers’ willingness to change farming 
practices in order to ensure the provision of certain process qualities. More specifically, the 
dissertation aims to investigate dairy farmers’ acceptance of GM-free milk production and 
further to enhance animal welfare in dairy cattle farming. Moreover, farmers’ as well as con-
2
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sumers’ preferences for animal welfare in pig fattening are assessed to predict supply and 
demand for high-welfare pork. Additionally a case study was conducted to investigate farm-
ers’ support of a strategic cooperation between dairy companies to achieve higher efficiency 
in milk collection. The following paragraphs provide an overview of existing DCE studies 
exploring farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) production schemes in livestock farming that 
require changes in farm management. Afterwards, the most recent studies on consumers’ 
preferences for farm animal welfare (FAW) are summarized and assessed.  
A number of DCE studies have been carried out to inform the efficient design of production 
schemes or contracts by providing insights on farmers’ preferences for contract elements or 
more generally their responses to changes in farm management. Norwood et al. (2006) inves-
tigated cattle farmers’ willingness to participate in a voluntary checkoff program in the U.S. 
The term checkoff refers to a producer-funded marketing program including commodity pro-
motion, research, and consumer information (Cattlemen’s Beef Board 2015). They obtained 
choice data from 670 farmers in order to answer what type of checkoff program would receive 
the greatest support. Farmers were asked to pay a checkoff fee that is refunded in full on re-
quest or allocated across advertising, research and other activities to promote the checkoffs. A 
threshold level of provision has to be met or all fees would be refunded, even if this was not 
demanded. Farmers’ participation was highest when the refund option was included and the 
majority of farmers placed a significantly greater priority on spending money on advertising 
than on other options. Olynk et al. (2012) reported results of a study on welfare effects if the 
use of a bovine growth hormone (rbST) was removed from the set of technologies used by 
Michigan dairy farmers. Although they found heterogeneous impacts on income between 
farmers who previously treated their cows with hormones and those who did not, significant 
welfare losses for all producers were evident. Other applications of DCEs are targeted on re-
vealing producers’ acceptance of business contracts. For example, Roe et al. (2004) investi-
gated hog producers’ preferences for marketing contract attributes affecting the distribution of 
profits. Besides the effect of contract elements on the likelihood of acceptance, farmers 
showed strong preferences for a cooperative organizational form. In particular producers who 
attach importance to a trustful relationship with their contractors are more likely to choose a 
contract offered by a cooperative. In their study on farmers’ participation in voluntary agri-
environmental schemes (AES) Ruto and Garrod (2009) could identify a group of scheme op-
ponents, but also a larger group of farmers who accept contracts offering relatively little flexi-
bility and a higher administrative effort. In addition to contract attributes, farmers’ age and 
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education affect their willingness to enter into a contract. DCEs have also been applied to 
afforestation contracts by Broch and Vedel (2012). The authors investigated the influence of 
contract elements on farmers’ acceptance. Enhancing biodiversity, groundwater protection 
and establishment of recreation area were selected as different purposes of afforestation. Ad-
ditionally a contract canceling option, varying sizes of area under monitoring and a compen-
sation payment formed part of the contract. It was suggested to account for heterogeneity 
among the farmers in order to design contracts efficiently. The studies presented thus far pro-
vide evidence that farmers respond differently depending on integral parts of contracts, but 
also on farm and farmer characteristics including attitudes towards, for example, nature con-
servation, the use of specific technologies or characteristics of the contractor. Information on 
farmers’ individual preferences is indispensable to design contracts more efficiently and, in 
turn, achieve a higher level of acceptance. A whole series of studies deals with farmers’ pref-
erences in the area of contracting and producers’ acceptance of hypothetical production tech-
nologies. In fact, there is no study investigating farmers’ preferences for programs offered by 
processors with the objective to produce a specific process quality by employing discrete 
choice experiments (DCE).  
With regard to food products claiming the absence of GMO and animal-friendly production 
conditions, DCEs were mainly applied to derive consumers’ willingness to pay. A cross-
cultural survey conducted by Lusk et al. (2003) has shown that some respondents attach value 
to rib-eye steak produced without GM feed. The data analysis revealed that German consum-
ers were willing to pay $4.40 per pound more than US consumers. Based on a large-scale sur-
vey with 710 Swedish consumers, Carlsson et al. (2005) performed an analysis of preferences 
for existent as well as non-existent, private and public attributes across six food products. 
They found that consumers’ willingness to pay for animal welfare related attributes vary 
across products, indicating that their importance seems to be animal specific. Surprisingly 
high premiums were identified for a ban of GM fodder, for a slower grow chicken breed and 
outdoor access for pigs and dairy cattle. In a comparable study dealing with animal-friendly 
pork production, Lagerkvist et al. (2006) estimated Swedish consumers’ WTP for specific 
practices. They reported two interesting results. Firstly, they found that respondents are 
strongly opposed to fixation of sows and secondly, that allowing pigs to be outdoors is highly 
valued by consumers. The latter matches the finding of Carlsson et al. (2005). However, con-
sumers prefer pork from surgically castrated boars over pork from intact male pigs. A possible 
explanation might be that taste quality dominates animal welfare concerns. The authors con-
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clude that immuno-castration is a socially accepted alternative to surgical castration. Besides 
the fact that this treatment causes less pain, it further provides economic advantages due to 
cost savings and better growth rates compared to surgical castrates. Carlsson et al. (2007) 
combined a bundle of quality indicators of different meats and asked consumers to choose 
between various types of chicken fillet and minced beef. The products were described by dif-
ferent attributes: information about product origin and the husbandry system on a label, the 
type of feedstuff used varying in the content of GMO or the option of GM-feed being entirely 
banned from the market. Additionally, respondents had to choose between meat from animals 
that are transported to abattoirs or, alternatively, slaughtered in mobile abattoirs. It turned out 
that consumers exhibit varying welfare preferences according to animal species. For example, 
mobile slaughter was found to be negative for broilers, but positively valued for cattle, mean-
ing that, on average, respondents are only willing to pay an increment for mobile slaughter of 
cattle. Recent work by Liljenstolpe (2008) on consumers’ preferences for pig welfare 
measures like mobile abattoirs, no castration and animal-friendly housing system revealed a 
high preference for mobile slaughtering and a stock limit of 100 pigs. Previous findings by 
Lagerkvist et al. (2006) on negative preferences for “no castration” could be confirmed here. 
Taken together, these results indicate that in spite of consumers’ value for enhanced farm an-
imal welfare (FAW), other product quality attributes e.g. taste or impact on health seem to be 
more important. Moreover, it has to be considered that animal welfare preferences vary re-
garding the species and food product purchased.   
From the previously reviewed studies it appears that DCE are used in various fields to esti-
mate consumers’ WTP of product attributes and farmers’ acceptance of production schemes, 
technologies or contracts. Yet, no study exists that examines farmers’ acceptance of a GM-
free milk production scheme (Chapter 2) and farmers’ willingness to participate in a voluntary 
animal welfare program for dairy cattle (Chapter 3). Furthermore this dissertation contributes 
to the body of literature by investigating acceptance of animal welfare schemes in pork pro-
duction bringing together both ends of the value chain, pig production and consumption of 
pork (Chapter 4). Although work has been done to reveal consumers’ preferences for animal-
friendly measures in pig farming (e.g. Carlsson et al. 2007; Liljenstolpe 2008), the innovative 
approach of combining WTP and WTA estimates obtained from identical DCE to simulate a 
market for high welfare pork has never been used in this context before. A further contribu-
tion focusses on farmers’ support of a strategic cooperation between dairy companies in milk 
collection (Chapter 5). The objective of the conducted case studies was to investigate farmers’ 
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preferences for production programs proposed by the private sector to provide a particular 
process quality employing DCE. Given the topicality of GM-free status of milk as well as 
FAW in food production, those issues were selected as relevant examples for process quali-
ties. Farmers’ decision behavior is often more complex than in cases where profit maximiza-
tion is the principal driver of decision-making. Therefore the model specifications used latent 
class (LC) and random parameter logit (RPL) models, allowing for heterogeneity among the 
population under study. Additionally, attitudinal variables and operational features of farms 
were incorporated into the analyses to capture and explain behavioral differences. The follow-
ing chapters have to be considered as distinct contributions and are summarized hereinafter.  
Farmers’ valuation of incentives to produce GM -free milk: insights from a Discrete 
Choice Experiment in Germany 
The study in Chapter 1 investigates farmers’ willingness to participate in a Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms (GMO)-free milk production scheme offered by some German dairy compa-
nies. The empirical analysis is based upon discrete choice experiments (DCE) with 151 dairy 
farmers from two regions in Germany. Unlike other studies on farmers’ acceptance of produc-
tion schemes, attributes are selected that are assumed to cause opposite effects: imposed con-
tractual elements requiring additional effort on the one hand, and technical support providing 
utility on the other. A conditional logit (CL) estimation reveals a strong positive effect of the 
price premium on offer. Reliable feed monitoring and free technical support increase the like-
lihood of scheme adoption, the latter however only on farms which have been receiving tech-
nical support in other fields. By contrast, any interference with the entrepreneurial autonomy 
of farmers, be it through pre-arranged feed procurement or prescriptive advice on the part of 
the dairy company, lowers acceptance probabilities. Farmers’ attitudes towards cultivation of 
GM soy, their assessment of the market potential of GMO-free milk and future feed prices 
were found to be significant determinants of adoption, as are farmer age, educational status 
and current feeding regimes. Respondents requested on average a mark-up of 0.80 eurocent 
per kilogram milk to accept a contract. Comparison of the estimates for the two regions sug-
gests that farmers in northern Germany are, on average, more likely to convert to GM-free 
production; however, farmers in the south are, ceteris paribus, more responsive to an increase 
in the price premium offered. A latent class model reveals significant differences in the valua-
tion of scheme attributes between two latent classes of “adopters” and “non-adopters”. Just 
over half of the respondents could be classified as potential adopters, whereas the remaining 
44% appear to be resistant to the range of incentives on offer. This study derives implications 
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for dairy companies wishing to introduce a GM-free production scheme to their farmers: in-
tensively communicating their marketing strategy plus a feed monitoring scheme to prevent 
losses through contamination. 
The role of non-use values in dairy farmers’ willingness to accept a farm animal welfare 
program 
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) about a hypothetical farm animal welfare (FAW) program 
were presented to a sample of 78 randomly selected German dairy farmers. Animal-friendly 
practices like pasturing of dairy cows, higher amounts of space available, somatic cell count 
limits and additional health checks were included in the choice sets as attributes of the FAW 
programs. Derived from the theory of social interactions, hypotheses on farmers’ adoption 
behavior deviate from the usual assumption that farmers provide FAW only in accordance 
with their profit-maximizing objective. Two sets of factors were considered to play a role in 
the decision-making process: non-use existence values, representing utility farmers may de-
rive from the perceived knowledge that the animal “feels good”, and values that are linked 
with individuals outside the farm household. These include perceived public appreciation of 
animal welfare as well as the opinion of other farmers about how farm animals should be 
treated. The ease of implementing program requirements and economic drivers such as in-
creased milk yield and extended productive life-span were assumed to affect the likelihood of 
program adoption. The analysis of choice data revealed plausible negative effects of program 
attributes, reflecting rising costs of implementation. Farmers who expect productivity benefits 
from a program and those, who already take part in a farm quality assurance scheme and regu-
larly exchange opinions on animal welfare are more likely to participate in a FAW program. 
Splitting farmers into subgroups of program adoption showed that farmers who never accept-
ed a program derive utility from their animals for reasons other than profitability, and at the 
same time disutility from a FAW program. This underlying aversion against the program per 
se might be explained by perceived loss of autonomy or a lack of familiarity with voluntary 
programs. Future design of private and public sector FAW programs should therefore consid-
er that farmers’ rejection of a program is not necessarily related to their lack of valuing FAW, 
but may instead indicate the presence of farm-specific transaction costs. 
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Predicting supply and demand for high-welfare meat with Discrete Choice Experiments 
An innovative approach to predict market shares for high-welfare pork is presented in Chapter 
4. Based on two DCEs, farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) a FAW program as well as 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for high-welfare pork were estimated. Respondents 
faced identical choice sets, except for the monetary variable, representing programs described 
by varying requirements including minimum barn area for each pig, the use of straw for bed-
ding, access to manipulable material and limitations to the duration of transportation to the 
abattoir. A random parameter logit (RPL) model revealed that farmers with secured farm suc-
cession and those who are selling their meat directly to consumers are more likely to accept a 
welfare scheme. Comparing actual costs for implementing welfare measures on farm with 
required compensation payments for the same measures showed that the majority of farmers 
demand extra compensation. On the other hand, the analysis of consumers’ preferences for 
animal welfare when buying cutlets showed that an increase in product price and transport 
duration of animals negatively affected the probability of purchase. Consumers who frequent-
ly purchase pork from the self-service counter and those who attach more importance to price 
than to brand, origin or taste of the product and prefer conventional to organic pork are less 
likely to buy high-welfare pork. Preference estimates enabled calculating carcass prices farm-
ers wish to achieve for compliance with defined program attributes. Additionally, prices that 
can be paid to farmers were derived from consumers’ willingness to pay for high-welfare 
pork. Market simulations for different scenarios of FAW programs indicate an increasing di-
vergence of supply and demand that arises with increasing strictness of standards. For a FAW 
program with standards only slightly above the legal minimum standard a market share of 
38% was predicted, whereas in a scenario with considerable higher requirements a market 
balance was not achieved. 
Dairy farmers’ support of horizontal cooperation among dairy processors: conceptual 
model and empirical testing 
Small dairy cooperatives can improve their economic performance through horizontal cooper-
ation such as joint milk collection from farmers. The approval of such a strategy by coopera-
tive members, however, may be low given the risk of increasing erosion of collective action 
commitment documented in the literature. The case study in this chapter aims to explain 
members’ decision to approve or disapprove of dairy cooperatives’ joint milk collection. A 
conceptual model was developed based on economic theory but further includes psychologi-
cal and sociological logics. Farmers’ decisions are modeled by means of a discrete choice 
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experiment. Relevant attitudes and relationship quality are measured using extant scales. The 
model is then tested on empirical data collected from members of two dairy cooperatives. A 
multinomial logit (ML) regression is performed to explain farmers’ answering patterns, where 
we distinguish between always supporters, selective deciders, and never supporters. The mul-
tinomial logit regression to explain farmers’ specific response behavior to the proposed alter-
native optimization models in the discrete choice experiment reveals that especially the never- 
and always-supporters can be meaningfully distinguished by their levels of social interaction 
with other members, supplier relationship quality with the cooperative, and attitude towards 
the project. Frequent coop member interaction (FCM) and supplier relationship quality (SRQ) 
are both associated with an increase in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to the group of 
Never supporters, whereas farmers’ attitude towards project and attitudes towards climate 
change are associated with a decrease in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to that group. 
Overall, the study hints at the necessity to take into account farmers’ attitudes towards pro-
posed strategies, but also their relationship with the cooperative, in order to predict and prob-
ably influence their decisions. For the latter, this study provides insights as to the relevance of 
social interaction among members, which could be exploited in member management. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates farmers’ willingness to participate in a Genetically Modified Organ-
isms (GMO)-free milk production scheme offered by some German dairy companies. The 
empirical analysis is based upon discrete choice experiments (DCE) with 151 dairy farmers 
from two regions in Germany. A conditional logit (CL) estimation reveals a strong positive 
effect of the price premium on offer. Reliable feed monitoring and free technical support in-
crease the likelihood of scheme adoption, the latter however only in farms which have been 
receiving technical support in other fields. By contrast, any interference with the entrepre-
neurial autonomy of farmers, be it through pre-arranged feed procurement or prescriptive ad-
vice on the part of the dairy company, lowers acceptance probabilities. Farmers’ attitudes to-
wards cultivation of GM soy, their assessment of the market potential of GMO-free milk and 
future feed prices were found to be significant determinants of adoption, as are farmer age, 
educational status and current feeding regimes. Respondents requested on average a mark-up 
of 0.80 eurocent per kilogram milk to accept a contract. Comparison of the estimates for the 
two regions suggests that farmers in northern Germany are, on average, more likely to convert 
to GM-free production; however, farmers in the south are, ceteris paribus, more responsive to 
an increase in the price premium offered. A latent class model reveals significant differences 
in the valuation of scheme attributes between two latent classes of “adopters” and “non-
adopters”.  
 
Keywords: GM-free milk production scheme, farmer valuation, discrete choice modelling, 
latent class analysis 
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2.1 Introduction 
European consumers have been shown to be critical of new technologies such as the use of 
genetically modified feed or growth hormones in animal husbandry (Lusk et al. 2003; Bredahl 
2001; Burton et al. 2001). A comprehensive review of consumers’ attitudes towards new food 
technologies revealed that perceived “naturalness” is highly valued. Moreover, the use of ge-
netically modified organisms (GMO) in food production affects purchasing behavior more 
adversely than other novel food technologies such as nanotechnologies (Rollin et al. 2011). 
According to Costa-Font et al. (2008), citizens of Northern European countries and France are 
less tolerant to GM food than those of the US and southern European countries. In a study 
among French consumers (n= 97) on willingness to pay (WTP) for food products that differ in 
their content of GM ingredients, Noussair et al. (2004) found that 35% of respondents are 
generally unwilling to purchase such products and that a GM-free guarantee raises the WTP 
for biscuits by 8%. A cross-cultural comparison of consumers’ WTP for rib-eye steak con-
firms that European consumers are more adverse towards the feeding of GM corn than US 
consumers. For example, the German respondents were willing to pay $4.40 per pound more 
than US consumers for a steak produced without GM feed (Lusk et al. 2003). In general, Eu-
ropean consumers are willing to accept increasing food bills to obtain products without GMO.  
In response to these market developments, some retailers and processors have begun to im-
pose GMO-free requirements on the primary stage of production. In Germany, the production 
of GM-free milk is one such example which has gained significant importance in recent years, 
in particular in Bavaria (Dorfner and Uhl 2012). Some dairies, mostly located in the south of 
Germany, have included this value-added quality concept into their product portfolio. To in-
crease transparency and aid consumers’ purchasing decisions, a voluntary GM-free label 
based on the Law on the Execution of Genetic Engineering (EG-Gentechnik-
Durchführungsgesetz) was introduced. Farmers who voluntarily accept the requirements for 
GM-free milk production must prove that they did not use feedstuffs listed as GM feed in EU 
Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003. Dairy companies wishing to use the label have begun 
to develop GM-free production schemes in accordance with the Law. These schemes offer a 
producer price increment to compensate farmers for the additional costs implied by the re-
quirements. The increment varies between 0.5 and 2.0 eurocent per kilogram of raw milk 
(corresponding to a rise of one to five percent of the milk price) and depends mostly on the 
marketing success and the type of products sold (Venus and Wesseler 2012). 
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This paper aims to assess dairy farmer’s willingness to participate in a GM-free milk produc-
tion scheme that a German dairy company is planning to launch. More specifically, we wish 
to clarify how the production requirements and the incentives offered by the scheme affects 
farmers’ willingness to participate and how much influence farm structure, farmer characteris-
tics, attitudes and region have on adoption behavior. The empirical analysis is based upon 
discrete choice experiments (DCE) with 151 dairy farmers from two key milk production re-
gions of Germany. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 2.3 describes the exper-
imental setup and the empirical model. The findings are presented and discussed in Section 
2.4. The final section summarizes key results and discusses implications for dairy companies 
wishing to launch comparable schemes.  
2.2  Literature Review 
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are mainly applied in fields like marketing and environ-
mental economics to analyze preferences of customers or citizens for certain attributes of con-
sumer goods or environmental assets in hypothetical settings.  
A brief overview of studies at the consumer level related to the acceptance of GMO in food 
(Lusk et al. 2003; Rigby and Burton 2005; Burton et al. 2001) has already been given in the 
introduction. The following review therefore focuses on relevant studies applying DCE at the 
producer level. Birol et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review of the application of DCE 
in Europe. The studies reviewed are designed to inform the implementation of policies relat-
ing to the environment and the agri-food sector. A large number of DCEs have been conduct-
ed to investigate farmers’ willingness to participate in agri-environmental schemes (AES). 
Since such schemes are complex and adoption is influenced by many factors (Edwards-Jones 
2006), including characteristics of farm and farmers, the DCE method provides information 
on how schemes can be designed effectively. The valuation of scheme components is reflect-
ed by specific willingness to accept estimates which can be calculated by including payment 
as one of the attributes.  
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) investigated the factors affecting farmer’s willingness to partic-
ipate in a proposed agri-environmental scheme (AES) paying Spanish farmers to cultivate 
alfalfa (a nitrogen-fixing crop). Farmer respondents were confronted with choice sets in which 
they had to choose among alternative contracts, each involving distinct implementation re-
quirements and a given compensation payment. The results indicate that free choice of the 
land offered for the program and unrestricted use of the alfalfa crop significantly increase 
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respondents’ willingness to sign a contract, as does previous experience with AES participa-
tion. Acceptance is also influenced by regional conditions and by farmer and farm-specific 
characteristics. Significant differences were found in the ranking of attributes between differ-
ent regions.  
Jaeck and Lifran (2013) investigated farmers’ willingness to implement agro-ecological prac-
tices like weed control and crop rotation in rice production. They applied a latent class model 
to account for heterogeneity in farm structures and farmer preferences. It was concluded that 
farmers’ concern for environmental issues is a main driver for the implementation of envi-
ronmentally friendly practices. Birol et al. (2006) used a DCE to investigate Hungarian farm-
ers’ preferences for traditional agricultural practices in home gardens, including crop variety 
diversity, maintaining landraces, integrated crop and livestock production and organic cultiva-
tion. They found that the valuation of home garden attributes depends on household structure 
and regional conditions, such that in regions with a lack of food market access, poorer soils 
and heterogeneous agro-ecological conditions, home gardens that are rich in crop variety di-
versity are highly valued. Socio-economic factors such as age and education were also found 
to affect preferences.  
Studies investigating the acceptance of marketing schemes at the producer level are rare. 
Olynk et al. (2012) conducted a survey among Michigan dairy farmer to estimate the welfare 
losses when the option to use rbST (recombinant bovine somatotropin) is eliminated from the 
set of technologies. They designed choice scenarios with varying milk and corn prices, pro-
duction practices (use of rbST or rbST-free) and different levels of milk production trends. 
They revealed that farmers, whether using rbST or not, had statistically significant welfare 
losses from the elimination of this technology. Whereas Olynk at al.’s study dealt with a tech-
nology aimed at increasing productivity, the present study focuses on the acceptance of pro-
duction methods to produce premium milk for a niche market. 
Only a small number of studies have investigated the influence of farmers’ attitudes towards 
GM technology in agriculture. Cook and Fairweather (2003), for instance, examined changes 
in intentions, attitudes and beliefs of farmers regarding the use of GM technology and 
concluded that attitudes are a key factor for the decision-making process. In particular, 
producers’ concerns about environmental risks, adverse effects on future generations, market 
acceptance and commercial viability were shown to influence their actions and decision-
making related to the cultivation of GM crops. Breustedt et al. (2008) applied a DCE to ex-
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plore the adoption behavior of German farmers concerning GM oilseed rape. Besides a strong 
impact of the gross margin difference between GM and non-GM varieties, they stressed the 
importance of farm and farmer characteristics for the likelihood of adoption. The attitudes of 
neighboring farmers towards GM crop cultivation were also found to have an important 
impact on respondents’ willingness to cultivate a GM variety. In a study on farmers’ contract 
acceptance, Schulz (2013, unpublished work) investigated the willingness to fulfill additional 
contract requirements, including the avoidance of GM feed in dairy farming. The study re-
vealed that the restriction of using only GM-free feed has a smaller negative impact on 
scheme adoption than the requirement to use only regionally grown feeds. Moreover, farmers 
who already use oilseed rape as protein component in their rations request less compensation 
to accept a contract requiring GM-free, regional feeding. The study corroborated the findings 
of Breustedt et al. (2008) that farmers’ attitude toward sustainability and the risks of GM crop 
cultivation had a significant impact on contract acceptance.  
The present paper contributes to this strand of literature by applying a DCE to evaluate farm-
ers’ preferences for a GM-free milk production scheme and investigating the valuation of 
monetary incentives as well as technical support provided by dairy companies. In contrast to 
the studies cited in this section, we selected scheme attributes that are expected to have oppo-
site effects: imposed contractual requirements that cause additional effort or disutility on the 
one hand, and technical support offered by dairy companies providing utility on the other.  
2.3 The Discrete Choice experiment 
Based on interviews with experts in dairy companies and the relevant literature we identified 
factors that might either hinder or facilitate participation in GM-free production schemes. 
Based on this information we selected the following attributes for inclusion in the choice sets: 
Feed procurement. 
The effort and cost of switching the feeding regime depends on the share and composition of 
concentrate feed in the ration (Dorfner and Uhl (2012), more precisely, on the amount of GM 
feed to substitute (Venus and Wesseler 2012). Farmers can either use GM-free soy or switch 
their feeding regimes to other protein sources such as oilseed meal or grain legumes without 
suffering losses in yield performance or milk quality. The price of GM-free soy is around €40 
to €80 per metric ton above that of conventional (GM) soy (Dorfner and Uhl 2012). Another 
important factor for adoption is the availability of GM-free soy on the European market. Soy-
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beans for feed are imported to Germany mainly from the U.S., Brazil, Argentina and Para-
guay, countries practicing large-scale GM soy cultivation. GM-free feedstuffs are therefore 
scarce on the European market and thus more expensive (FEFAC 2014). Against this back-
ground we chose three alternative specifications for the attribute ‘feed procurement’:  
 Farmer self-procurement (SELF_PROC)  
 Dairy company offers a list of regional suppliers of GM-free soy (LIST)  
 Dairy company arranges the procurement of feedstuffs (DAIRY_PROC).   
Monitoring 
Feedstuffs labelled as GM-free are credence goods in that the truth of the GM-free claim can-
not be judged prior to purchase (Darby and Karni 1973). Thus contract monitoring is needed 
to prove compliance with requirements. By including the attribute ‘monitoring’ in the choice 
sets we wish to establish which type of monitoring is preferred by farmers. We consider three 
different monitoring options:  
 Farmer self-documentation: the farmer documents all feedstuffs used with delivery 
notes and a supplier’s declaration (DOCU).  
 Dairy company audits: the company carries out on-farm audits and carries out labora-
tory tests to substantiate the GM-free status of feed samples (DAIRY_CONT). 
 Independent agency monitoring (Hein et al. 2014): the dairy company entrusts an in-
dependent agency with the task to ensure that no GM feed is used (EXT_AUD). 
Technical support 
Interviews with dairy farmers revealed that lack of know-how to switch the feeding regime or 
to avoid contamination with GMO is a potential obstacle to adoption. Thus, technical support 
in the form of advice offered to farmers could turn out to facilitate adoption. We consider 
three specifications of the attribute:  
 free one-off advice offered by the dairy during conversion (DAIRY_ADV); 
 free continuous advice by an advisory service (PLUS_ADV); 
 no advice offered (NO_ADV). 
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Price premium 
A premium on the producer price of raw milk (PREMIUM) is offered by the dairy company 
to compensate farmers for the extra cost involved in GM-free milk production. This payment 
is varied in the range of 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5 - 2.0 eurocent per kilogram of milk as confirmed to be 
realistic (Venus and Wesseler 2012).  
The empirical analysis is based upon discrete choice experiments (DCE) with 151 dairy farm-
ers in two German federal states, Bavaria (in the south) and Schleswig Holstein (in the north). 
These states represent the two main milk production regions of Germany. Bavaria represents 
upland and mountainous dairy farming systems with small farms; Schleswig-Holstein repre-
sents lowland dairy systems with larger farms size and more favorable natural circumstances. 
The data were collected in 2013 using a paper-based questionnaire and stratified sampling. 
Questionnaires were distributed with the aid of a dairy company in Bavaria and the State In-
spection Association in Schleswig-Holstein. Of the 800 questionnaires sent out, 151 were 
returned completed, accounting for a response rate of almost 20 percent. Our sample size is 
comparable to that of Birol et al. (2006) who interviewed around 100 farmers in three differ-
ent regions of Hungary. From each choice set (as shown in Table 2.1), respondents were 
asked to choose the most preferred option: either one of the scheme alternatives or the status 
quo (no adoption). The ‘opt-out’ alternative had to be included because participation in GM-
free production schemes is voluntary.  
The choice sets were compiled by means of SPSS which generated 15 sets of all 108 combi-
nations satisfying a balanced orthogonal and fractional factorial design. The D-efficiency val-
ue is 94.9 - sufficiently close to the maximum value of 100 for a perfectly orthogonal and 
perfectly balanced design (Kuhfeld et al. 1994). In the survey, each farmer was confronted 
with seven or eight randomly chosen choice sets (Table 2.1). This was done by splitting the 
15 choice sets generated by SPSS into two blocks of seven and eight choice sets, respectively. 
A total of 987 choice sets were included in the estimation. Each choice set contained two GM-
free schemes, hence n= 1974 scheme alternatives were presented in total.  
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Table 2.1 Example of a Choice Set 
 
The Choice Model 
The discrete choice method is based on the characteristics theory of value (Lancaster 1966) 
and the random utility theory provided by Thurstone (1927) and further extended by McFad-
den (1974) from paired to multiple comparisons. The theory assumes that non-observable 
variables affect individuals’ choices and that utility must be seen as a latent construct with an 
unexplainable component (McFadden 1974; Manski 1977). In this context, Lancaster stated 
that utility will be obtained from the attributes of a good rather than from the good itself.  
In our model we consider farmers to be utility-maximizing individuals who choose from the 
alternatives on offer the one with the highest utility. A farmer will therefore only participate 
in the scheme when the expected utility is higher than the utility obtained from current pro-
duction. The utility function can be seen as a vector of attributes associated with each choice 
alternative and a vector of individual farm and farmer characteristics (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
2000). Following the random utility approach, the utility function can be decomposed into 
two parts: (1) a non-stochastic component which maps the deterministic part of utility de-
pendent on observable attributes of the choice alternative and farm or farmer characteristics; 
and (2) a stochastic component which reflects the unobserved random variables with zero 
mean. The deterministic portion of the function is an additive function, i.e. the sum of influ-
ences of the attributes and characteristics. In the estimation, the ordinal attribute variables 
were dummy-type coded and the status quo option was omitted as base level.  
The econometric model aims to estimate the probability of a farmer choosing a specific alter-
native. The function to be estimated is a logistic function ranging from zero to one, depending 
on the matrix of scheme attributes and the vector of individual farm and farmer characteris-
tics. The impact of scheme attributes and farm/farmer characteristics on choice probabilities 
Attributes Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Opt-Out 
Feed procurement  Farmer self-procurement  List of suppliers 
Conditions remain un-
changed. 
Monitoring Audit by dairy company External audit 
Technical support 
Free one-off advice by the 
dairy company 
Advice plus 
Premium (€cent/kilogram) 2.0 0.5 
I choose: □ □ □ 
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are derived from the estimated parameters of the function. For the estimations it is assumed 
that the error components are independently and identically distributed (IID) following a 
type-1 extreme value distribution. This condition implies that the variances of the error com-
ponent of the utilities are identical and the alternatives are independent (Louviere et al. 2000).  
After confirming that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption holds ap-
plying a Hausman-test, an alternative-specific-conditional logit (ASC) model also known as 
Mc Fadden’s conditional logit was employed (McFadden 1974). The model was estimated 
using the asclogit routine in STATA 12. Based on the estimation results, marginal effects on 
the likelihood of adoption were computed and used to calculate willingness to accept (WTA). 
The WTA estimates reflect the price premium requested to compensate farmers for the loss of 
utility from implementing the production requirements. The marginal effects can be interpret-
ed as the change of the outcome variable (here the likelihood of choice) due to an infinitesi-
mal change of independent variables. For discrete variables it is not appropriate to calculate 
the marginal effect in terms of infinitesimal changes. Thus, as a preliminary step, the marginal 
effects were calculated at the sample mean and subsequently a discrete change (from zero to 
one) of the variable of interest was simulated that leads to a change in the corresponding 
probability. The difference of both probabilities represents the average marginal effect of the 
dummy variable or categorical variable (see Breustedt et al. 2008). By setting the marginal 
effect of an explanatory variable in relation to the marginal effect of the price premium, the 
WTA for that variable is denoted in monetary terms.  
In order to capture the heterogeneity of preferences, interaction terms between scheme attrib-
utes and farm/farmer characteristics were included in the model. As explained in Section 2.2, 
the value placed on the attributes is strongly related to individual resource settings and current 
production practices. For example, support to procure GM-free feed may be valued differently 
by different farmers depending on whether they are already feeding non-GM protein compo-
nents. Additionally, provision of advice might be more important to farmers who have previ-
ously accepted advice on other matters and are more receptive towards agricultural advice in 
general. Thus, the first and the second interaction terms are products of the attributes 
“DAIRY_PROC” and “LIST” with the variable “SEG”, a variable indicating the use of soy 
extraction grist in the current feeding regime. The third and fourth interaction term were cre-
ated as product of the attributes “DAIRY_ADV” and “PLUS_ADV” and the variable “ADV”, 
which indicates farmers receiving technical assistance in other fields.  
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In addition to the CL model, a latent class (LC) model was estimated allowing parameter es-
timates to vary among distinguishable latent classes where the preferences are homogeneous 
within but differ substantially across the classes. In contrast to the mixed logit model, the dis-
tribution of coefficients is discrete, with the parameter estimates taking distinct values (Train 
2003). To assess farmers’ willingness to adopt GM-free production, investigation of prefer-
ences among different groups and hence application of an LC model is most suitable (Birol et 
al. 2011). Farmers are assigned to latent groups according to their individual characteristics, 
attitudes and the farm properties. The LC analysis is based on the STATA estimation com-
mand lclogit by Pacifico and Yoo (2012). 
 
2.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the whole sample (N = 151). The average age of 
respondents is 44 years; 87% are farm managers (owner operators), thus the decision-makers 
on the farm. Over half of the respondents have vocational qualifications or a college or uni-
versity degree (High Edu) and 90% of all farmers achieved their qualification in the field of 
agriculture. The majority of farms are pure agricultural enterprises. A few of them also have 
photovoltaic systems. The share of feeding soy extraction grist (SEG) within the sample is 
considerable (almost 80%). The attitudinal variables indicate that, on average, respondents 
believe that GM soy cultivation has a negative impact on biodiversity. Respondents’ assess-
ment of consumer demand for GM-free milk is rather neutral on average. Concerning feed 
prices for conventional soy and oilseed rape, they expect, on average, rather unstable and in-
creasing prices in the future.  
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics of respondents  
Whole sample N = 151   
Variable Mean (SD) Explanation 
Age  44.2 (8.6) Age of participant (years) 
Farm Acr 100.39 (65.8) Farm acreage (total in hectares) 
Grassland  43.8 (28.2) Grassland (total in hectares) 
Forage Prod (N = 57) 17.44 (20.59) Forage production (total in hectares of arable land) 
Corn Sil (N = 127) 30.05 (40.84) Production of corn for silage (total in hectares) 
Herd size  86 (65) Herd size (number of cows) 
Milk yield  7188.8 (1431.3) Milk yield in kilograms per cow and year 
Income Milk 66.65 (21.17) Share of farm income from milk production 
Dummy variables (1 =  yes) Proportion of affirmative 
response (%) 
Explanation 
Farm manager 86.99 Respondent is farm manager 
Young 14.21 Farm manager is under 35 years 
Successor 46.58 Farmer has a successor 
High Edu 52.05 Farmer with vocational training, degree from a 
technical college or university degree 
ADV 68.75 Farm uses advisory services 
Agri-branch 44.52 Farm is solely an agricultural enterprise 
SEG 79.45 Farmer is feeding soy extraction grist (SEG) 
Conc_Purch 58.90 100% of concentrates purchased  
Categorical Variables Mean (SD) Explanation 
Negative impact of GMO  2.5 (0.98) Item: “The cultivation of GM-soy has a negative 
impact on biodiversity in the producing countries.” 
(1 = I fully agree; 5 = I fully disagree) 
Assessment of consumers’ WTP 3.02 (1.03) Item: “Consumers have a higher willingness to pay 
for GM-free milk.” (1 = I fully agree; 5 = I fully 
disagree) 
GM-free milk = short lived trend 2.92 (0.97) Item: “GM-free milk is a short-lived trend.” (1= I 
fully agree; 5= I fully disagree) 
Feed price volatility
 
3.7 (0.94) Expectation of volatility of feed prices (soy and 
oilseed rape) compared to the current year. (1=  
prices will be very stable; 5= prices will be very 
unstable) 
Feed price development
 
3.91 (0.97) Expectation of long-term (10 years) feed price 
development (soy and oilseed rape) (1=  prices will 
be decreasing; 5 = prices will be increasing) 
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Notable differences were found between the two study regions (Table 2.3). Average farm size 
and the share of permanent grassland are twice as high in Schleswig-Holstein as in Bavaria. 
The same holds for herd size. The share of land used for arable forage production is slightly 
higher in Schleswig-Holstein. The share of farmers feeding SEG and buying fodder mixture is 
also higher in Schleswig-Holstein, indicating a stronger reliance on the animal feed market. 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics of respondents by region 
 Bavaria (N = 57) Schleswig-Holstein (N = 94) 
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age  45.4 (8.48) 43.48 (10.0) 
Farm Acr  58.23 (28.05) 124.81 (69.07) 
Grassland 24.57 (12.66) (N = 51) 56.21 (27.86) (N = 89) 
Forage Prod  4.55 (6.17) (N = 19) 23.89 (22.25) (N = 38) 
Corn Sil 10.9 (6.58) (N = 48) 35.79 (46.13) (N = 79) 
Herd size 37.4 (23.8) 68.7 (56.7) 
Milk yield 6240.539 (1186.306) 7726.26 (1274.60) 
Income Milk 63.33 (17.72) 68.48 (22.74) 
Dummy variables (1=  yes) Proportion of affirmative re-
sponse (%) 
Proportion of affirmative re-
sponse (%) 
Farm manager 89.09 85.71 
Young 11.61 15.71 
Successor 47.27 46.15 
High Edu  47.14 54.94 
ADV 66.03 70.32 
Agri-branch 39.53 61.22 
SEG 67.27 86.81 
Conc_Purch 10.90 87.91 
Negative impact of GMO 2.34 (1.00) 2.59 (0.96) 
Estimation of consumers’ WTP 2.75 (1.00) 3.17 (1.02) 
GM-free milk = short lived trend 3.13 (0.99) 2.8 (0.95) 
Feed price volatility
 
3.72 (0.91) 3.75 (0.95) 
Feed price development
 
4.01 (0.91) 3.85 (0.99) 
 
Only minor differences regarding the attitudinal variables were found between the samples. 
Respondent’ attitude towards GMO is on average rather negative, and farmers from both re-
gions expect increasing and more volatile prices of conventional soy and oilseed rape in the 
future. Farmers have rather neutral views on consumers’ willingness to pay for GM-free milk 
and the statement that GM-free milk is a short-lived trend.  
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Estimation results 
We begin by presenting the results of the conditional logit (CL) model. First, the estimation 
was conducted for the whole sample, then for subsets by region. Subsequently, marginal ef-
fects on the likelihood of adoption and also the respective compensation payment (WTA) in 
eurocent per kilogram milk were calculated for each explanatory variable. Table 2.4 reports 
the estimation results for the whole sample. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the marginal effects and 
compensation prices for the whole sample and differentiated by region, respectively. The full 
model includes all exogenous variables. To improve model fit only variables significant at the 
10% level or below were included in the estimation of a parsimonious model (see right-hand 
column of Table 2.4). Following a likelihood ratio test (χ²-value = 4.37; Prob > χ² = 0.9292) 
eight insignificant variables were omitted from the model without impairing the model fit. 
Additionally, a robust Wald test (χ²-value = 2.65 with α = 0.9151) confirmed the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the omitted variables are zero. The McFadden pseudo R² of the parsi-
monious model is 0.208 which indicates an extremely good model fit according to Louviere et 
al. (2000). 
From the 987 decisions, 53.2% were in favor of conversion to GM-free milk production. Out 
of all 151 farmers, 35 (23.2%) always chose the GM-free scheme. By contrast, 34 respondents 
(22.5%) never chose a scheme option. From the farmers who always chose the scheme, 23 are 
located in Schleswig-Holstein and 12 in Bavaria. From those who have never accepted a 
scheme, 24 are located in Schleswig-Holstein and 10 in Bavaria. The overall probability that a 
GM-free alternative is accepted is 0.48 (Bavarian farmers 0.47 and for farmers from Schles-
wig-Holstein 0.48). On average, respondents requested a mark-up of 0.80 eurocent per kilo-
gram milk to accept a contract. Among the scheme attribute variables, the price premium has 
the greatest influence on adoption. The attributes “DAIRY_PROC”, “EXT_AUD” and all 
levels of technical support including “NO_ADV” exert an adverse effect on scheme adoption. 
Referring to Key (2005), farmers’ preferences for independence from the dairy company may 
be a plausible explanation for rejecting attributes which would confine autonomy. An audit by 
an external certifier (EXT_AUD) is often time-consuming and related to high effort on the 
part of farmers. By contrast, “DAIRY_CONT” has a positive influence on the probability of 
adoption, indicating that the monitoring of feedstuff (including laboratory testing) by the 
dairy company is valued by farmers – presumably as a protection against potential losses of 
mark-ups. Among the four interaction terms, the ones between the advice attributes and farms 
which have been receiving advice in other fields are significant. The positive coefficient indi-
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cates that farmers who have previously accepted agricultural advice in other cases are more 
inclined to adopt a GM-free contract when free advice is offered.  
In addition to the provisions of the production scheme, farm and farmer characteristics have 
an impact on the likelihood of adoption. Farmers under 35 are less likely to participate. Re-
garding a longer planning horizon, younger farmers may rather be interested in investing in 
productivity-enhancing technologies than niche production. Higher educational achievement 
(vocational training, degree from technical college or university) lowers the acceptance of 
GM-free production. In the literature, the effect of education on the adoption of new technol-
ogies is often discussed and there is no scientific agreement on the direction of impact 
(Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Prokopy et al. 2008). GM-free milk production can be seen as 
a management-intensive technology that does not necessarily require higher education or bet-
ter knowledge. Such a scheme is rather feasible for less specialized farms (Dorfner and Uhl 
2012).  
Region (0 = Bavaria; 1 = Schleswig-Holstein) and herd size have a significant and positive 
effect on the likelihood of adoption, implying that farmers with larger farms and those in the 
lowland regions of northern Germany are more inclined to participate. The share of grassland 
and land used for cultivation of corn silage, the feeding of soy extraction grist (SEG) and 
complete purchasing of concentrate lower the probability of adoption. The availability of 
grassland and land grown with corn is not necessarily related to the diet of dairy cows in that 
the biomass may be used to feed anaerobic digesters. The negative effects of feeding SEG and 
the purchase of concentrates are plausible because farms which strongly rely on the feed mar-
ket are likely to face higher switching costs. Of the five attitudinal variables, four have an 
impact on the probability of adoption. As expected, farmers with a negative attitude towards 
cultivation of GM soy and those who are convinced of existing consumer demand for GM-
free milk are more likely to adopt a GM-free scheme. Expectations of stable and, in the long-
run, decreasing prices for GM soy and oilseed rape lower the likelihood of scheme adoption. 
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Table 2.4 Estimation results of the CL model  
N= 151 Full model Parsimonious model 
Log-Likelihood  -831.796 -836.557 
 
 Coefficient (SD) Coefficient (SD) 
P
ro
d
u
ctio
n
 S
ch
em
e A
ttrib
u
tes x
 
PREMIUM 1.165*** (0.120) 1.176*** (0.112) 
SELF_PROC -0.125 (0.499) - 
DAIRY_PROC -0.908* (0.571) -0.846*** (0.136) 
LIST -0.018 (0.528) - 
DOCU -0.036 (0.141) - 
EXT_AUD -0.548** (0.164) -0,496*** (0.135) 
DAIRY_CONT 0.242* (0.192) 0.249**   (0.148) 
NO_ADV -1.432** (0.676) -1.337*** (0.336) 
DAIRY_ADV -1.565** (0.703) -1.494*** (0.370) 
PLUS_ADV  -1.590** (0.717) -1.525*** (0.363) 
In
teractio
n
 
term
s x
*
z 
DAIRY_ADV* ADV 0.451**  (0.260) 0.488** (0.254) 
PLUS_ADV* ADV 0.466** (0.253) 0.499** (0.248) 
DAIRY_PROC*SEG -0.042 (0.343) - 
LIST*SEG 0.005 (0.305) - 
S
o
cio
-eco
n
o
m
ic v
ariab
les an
d
 farm
 
ch
aracteristics z 
Young  -0.559** (0.205) -0.544** (0.200) 
High Edu -0.574*** (0.156) -0.545** (0.155) 
Successor  -0.080 (0.157) - 
Income Milk 0.004 (0.004) - 
Grassland  -0.017*** (0.005) -0.015** (0.004) 
Region  1.588*** (0.304) 1.533*** (0.288) 
Herd size  0.016** (0.008) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Forage Prod -0.025*** (0.007) -0.025*** (0.007) 
Corn Sil  -0.008** (0.003) -0.010** (0.003) 
SEG   -0.777** (0.267) -0.772** (0.212) 
Conc_Purch -1.108*** (0.260) -1.107***  (0.252) 
A
ttitu
d
in
al 
v
ariab
les z 
Negative impact of GMO soy  1.001*** (0.160) 1.013*** (0.150) 
Consumers’ WTP is positive 0.628** (0.193) 0.656*** (0.189) 
GM-free milk = short lived trend
 
-0.005 (0.184) - 
Expectation of stable prices (soy 
and rapeseed) 
-0.595** (0.227) -0.569** (0.227) 
Expectation of decreasing prices 
(soy and rapeseed oil) 
-0.663** (0.276) -0.607** (0.266) 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 shows the marginal effects of the attributes and the corresponding WTA estimates 
based on the parsimonious model. An increase in the price premium by one eurocent per kilo-
gram of milk raises the likelihood of adoption by 29 percentage points. Surprisingly, farmers 
don’t like the idea of the dairy company organizing the purchasing of GM-free protein feed on 
their behalf (“DAIRY_PROC”): this option lowers the acceptance probability by 20 percent-
age points, and a milk price increment of 0.69 eurocent per kilogram is required to offset this 
effect. The negative marginal effects for the audit options and technical support measures 
highlight the respondents’ refusal of any form of external intervention. Prescribing audits by 
an external organization requires a price increment of around 0.42 eurocent per kilogram 
milk. Free one-off advice from the dairy company during the conversion period 
(“DAIRY_ADV”) requires a mark-up of 1.11 eurocent; more frequent advice 
(“PLUS_ADV”), which includes technical assistance on feeding regimes and separation of 
production lines, is even more expensive (1.12 eurocent per kilogram), although the service 
would be offered for free. There are, however, large differences in respondents’ receptiveness 
to technical support: farmers who already take advice assign a positive value to the service. 
The coefficient of the two interaction terms show that for those farmers the mark-up can be 
lowered by around 0.40 eurocent per kilogram milk if free advice is provided.  
Socio-economic and farm variables also impact the likelihood of adoption. Younger farmers 
(below 35) and better educated farmers (with vocational training or degree) request on aver-
age higher mark-ups than older and less well trained colleagues. A first hint at regional differ-
ences is given by the highly significant coefficient of the “region” variable. A discrete change 
from zero (Bavaria) to one (Schleswig-Holstein) raises the probability of acceptance by 36 
percentage points and lowers the mark-up on the milk price by 1.22 eurocent. The marginal 
effect of “herd size” is positive but quite low, as are the negative effects of the feeding varia-
bles “Forage Prod” and “Corn Sil”. An increase in herd size by ten cows would raise the ac-
ceptance probability by 2 percentage points. For farmers who find it difficult to convert to 
GM-free production due to a high share of SEG request an extra 0.65 eurocent per kilogram.  
The attitudinal variables have a notable impact on adoption behavior: farmers who are strong-
ly concerned about the impact of GM soy cultivation request 0.84 eurocent less price premi-
um. Farmers who believe that prices of soy and oilseed will rise require 0.47 eurocent more. 
Likewise, respondents who are critical of the market success of GM-free milk request a pre-
mium of 0.55 eurocent. 
28
2 Farmers’ valuation of incentives to produce GM -free milk: insights from a DCE in Germany 
29 
 
Table 2.5 Marginal effects on the probability of adoption for whole sample  
 
Parsimonious estimation 
N = 151 
  
 Variables Marginal effect 
WTA[€cent/kilogram] 
confidence interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
P
ro
d
u
ctio
n
 S
ch
em
e A
ttrib
u
tes x
 
PREMIUM (change +1 ct/kilogram) 0.294*** - 
DAIRY_PROC -0.203*** 
0.691 
(0.422; 0.959) 
DAIRY_CONT 0.062** 
-0.210 
(-0.458; -0.038) 
EXT_AUD -0.123*** 
0.417 
(0.182; 0.653) 
NO_ADV -0.298*** 
1.017 
(0.524; 1.510) 
DAIRY_ADV 
 
-0.324*** 
1.105 
(0.545; 1.665) 
PLUS_ADV  
 
-0.329*** 
1.122 
(0.573; 1.670) 
DAIRY_ADV x advised farms 
 
0.118** 
-0.403 
(-0.832; 0,026) 
PLUS_ADV x  advised farms 
 
0.121** 
-0.412 
(-0.830; 0.007) 
S
o
cio
-eco
n
o
m
ic v
ariab
les  
an
d
 farm
 ch
aracteristics z
 
Young 
 
-0.133** 
0.453 
(0.112; 0.794) 
High Edu 
 
-0.135*** 
0.461 
(0.92; 0.729) 
Grassland 
 
-0.004*** 
0.013 
(0.005; 0.020) 
Region 
 
0.358*** 
-1.220 
(-1.749; -0.691) 
Herd size 
 
0.002*** 
-0.006 
(-0.108; 0.095) 
Forage Prod 
 
-0.006*** 
0.021 
(0.009; 0.032) 
Corn Sil 
 
-0.003** 
0.009 
(-0.157; 0.174) 
Feeding SEG  -0.189*** 
0.645 
(0.276; 1.013) 
Conc_Purch -0.270*** 
0.919 
(0.463; 1.375) 
A
ttitu
d
in
al v
ariab
les 
z 
Negative impact of GMO***  
0.248*** 
-0.843 
(-1.133; -0.553) 
Expectation of stable prices (soy and oilseed 
rape)** 
 
-0.147* 
0.471 
(0.086; 0.851) 
Expectation of decreasing prices (soy and 
oilseed rape)** 
 
-0.138** 
0.500 
(0.045; 0.955) 
Consumers’ WTP is positive***  
0.162*** 
-0.553 
(-0.882; -0.223) 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To account for regional effects, marginal effects and WTA estimates have been derived for 
the subsets of farmers in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein (Table 2.6). It is clear from the table 
that the Bavarian farmers are more responsive to changes in the premium. An increase by one 
eurocent per kilogram milk raises the probability of adoption by 46 percentage points among 
the Bavarian respondents and by only 26 percentage points among farmers from Schleswig-
Holstein. Marked differences also exist with respect to feed procurement. Farmer self-
procurement has a negative impact on adoption and leads to a higher compensation require-
ment (+0.83 eurocent) in the Bavarian sample, whereas the option is valued positively by 
Schleswig-Holstein farmers (mark-up lowered by 0.49 eurocent). An opposing effect was also 
found for the provision of a list of suppliers for GM-free feed. This type of support decreases 
the likelihood of acceptance in the Bavarian sample but increases it in the sample from 
Schleswig-Holstein. If the dairy company demands external audits by a certifier agency, this 
must be “bought” at a price of 0.43 eurocent from the Bavarian farmers, whereas the variable 
is not significant in the Schleswig-Holstein sample. Feed monitoring offered by the dairy 
company is valued positively in both samples, lowering the necessary mark-up by 0.32 euro-
cent in the Bavarian sample and by 0.55 eurocent among farmers from Northern Germany.  
Regional differences are also detected for the effects of socio-economic variables. Better edu-
cated farmers from Bavaria require a price increment of 1.09 eurocent compared to only 0.41 
eurocent for farmers from Schleswig-Holstein. A high share of SEG in the ration is only sig-
nificant in the Bavarian sample.  
The attitudinal variables have the same sign in both samples. The magnitude of the effects is 
also similar except for farmers’ expectations of decreasing prices for GM soy and oilseed 
rape, which lower the adoption probability in Schleswig-Holstein but are not significant in 
Bavaria. Farmers who are critical of GM soy cultivation request less compensation. In the 
Bavarian sample the required premium is about two times lower than that for Schleswig-
Holstein.  
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Table 2.6 Marginal effects on the probability of adoption by region  
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Parsimonious estimation 
N = 151 
Bavaria (N = 57) Schleswig-Holstein (N = 94) 
Variables Marginal effect 
 
WTA 
[€cent/kilogram] 
confidence interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
 
Marginal effect 
 
WTA 
[€cent/kilogram] 
confidence interval  
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
 
P
ro
d
u
ctio
n
 S
ch
em
e A
ttrib
u
tes x
 
PREMIUM  
 
0.459*** - 0.258*** - 
SELF_PROC -0.381*** 
0.831 
(0.133; 1.795) 
0.126** 
-0.489 
(-0.823; -0.154) 
DAIRY_PROC -0.472*** 
1.028 
(0.247; 1.810) 
- - 
LIST -0.392*** 
0.854 
(0.072; 1.636) 
0.272*** 
-1.056 
(-1.753; -0.358) 
DOCU - - 0.085* 
-0.330 
(-0.688; 0.028) 
DAIRY_CONT 0.145** 
-0.317 
(-0.636; 0.002) 
0.142** 
-0.549 
(-0.942; -0.157) 
EXT_AUD -0.198*** 
0.431 
(0.135; 0.727) 
- - 
S
o
cio
-eco
n
o
m
ic v
ariab
les 
an
d
 farm
 ch
aracteristics z 
Young 
-0.253** 
0.550 
(-0.020; 1.120) 
-0.128** 
0.497 
(-1.237; 2.231) 
High Edu 
-0.500*** 
1.088 
(0.585; 1.592) 
-0.105** 
0.408 
(-1.114; 1.931) 
Grassland -0.010** 
 
0.022 
(0.005; 0.039) 
-0.004** 
0.014 
(-0.021; 0.049) 
Feeding SEG  
-0.387*** 
0.843 
(0.368; 1.318) 
- - 
Conc_Purch 
- - 0.424*** 
1.641 
(-0,450; 3,733) 
A
ttitu
d
in
al v
ariab
les z 
Negative impact 
of GMO 0.193*** 
-0.421 
(-0.839; -0.002) 
0.229*** 
-0.886 
(-2.344; 0.572) 
Expectation of 
stable prices  0.362*** 
-0.788 
(-1.345; -0.231) 
0.342*** 
-1.122 
(-1.562;-0.683) 
Expectation of 
decreasing prices  - - -0.266** 
1.032 
(-1.432; 3.496) 
Consumers’ WTP 
is positive 0.412*** 
-0.898 
(-1.286; -0.510) 
0.246*** 
-0.955 
(-2.834; 0.924) 
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Latent Class estimation 
To account for heterogeneous preferences among respondents we estimated a latent class 
(LC) model which allows parameter estimates to vary among different classes of respondents 
(Train 2003). The LC assumes a finite number of latent structures underlying the data and 
classifies the sample into groups taking the estimated class membership for each farmer into 
account.  The optimal number of classes is determined ex ante, based on goodness of fit 
measures (Train 2008). For the model with seven attributes and eleven membership variables, 
two classes revealed the best data fit. Table 2.7 presents the results.  
Table 2.7 Results from the LC estimation 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The average membership probability of class 1 is 43.8% and that of class 2 is 56.2%. The 
average probability of accepting the GM-free production scheme for famers in class 2 is 43% 
and in class 1 only 4.9%. We thus term class 2 members “adopters” and members of class 1 
“non-adopters”. As can be seen from the WTA estimates, the “non-adopters” request prohibi-
tively high compensation for accepting technical assistance in the form of advice. The corre-
sponding variables for the “adopters” are not significant, except for the “ADV_PLUS” varia-
ble, indicating that those who, in principle, are willing to convert are also receptive to accept 
technical assistance. As one would expect from the estimation results in Table 2.6, farmers 
N = 151 
Average membership probability: 
Class 1 
“Non-adopters” 
43.8% 
Class 2 
“Adopters” 
56.2% 
Variables 
WTA[€cent/kilogram] 
confidence interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
WTA[€cent/kilogram] 
confidence interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
DAIRY_PROC 
0.444* 
(-0.074; 0.961) 
0.778*** 
(0.450; 1.107) 
DAIRY_CONTR 
-0.336* 
(-0.815; 0.144) 
-0.273* 
(-0.618; 0.073) 
EXT_AUD 
0.181 
(0.771; 0.802) 
0.537*** 
(0.264; 0.809) 
NO_ADV 
2.709*** 
(2.221; 3.196) 
0.136 
(-0.371; 0.643) 
DAIRY_ADV 
2.749*** 
(2.178; 3.321) 
0.793 
(0.414; 1.173) 
PLUS_ADV 
2.969*** 
(2.270; 3.668) 
-0,021* 
(-0.486; 0.444) 
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from Bavaria are more likely to be members of the class of “non-adopters”. Moreover, farm-
ers with a less negative attitude towards cultivation of GM soy and those who are less con-
vinced of existing consumer demand are more likely to be in the class of “non-adopters”. A 
comparison of the latent class estimation results and the calculated WTA from the conditional 
logit (CL) models reveals similarities – evidence for the robustness of results.  
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper set out to investigate farmers’ willingness to accept a GM-free milk production 
scheme. Similar schemes are being launched by a number of German dairy companies in re-
sponse to increasing consumer demand for milk produced without GM feeds. A DCE was 
carried out to explore dairy farmers’ likely responses to alternative contractual requirements 
and incentives. The empirical analysis covered the two main milk production regions of Ger-
many: Bavaria in the south and Schleswig-Holstein in the north.  
Our findings are largely consistent with those of Schulz (2013, unpublished work) who inves-
tigated dairy farmers’ acceptance of contract requirements including a ban on GM feed. They 
calculated a compensation price of 0.77 eurocent for banning GM feed from dairy cow ra-
tions. Our analysis yielded an estimate of 0.80 eurocent on average. Our estimates of the nec-
essary mark-up for farms feeding soy extraction grist also accord with those of Schulz (2013, 
unpublished work): 0.65 eurocent in our study and 0.65 eurocent in Schulz. 
The findings of the present study reveal a potential willingness to adopt GM-free milk pro-
duction among dairy farmers. This is slightly higher in the northern part of Germany with its 
favorable farm structures and natural circumstances. The latent class estimations, however, 
revealed large differences in farmers’ preferences. Just over half of the respondents were clas-
sified as potential “adopters”, willing to consider trade-offs between stricter production re-
quirements and higher price premiums. The remaining 44 per cent appear to be resistant to the 
range of incentives offered in the experiment.  
Besides the price premium on offer, monitoring of feed samples and free advice are positively 
valued by potential adopters. Offering reliable feedstuff monitoring to assure that the feed is 
actually free from GMO is thus likely to be an effective means for dairy companies of entic-
ing farmers into GM-free production schemes. Also, dairy companies are well advised to tar-
get farmers who have been receiving technical advice in other fields: such farmers are more 
receptive to scheme-specific technical assistance and, as a consequence, request lower price 
premiums when free technical advice is offered. However, any interference with the entrepre-
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neurial autonomy of the farmer, be it through pre-arranged feed procurement or prescriptive 
advice on the part of the dairy company, lowers the acceptance of the scheme – a finding in 
agreement with Key (2005) who stresses farmers’ preference for autonomy.  
Although no obvious conclusions can be drawn from the variables representing current feed-
ing regimes, the estimation results confirm that farmers who are more reliant on external feeds 
are less likely to adopt GM-free production. This study has also highlighted the role of “soft” 
factors: farmers’ attitudes towards GM soy cultivation, their assessment of consumer demand 
for GM-free milk and expectations of future concentrate feed prices all have a strong impact 
on adoption. Dairy companies wishing to launch GM-free production schemes should thus 
focus on intensive communication of their marketing strategy as a means of encouraging 
farmer collaboration. Comparison of the estimates for the two regions suggests that dairy 
farmers in northern Germany are, on average, more likely to convert to GM-free production; 
however, farmers in Bavaria are ceteris paribus more responsive to an increase in the price 
premium offered. With the exception of feed monitoring, all other attributes of technical sup-
port turned out to lower adoption probabilities, indicating a strong preference for monetary 
incentives among respondents.  
While this paper offers first insights into likely responses of dairy farmers to alternative pro-
duction requirements and financial incentives, more research is needed to derive more com-
prehensive conclusions. Non-monetary motives and socio-economic factors such as commu-
nication and interaction among farmers in social networks are likely to affect adoption behav-
ior as shown by Läpple and Kelley (2015) for the adoption of organic farming. We leave this 
for future research.   
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Abstract 
Choice experiments about a hypothetical farm animal welfare (FAW) program were presented 
to a sample of randomly selected German dairy farmers. Based on the theory of social interac-
tions, it was hypothesized that the probability of participating in the program would increase 
with i) the ease of implementing program attributes on the farm, ii) perceived use values such 
as increased milk yield, and iii) stated levels of non-use existence values derived from im-
proved animal welfare conditions and extrinsically motivated non-use values from enhanced 
prestige among relevant peer groups. It was found that non-use existence values were nega-
tively related to program acceptance because relatively high personal standards may not be in 
line with the program design and may make the program seem unnecessary. In addition, the 
intention of enhancing public acceptance of dairy farming appeared to have an influence on 
some farmers’ willingness to accept the program, which can be explained by the relevance of 
social interactions among peers in the context of farmers’ provision of FAW.  
 
Keywords: farm animal welfare, choice experiments, random parameter logit model, non-use 
values, social interactions  
JEL classification: Q12, Q18, Q19, C49 
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3.1 Introduction  
It is commonly assumed that farmers raise farm animals in order to maximize profits. Lusk 
and Norwood (2011) argue in this context that profit-maximizing choices of input and output 
levels are most likely different from the corresponding levels that would maximize farm ani-
mal welfare. Furthermore, larger and more professional farms are widely believed to provide 
ceteris paribus lower levels of farm animal welfare (FAW) than smaller and more traditional 
farms because economic optimization would not leave room for ethical or other potential non-
monetary values related to how animals are treated (Fraser 2005; Burton et al. 2012). 
While questions of consumers’ willingness to pay for FAW (Lagerkvist and Hess 2011) and 
related public and private policy issues (Ingenbleek et al. 2012) are attracting increasing atten-
tion within the scientific literature, only a limited set of studies has begun to analyze the role 
that farmers’ personal evaluations of FAW may play here: it is commonly assumed that the 
provision of FAW is subject to a farmer’s profit-maximizing objective. However, little is 
known about how the decision to provide FAW may enter a farmer’s utility function (Lager-
kvist et al. 2011). Austin et al. (2005) aimed to shed light on the link between a farmer’s per-
sonality and attitude and the implementation of good welfare practices. They developed a 
welfare attitude scale to measure farmers’ attitudes towards animal welfare and tested it em-
pirically with both farmers and agriculture students. From this they identify two superordinate 
dimensions in the two groups: welfare and business orientation. Bock and van Huik (2007) 
investigated pig farmers’ acceptance of different types of animal welfare schemes and identify 
two groups of farmers: one group describing animal welfare mainly in terms of health and 
considering it important for economic outcomes, and another group of farmers that relates 
animal welfare to the possibility of expressing natural behavior. Bock and van Huik (2007) 
report that the latter group views the enhancement of animals’ wellbeing as a moral obliga-
tion. Members of the second group participate in specific FAW schemes or organic farming 
and are in favor of stricter regulations in future. Bock and van Huik (2007) conclude that 
farmers’ attitudes towards FAW are neither a result of ethical concern nor driven by compas-
sion for animals alone, but have to be seen in the broader context of their farms’ business ob-
jectives. Vanhonacker et al. (2008) find a heterogeneous set of farmers’ interests influencing 
their perceptions of FAW: while some are more economically driven, others are, in addition 
to their profit-maximizing objectives, also interested in supplying high quality products, hav-
ing a satisfying job and establishing a more positive image of their profession among the pub-
lic.  
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McInerney (2004) proposes that economic analyses of FAW provision should consider not 
only productivity-related use values, but non-use values as well. Lagerkvist et al. (2011) iden-
tify in this respect key elements that determine farmers’ preferences for use and non-use val-
ues related to FAW, emphasizing the importance of taking into account the trade-off between 
use and non-use values when explaining the level of FAW provided by farmers. Based on the 
theory of planned behavior, they hypothesize that producers’ beliefs concerning the attributes 
associated with FAW govern their decision-making, aiming to maximize their utility. From 
this perspective, higher levels of FAW may result in improved productivity and the better 
health status of animals, thereby affecting costs of production. However, Lagerkvist et al. 
(2011) do not provide an empirical test for their conceptual framework in which FAW-related 
non-use values enter the simultaneous production and consumption decision of a household 
production framework. Hansson and Lagerkvist (2015) conducted in-depth qualitative inter-
views with Swedish dairy farmers. The element “animals feel good” is mentioned 228 times 
and thus is by far the most commonly used element, together with identified values such as 
“avoidance of suffering”, “continue business”, “ethics”, “doing the right thing”, “animals eat-
ing properly”, and “work environment”, which the authors relate to “existence non-use val-
ues”. In addition, they find the elements “impression on others” and “product quality” to be 
representations of paternalistic-altruism-related non-use values (terminology as in Lagerkvist 
et al. 2011). 
The aim of the present paper was to undertake further analysis of the potential role of non-use 
values in farmers’ decisions to provide FAW and, more formally, use a discrete choice exper-
iment (DCE) about the decision to adopt a voluntary FAW program in dairy farming.  
The DCE method is well suited to determining and quantifying factors that may influence 
farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) a certain FAW standard, represented by the hypothet-
ical program described by a bundle of requirements. In addition, the study had a practical pol-
icy implication because several European dairy companies have recently begun to work to-
wards implementing private sector FAW program that would go beyond the basic legal regu-
lations concerning animal protection. These dairy companies are interested in implementing 
animal welfare schemes and rewarding those milk suppliers who comply by means of a com-
pensatory premium on milk price. 
Section 3.2 establishes a conceptual framework based on the theory of social interactions. It is 
argued that this theory based on a household production model is more appropriate for gener-
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ating empirically testable hypotheses than the household production framework outlined in 
Lagerkvist et al. (2011). It is then demonstrated how the hypotheses derived from the general 
theoretical framework could be tested using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). Section 3.3 
then presents the empirical implementation based on a sample of German dairy farmers. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the data and estimation results from a random parameter (RPL) logit model 
and Section 3.5 discusses key findings and finally concludes with a perspective on future re-
search and policy recommendations.  
3.2 Conceptual framework 
Integrating production decisions and non-use values 
The theory of social interactions (Becker 1974) is a widely-used household production 
framework that, to the authors’ knowledge, has never before been applied to farmers’ choices 
of a FAW program. The theoretical framework is based on the farm household’s (i) utility 
function 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚), in which utility is a function of the consumption of different 
goods Z. These goods are partly produced by the household itself, for instance a farm house-
hold may produce milk output 𝑍𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 using dairy cows and other marketable inputs (summa-
rized in the milk-specific vector 𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘), according to the following farm i-specific production 
function: 
(3.1)  𝑍𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 , 𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑖  ;  𝐸𝑖 , 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
1 , … , 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑟  )  
Equation 3.1 says that farm household i will produce its milk output according to marketable 
inputs 𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘) and its available time t. Becker (1974) shows how time used in the production 
process of one output such as milk has to be valued against its household specific opportunity 
cost, for example from working off-farm or from the consumption of leisure time. Further-
more, following Becker (1974), it was assumed here that this production process is governed 
by two further vectors that cannot be treated as fully exogenous to the decision-making pro-
cess: vector E is commonly used to describe “environmental variables” such as education, 
religion or other characteristics that may influence the way in which X and t are combined to 
produce Z
2
. In the context of FAW, following the terminology proposed by Lagerkvist et al. 
(2011), E is interpreted as a vector of farm household-specific non-use existence values. Such 
values may refer to the farmers’ utility derived from their evaluation associated with the per-
                                                 
2
 Within the framework of stochastic frontier-based analysis of the technical efficiency of production process-
es, such environmental variables are typically modelled as shifting the level of technical inefficiency. 
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ceived knowledge that the “animal feels good” (Hansson and Lagerkvist 2015). Different lev-
els of E among different farm households may lead to different choices of inputs X and t, such 
that different output levels are achieved. Thus when substituting Z in the utility function by 
the different production processes, such as the one outlined in equation 3.1, it becomes evi-
dent that the level of E affects utility directly, but also indirectly through its effect on market-
able milk output 𝑍𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘.  
While the level of the existence non-use values E is assumed here to be a static factor affect-
ing production technology, Becker (1974) explains that the role of the variables 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑟  is more 
subtle: these variables describe the characteristics of other persons outside the farm house-
hold, and their characteristics may affect the choice of output level 𝑍𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘. This happens 
through the assumption that household i can partly influence these characteristics through 
their own effort h (= forgone income) such that 
(3.2)  𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑟 = 𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + ℎ𝑖  
Equation 3.2 breaks down the characteristics of other members of the society into an exoge-
nous part 𝐷𝑖
𝑟, e.g. the existing level of public appreciation of the farm household’s state of 
FAW, or the existing level of knowledge and opinion that other farmers (or members of the 
administration who check FAW compliance for example) who form a relevant peer group for 
household i may have. In the terminology proposed by Lagerkvist et al. (2011), 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘
𝑟  is inter-
preted as the representation of non-use values related to paternalistic altruism (e.g. household 
i’s utility derived from the opinion that others express about FAW at farm i). 
Becker (1974) provides further derivations and special cases that build on this general theoret-
ical framework and that are now also partly contained in advanced gradient texts on microe-
conomics. For the analysis of non-use values in the context of FAW provision, it is possible 
therefore to proceed directly to a description of the empirical framework that is employed in 
order to measure the potential effect of the two different types of non-use values: E and R. 
Discrete choice experiments related to livestock production 
A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was used to investigate farmers’ willingness to partici-
pate in a FAW program, focusing on influences underlying the required program measures, 
perceived use values (e.g. perceived effects on productivity or production costs) and non-use 
values derived from enhanced animal welfare (existence non-use values, E) and empirical 
approximations to paternalistic-altruistic non-use values R (e.g. peer-group effects). Only a 
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few DCE studies deal with the valuation of programs or contracts that impose changes on 
farmers’ production practices. For example Roe et al. (2004) investigated pig producers’ pref-
erences for risk-shifting marketing contracts varying in pricing, a quality premium, contract 
length, minimum volume delivery requirements and ledger provisions. Besides other results, 
they show that contract elements that constrain the producer, e.g. delivery requirements, are 
less preferred. Norwood et al. (2006) present information on cattle producers’ acceptance of 
voluntary checkoff programs. The term checkoff refers to a producer-funded marketing pro-
gram including commodity promotion, research, and consumer information (Cattlemen’s Beef 
Board 2015). They designed a beef checkoff assessing a fee for each head of cattle sold that 
would be refunded upon request, while remaining funds would be spent on advertising, pro-
motion or research. Participation in such checkoff programs depends on the actual refund 
mechanism in place. Calf producers’ acceptance of voluntary traceability systems is strongly 
influenced by the price premium per head, whether the program is introduced by the govern-
ment or by private industry, and additional information required, e.g. information about pro-
duction practices, performance or genetics (Schulz and Tonsor 2010). In a study on milk pro-
ducers’ welfare impacts of removing the use of rbST3 from the set of production technologies, 
Olynk et al. (2012) find that significant welfare losses occur even for differentiated samples 
regarding the herd size and in those cases where farmers have used rbST before. They con-
clude that there has to be adequate compensation for forced disadoption of production tech-
nologies in order to avoid farmers giving up milk production altogether.   
Participation in programs or production schemes or the producers’ willingness to sign a con-
tract are plausibly affected by the amount of additional effort and costs that the implementa-
tion will cause, but Key (2005) shows that farmers’ preference for autonomy also plays a sig-
nificant role in decision-making. Retaining autonomy as regards the decision to provide a 
certain level of FAW could also provide another dimension of existence non-use values. The 
review of DCE-based results may indicate that this component of farmers’ preferences can be 
identified within the context of DCE in particular and may therefore not have been among the 
set of existence values described by the qualitative interview approach in Hansson and Lager-
kvist (2015), for example. 
  
                                                 
3
  Recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) is a hormone applied to dairy cows aiming at increasing milk 
yields. 
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A compilation of insights from the theory of social interactions and the review of empirical 
DCE-based literature of farmers’ program adoption decisions led to the following hypotheses:  
H1: The higher the mark-up on the milk price paid for compliance with a new FAW program, 
the higher the likelihood of acceptance. 
This hypothesis is plausible because a higher milk output price will ceteris paribus lead to 
higher profits from milk production and thus to potential utility gains for the farm household. 
However, this higher milk price has to be assessed against the potential cost of adopting the 
FAW program. In this context, it is important to understand that for farmers the consequences 
of implementing measures to boost FAW are often not entirely predictable. Economic factors 
such as milk yield, milk quality and productive life span might be affected. Additionally, such 
measures might impose costs in terms of increasing production costs and the amount of work 
(for example if pasturing is required) or the opposite of the intended effect (e.g. reduced costs 
of veterinary treatments). The farmer decides whether or not to accept the program bearing in 
mind this trade-off between use values and animal wellbeing. 
H2: The easier it is to implement the measures of the FAW program, the more likely it is that 
the farmer will accept the program. 
Farmers’ acceptance is governed by the amount of utility they derive from a FAW program. 
Besides changes in use values, changes in non-use values due to enhanced animal welfare 
might also affect their adoption behavior.  
H3: The higher the perceived use values (UV) of the new FAW program, the higher the likeli-
hood of acceptance. 
Concerning the practicability of FAW program requirements (pasture grazing, requirements 
of space for animals etc.) due to differences in farm structure, relative implementation costs 
may vary and therefore it is hypothesized that:   
H4: The higher the farmer values program attributes associated with perceived animal well-
being (non-use existence values, NUV), the more likely it is that the farmer will accept a pro-
duction scheme. 
Examples of farmers’ non-use existence values 𝐸 related to the wellbeing of dairy cows are 
described in Hansson and Lagerkvist (2015). Similarly, Austin et al. (2005) developed empir-
ical measures to identify farmers who derive value from the wellbeing of dairy cows. Farmers 
were asked if they regularly check their animals even when there are no health problems, if 
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they consider costs before calling the veterinarian to a sick animal and if they place any im-
portance on the cows’ ability to perform their natural behavior. These measures are used in 
order to approximate the otherwise unobservable non-use existence values 𝐸. 
H5: The more social interaction the farmer has with other peers on FAW issues, the more 
likely it is that the program will be accepted. 
Interaction with other peers is measured in terms of interactions with other farmers about 
FAW issues, but also in terms of contact with farm advisory services. In this context 
Gunnesch-Luca et al. (2010) investigated the role of trendsetting for the adoption of agricul-
tural innovations. Trendsetters are those who intensively adapt information on innovations 
and like to pass on and explain that information to others, therefore positively influencing the 
diffusion of innovations (Gailhard et al. 2012). Farmers who share information on FAW with 
their social network and/or peer group and furthermore participate in events related to FAW 
are assumed to be more likely to accept a FAW program than farmers who do not. 
3.3 Empirical implementation 
DCE is a common tool to reveal determinants of farmers’ adoption behavior and allow the 
amount of monetary compensation necessary to encourage participation in a scheme to be 
derived. This study aimed to reveal ex ante farmers’ willingness to participate in a farm ani-
mal welfare (FAW) scheme in dairy farming. The empirical analysis in this study was based 
on primary data collected at an international trade fair for animal production in Hannover, 
Germany (EuroTier) in November 2014 using a paper-based questionnaire.  
As Europe’s most important milk producer, Germany faces challenges due to concentration 
processes leading to growing herd sizes on a diminishing number of farms (BMELV 2014). 
Partly due to this rapid structural change, there is much debate within the sector surrounding 
animal welfare in livestock farming: dairy farms are increasingly perceived as large commer-
cial enterprises, potentially with adverse effects on FAW. For these reasons, Germany is a 
relevant country for the implementation of DCE addressing FAW programs. 
Prior to the actual DCE survey, the questionnaire and the choice experiment in particular were 
pre-tested using a sample of 15 dairy farmers to ensure the comprehensibility of the questions 
and the choice task. A total of 126 dairy farmers completed the questionnaire at the fair, but 
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only 78 farmers
4
 answered all the questions. Participants were first asked whether they were 
milk producers and then were informed about the motivation and purpose of the study. The 
questionnaire comprised four sections. The first section addressed general attitudes towards 
farm animal welfare, including items to measure the relationship with their animals and a 
profit motivation (explained in detail in 3.2). In the second section, after providing infor-
mation about the requirements of a hypothetical FAW scheme, four choice sets were present-
ed and farmers were asked to indicate which scheme they would implement on their own 
farm.  
To obtain a better understanding of the farmers’ views on animal welfare in dairy cattle man-
agement, semi-structured interviews with four dairy farmers were undertaken prior to data 
collection. An analysis of transcripts revealed that farmers strongly associated animal welfare 
with the health status of their livestock and that a good health status depended mainly on the 
housing conditions and space available. A cubicle barn with freedom to move was stated as a 
suitable housing system for sustaining the animals’ wellbeing. Interestingly, all the farmers 
interviewed said that they attached great importance to their animals’ wellbeing for reasons 
other than higher productivity. Although the interviewees could not specify these reasons, 
they described them as: “getting a good feeling from treating them (the animals) well”, “if 
your animals are sick, you can’t be happy”, “seeing cows in a poor condition has a negative 
effect on enjoyment at work”. These statements appear similar to those in Hansson and La-
gerkvist (2015) and indicate the potential importance of dairy farmers’ non-use values in rela-
tion to FAW. 
  
                                                 
4
  Garrod and Willis (1998) analyzed choice data obtained from a survey of 73 local respondents about their 
willingness to pay for a reduced impact from landfill waste. 
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The choice experiment 
Based on insights obtained from the interviews, cubicle barns of varying sizes (ranging from 
4.5 m
2
 to 5.5 m
2
 with an animal-feeding place ratio of 1:1.2) were selected as an attribute for 
the FAW. Since access to pasture is socially desirable and some consumer groups show a pos-
itive willingness to pay (Olynk et al. 2010; Weinrich et al. 2014), some European dairy com-
panies (for example Arla Foods and Friesland Campina) are responding to this demand with 
pasture-based programs. In accordance with information obtained from the marketing manag-
er of a German dairy company, access to pasture was chosen as a relevant attribute for a FAW 
program. Additionally, somatic cell count limits of 125,000 cells 10
3
 per mg and 150,000 
cells 10
3
 per mg and a required veterinary check once or twice a year were included as 
measures. Since the FAW scheme in this hypothetical setting was being introduced by a dairy 
company, a price premium was added on the standard milk price (between 1.0 and 2.0 euro 
cents per kg milk) as an incentive to encourage farmers’ acceptance.  
After selecting attributes and corresponding levels, an orthogonal fractional design was gen-
erated by means of SPSS comprising 24 choice sets out of all the possible combinations of 
attributes and corresponding levels. The D-efficiency value was 99.29 – sufficiently close to 
the maximum value of 100 for a perfectly orthogonal and balanced design (Kuhfeld et al. 
1994). In order to make the number of choice tasks manageable for farmers, the sets were 
blocked into six versions, with four choice sets in each block. Each choice set encompassed 
two FAW schemes and an opt-out representing non-participation. Due to the voluntary nature 
of the scheme, the inclusion of such opt-outs was deemed realistic. Table 3.1 shows a typical 
choice set presented to the farmers. 
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Table 3.1 Example of a Choice Set 
 
Further determinants of FAW program acceptance by the farmers were measured as follows: 
Business orientation 
Productivity and welfare objects can be in conflict with one another and challenge farmers on 
the one hand to deliver higher FAW to meet societal and governmental expectations and on 
the other to maintain profitability in order to stay in business. Different strategies to cope with 
this conflict depend on individual differences in farmers’ welfare attitudes.  
Based on the approach of Austin et al. (2005), the farmers’ business orientation reflecting an 
attitude that views farm animals mainly as a means for doing business was added. Items 25, 
26, 27 and 28 listed in Table 3.3 were used to measure business orientation.   
The role of paternalistic-altruistic non-use values 
In order to develop empirical measures for variables that relate to social interaction and that 
may influence the farmers’ decision to adopt a hypothetical FAW program, communication 
behavior was measured in terms of information sharing among peers and participation in 
FAW-related information events. To reduce the complexity of data and identify a business 
orientation as well as an indicator of communicative behavior, PCA was employed. With an 
eigenvalue of 1 as the cut-off criterion, two factors with sufficient values of Cronbach’s Alpha 
(measuring scale reliability) were identified. Table 3.2 reports the results of the PCA includ-
ing factor loadings and share of variance explained by the factors. 
Attributes 
 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Opt-out 
Outdoor system Yard 
Access to pasture 120 
days per year 
No FAW program 
Housing system 
5.0 square meters per 
animal 
5.5 square meters per 
animal and animal-
feeding place ratio of 
1:1.2 
Somatic cell count 
(10
3
 per milligram) 
< 125,000 No requirements 
Veterinary check Twice a year Once a year 
Premium on standard milk price 
(euro cents per kilogram) 
 
2.0 1.5 
I choose: □ □ □ 
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Table 3.2 Results of the PCA 
N = 78 
Construct 
Factor loading 
Business orientation 
 (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.64; % of variance explained=24.5) 
 
High milk yield = AW 0.63 
Public opinion 0.53 
Productivity 0.82 
Profit 0.73 
Communication behavior 
 (Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.65; % of variance explained = 19.8) 
 
Information sharing 0.86 
Participation in events 0.83 
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3.4 Data and descriptive results 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics of respondents  
N = 78     
No. Variable Mean (SD) Min Max Explanation 
1 Milk yield 8945.5 (145.3) 6000 11500 Average milk yield in kilograms per cow per 
year 
2 Herd size 149 (20) 8 1300 Number of dairy cows 
  Absolute values    
3 Small herd size 16   Number of farms with a herd size ≤ 50 cows 
5 Large herd size 45   Number of farms with a herd size ≥ 100 cows 
6 Region     
        North 36   Farm is located in the northern part of Germa-
ny 
        East          2   Farm is located in the eastern part of Germany 
        South 14   Farm is located in the southern part of Germa-
ny 
        West 20   Farm is located in the western part of Germa-
ny 
        Foreign countries 3   Farm is located abroad 
 Dummy variables (1= 
yes) 
Proportion of 
affirmative re-
sponse (SD) 
Min Max Explanation 
7 Farm manager 61% (5%)   Respondent is a farm manager 
8 Cooperative 63% (5%)   Farmer is a member of a cooperative 
9 Advice 91% (3%)   Farmer employs an advisory service 
10 Successor 52% (6%)   Farm has a successor 
11 Quality management 91% (3%)   Participation in quality management system 
12 Very low somatic cell 
count (SSC) 
31% (5%)   < 150,000 cells per milligram 
13 Low somatic cell count 
(SSC) 
43% (6%)   150-200,000 cells per milligram 
14 High share of income 
from milk production 
56% (6%)   Income from milk production is >70 % 
15 Low share of income 
from milk production 
8% (3%)   Income from milk production is < 50 % 
16 Paddock 16   Farm has a paddock for cows 
  Mean: 3.6 1 7 Item: how easy or hard is it to implement a 
paddock within the next year?
5
 
17 Pasture 35   Farm has grassland for pasturing 
  Mean: 2.7 1 7 Item: how easy or hard is it to implement 
pasture grazing within the next year?
5
 
18 Cubicle barn 80   Farm has a cubicle barn 
  Mean: 5.2 1 7 Item: how easy or hard is it to implement a 
cubicle barn within the next year?
5
 
19 Animal health monitor-
ing 
42   Management includes health monitoring 
 
  Mean: 5.5   Item: how easy or hard is it to implement 
health monitoring within the next year?
5
 
20 Relative practicability Mean: 3.8 1 7 Total relative practicability
6
 
                                                 
5
  Items are measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very difficult to implement (1) to very easy to 
implement (7), excluding those who have already implemented the required measure. 
6
  Variable 20 was generated by computing the sum score of variables 16, 17, 18 and 19. 
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The summary statistics of respondents were similar to the population of German dairy farm-
ers. The sample average milk yield of 8945.5 kilograms of milk per cow per year was com-
pared with the average milk yield of 7400 kilograms per cow in Germany in 2013. The sam-
ple average herd size of 149 cows per farm was higher than the average herd size of all Ger-
man farms (54 cows per farm, BMELV 2014), however this national average also contained a 
large number of part-time farms or farms that will soon go out of business, such that the sam-
ple average herd size can be viewed to represent the modern, professional German dairy farm 
for which the potential adoption of a voluntary FAW program is most relevant. This indicates 
a sample that is slightly above the statistical average and probably representative of larger, 
more commercially-oriented dairy producers in Germany.  
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
No. Variable Mean (SD) Min Max Explanation 
21 Regular check 6.2 (1.1) 2 7 Item: I check my animal regularly, even when 
there are no health problems.
7
 
22 Natural behavior 6.1 (1.0) 3 7 Item: It is important for animals to be able to 
perform their natural behavior.
7 
23 Sympathy with animal 6.0 (1.0) 4 7 Item: I do not consider costs before calling the 
vet to a sick animal.
7 
24 Non-use values (‘existence’) 18.4 (2.0)   Index of variables 21, 22, 23 (sum score) 
25 High milk yield = AW 5.6 (1.4) 2 7 Item: A high milk yield is an indicator of 
animals’ wellbeing.7 
26 Public opinion 5.5 (1.8) 1 7 Item: Public opinion should not dictate AW 
standards.
7 
27 Productivity 4.9 (1.6) 1 7 Item: Productivity of animals should be a 
farmer’s first priority.7 
28 Profit 3.2 (1.5) 1 6 Item: I think of my stock mainly in terms of 
profit.
7 
29 Business orientation    Factor loadings of items 25, 26, 27 and 28 
30 Information sharing 5.1 (1.4) 2 7 Item: How often do you share information 
about innovations in the field of AW?
8
 
31 Participation in events
 
4.7 (1.5) 1 7 Item: How often do you participate in events 
related to AW?
8 
32 Number of peers for exchange 7 (6) 1 40 Number of peers (family, other farmers) in a 
regular exchange on FAW issues 
33 Communication behavior    Factor loadings items of 30 and 31 
34 Effects on milk yield 3.8 (0.6) 2 5 Effect of all measures on milk yield (1= milk 
yield decreases; 5= milk yield increases) 
35 Effects on milk quality 3.8 (0.6) 2 5 Effect of all measures on milk quality (1= 
milk quality decreases; 5= milk quality in-
creases) 
36 Effects on productive lifespan 4.1 (0.7) 2 5 Effect of all measures on productive lifespan 
(1= productive lifespan decreases; 5= produc-
tive lifespan increases) 
37 Effects on amount of work 2.4 (0.9) 1 5 Effect of all measures on amount of work (1= 
amount of work increases; 5= amount of work 
decreases) 
38 Effects on production costs 2.1 (0.8) 1 4 Effect of all measures on production costs (1= 
production costs are increasing; 5= production 
costs are decreasing) 
39  Use values from program 
implementation 
16.1 (2.7)   Index of variables 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 (sum 
score) 
 
  
                                                 
7
  Items are measured using a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1= fully disagree to 7= fully agree. 
8
  Items are measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1= never to 7= very often. 
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Estimation procedure 
To account for the heterogeneity of FAW preferences among farmers, a random parameter 
(RPL) logit model was estimated that allowed the parameters to vary between individuals and 
to capture different tastes for FAW measures that were required by the cattle welfare scheme. 
In contrast to the standard multinomial logit model, this specification captured heterogeneous 
preferences for FAW program measures arising from different farm and farmer characteris-
tics.  
Based on McFadden’s random utility theory (1974), farmer 𝑛 compares alternatives of FAW 
schemes (j =  1, … , 𝐽) and choses in choice situation 𝑡 the alternative that provides the highest 
utility 𝑗∗. However, utility is a latent, not directly measurable construct; instead, only the re-
quired measures of the FAW scheme and the characteristics of the farmer and the farm are 
observable and enter the model as regressors. The utility expression of the general form is 
therefore: 
(3.3) 𝑈𝑛𝑗∗𝑡 = 𝛼𝐶 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗𝑧𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 
where 𝜃𝑗  is a vector of non-random fixed coefficients multiplied by a set of choice-invariant, 
observable farm and farmer characteristics 𝑧𝑛, e.g. milk yield or perceived non-use values. 
Furthermore,  𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 represents a vector of observed choice-varying attributes of the FAW pro-
gram (such as additional pasture or more frequent veterinary checks) and 𝛽𝑛 the correspond-
ing vector of coefficients to be estimated. In a RPL model, these coefficients are assumed to 
be randomly distributed and varying across farmers following a normal distribution, which is 
a common assumption in random parameter (RPL) logit models, as Louviere et al. (2000) 
demonstrate. 
A constant (𝛼𝐶) capturing the average effect of all unobserved factors associated with the 
FAW program on utility is included in the model specification (Train 2003). Instead of two 
alternative-specific constants corresponding to the FAW programs (alternative 1 and 2) that a 
farmer faces in a choice set, only one generic constant was added to the model because the 
alternatives were exclusively described by their attributes and not by a label. The error term 
𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 was assumed to be independent and identically distributed. In contrast to the standard 
logit model, 𝛽 was allowed to vary among farmers with density 𝑓(𝛽𝑛|𝛾) to capture taste het-
erogeneity. By estimating the population parameters  𝛾, which describe the distribution of 
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individual parameters (e.g. mean and covariance of the estimated coefficients), individual 
preferences can be described (Hensher and Greene 2003). 
The probability P that farmer 𝑛 will select from the available choice sets the utility-
maximizing FAW scheme 𝑗∗ can be written as: 
 (3.4)  
𝑃𝑛𝑗∗𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼𝐴𝑆𝐶 + 𝜃𝑗∗𝑧𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑗∗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗∗𝑡 ≥  𝛼𝐴𝑆𝐶 + 𝜃𝑗𝑧𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡) ∀ 𝑗
∗ ≠ 𝑗 
 
Although individuals were being observed over a sequence of choices, the random parameters 
were considered to be constant for each farmer. This implied that preferences varied across 
choices, but that an individual’s preferences could not vary across repeated choice situations. 
Given that the individual 𝛽𝑛 was unknown, the unconditional probability had to be calculated 
as the integral of the conditional probability over all possible values of 𝛽𝑛: 
 (3.5) 𝑃𝑛𝑗∗𝑡(𝛾) = ∫ 𝑃𝑛𝑗𝑡 (𝛽𝑛)𝑓(𝛽𝑛|𝛾)𝑑𝛽𝑛 
 
Taking a sequence of choices into account, the probability of farmer 𝑛’s observed choice de-
cisions is the product of standard logits from each choice (Revelt and Train 1998).  
Farm and farmer characteristics were included in the model as interaction terms with the al-
ternative-specific constant to capture the effect on the likelihood of adoption. From the esti-
mated coefficients, willingness to accept (WTA) values could be derived as the ratio of the 
marginal effect of a FAW scheme measure and the marginal effect of the corresponding farm 
gate milk price (𝑝𝑗𝑛). WTA values were computed according to equation 3.6: 
  
(3.6)  𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑛𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥𝑛𝑗 = (
∑
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
∆𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) / (
∑
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
∆𝑝𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) 
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Results 
Results from estimation of the RPL model (equation 3.3) are presented in Table 3.4. Regres-
sors can be distinguished into program attributes X and variables that capture individual char-
acteristics of respondents and their farms Z.  
Table 3.4 Factors affecting farmers’ acceptance of a dairy cattle welfare scheme  
N = 78 
Variable name and number  
Coefficient  
(SD of random 
coefficients) 
WTA 
[€cent/kilogram] 
WTA 
confidence interval
9
 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
P
ro
g
ram
 attrib
u
tes  X
 
Premium on milk price 1.980*   
Part-time pasture  
-3.114** 
(22.638**) 
1.572 (-0.292;  3.437) 
Full-time pasture  
-9.327*** 
(13.732***) 
4.709 0.368; 9.050) 
Housing 5.0  
-1.626 
(6.056***) 
0.821 (-0.367; 2.008) 
Housing 5.5  
-3.583** 
(7.348**) 
1.809 (-0.216; 3.833) 
SSC  125,000 
-9.463*** 
(14.707***) 
4.778 (0.357; 9.199) 
SSC 150,000 
-5.527** 
(10.302***) 
2.791 (0.201; 5.380) 
Veterinary check 1 
0.0436 
(1.831*) 
-0.022 (-0.803; 0.759) 
Veterinary check 2 
1.602 
(14.271***) 
-0.809 (-1.978; 0.360) 
In
d
iv
id
u
al ch
aracteristics o
f resp
o
n
d
en
ts 
an
d
 th
eir farm
s Z
 
1) Milk yield  0.001* -0.001 (-0.0014; 0.0001) 
2) Herd size 0.002 -0.001 (-0.004; 0.002) 
9) Advised farmer 4.467 -2.255 (-5.243; 0.732) 
10) Farmer has successor 0.957 -0.483 (-1.477; 0.510) 
11) Quality assurance scheme 13.257*** -6.694 (-12.543; -0.844) 
20) Relative practicability of implemen-
tation 
-0.388 0.1959 (-0.130; 0.522) 
24) Non-use existence values (NUV) -0.680* 0.343 (-0.053; 0.739) 
29) Business orientation -4.379** 2.211 (0.196; 4.23) 
32) Number of peers for exchange 0.344** -0.173 (-0.341; -0.006) 
33) Communication behavior 1.698* -0.857 (-1.874; 0.159) 
39) Use values (UV) from program 1.692*** -0.854 (-1.616; -0.092) 
Constant 
 
Simulated Log-Likelihood 
AIC
10
 
-41.207** 20.806 (2.916; 38.695) 
-266.43  
 590.85 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Following Hole (2007) the delta method is used to compute accurate confidence intervals. 
10
  The AIC for a CL model was 666.38, indicating a better fit of the RPL specification. 
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Table 3.4 presents estimated regression coefficients with standard deviation for random ef-
fects parameters in parentheses and estimated willingness to accept (WTA). Statistical levels 
of significance are indicated by different “*” (see legend at the bottom of Table 3.4).  
Estimated coefficients on program attributes were plausible overall and reflected the rising 
cost of adopting the various components of the program. The statistically significant standard 
deviation parameters indicated the existence of heterogeneous preferences among farmers. 
This, in turn, gave rise to consideration of the RPL specification as appropriate. As was to be 
expected, a milk price premium for program participation in general also significantly in-
creased the probability of the program being accepted, which implied that there was a failure 
to reject hypothesis H1. A similar effect was indicated by the negative and significant con-
stant that was estimated. This constant had to be interpreted as the average level of rejection 
of any FAW program relative to not subjecting their farm to such a program.  
Furthermore, program components that could be thought of as being more difficult to imple-
ment than others exhibited increasingly negative coefficients and required a higher WTA in 
euro cent additional price per output price of milk. For instance, relative to the status quo of 
no pasture, part-time pasture reduced the probability of accepting the program, and was ac-
cepted if an average price premium of 1.57 euro cents/kg milk output was paid, while full-
time pasture exhibited an even more negative coefficient. Similar findings were obtained for 
increasing levels of space and increasing restrictions on the maximum number of somatic 
cells that could be contained in delivered milk (note that SSC 125,000 is a more restrictive 
measure than SSC 150,000 in this respect, and consequently this was reflected by the estimat-
ed coefficients). Based on these findings, there is a failure to reject hypothesis H2. 
Interestingly, more frequent veterinary check-ups as mandatory elements of a farm animal 
welfare program were associated with increasing willingness to accept the program. In this 
context, the econometric model also controlled for perceived relative compatibility of the pro-
gram attributes, which tested hypothesis H2. Various control questions (variables 16, 17, 18 
and 19 in Table 3.3) were combined into a sum score index (variable 20) that was high if re-
spondents perceived the program attributes to be relatively easy to implement on their farms. 
Interestingly, the corresponding coefficient on this variable was insignificant, which indicated 
that the random parameter specification of program attributes was apparently better suited to 
capturing the heterogeneity of the perceived relative compatibility of program measures than 
this variable, which captures practicability at farm level.  
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However, the estimated coefficient on the index of use values was positive and significant. 
This meant that respondents on average perceived some or all program attributes as contrib-
uting to their eco-productivity in a positive way. Consequently, the probability of adopting a 
FAW program increased with the perceived productivity benefits (use values) that respond-
ents attributed to the program. Consequently, there was a failure to reject hypothesis H3. Per-
ceived productivity benefits were closely linked to the farmer’s individual characteristics. The 
variables that captured the individual characteristics of respondents and their farm provided a 
more nuanced and slightly less obvious picture that required further interpretation.  
Apparently, typical socio-economic variables that describe dairy herd size, whether the farmer 
has a successor and whether the farmer uses advisory services or not, proved to be insignifi-
cant. This suggested that according to these criteria no typical group of farms could be identi-
fied that would be more likely to adopt a FAW program than other farms. However, farmers 
who had a relatively high average milk yield per cow appeared more likely to adopt a FAW 
program. High milk yield may be interpreted as a signal of high input intensity, e.g. as a result 
of high quality forage, successful breeding, a high level of fertility and low rates of mastitis. It 
is likely that all these factors that are known to be important determinants of milk yield can 
also be interpreted as signals of farmers’ individual levels of knowledge, attention and care 
when handling their dairy cattle. 
In other words, successful, ambitious and caring dairy herdsman can be found on farms of any 
size, according to the results in Table 3.4. This was also supported by the significant positive 
coefficient estimated for the farm’s participation in a quality assurance scheme. This quality 
assurance scheme is a voluntary program introduced by the German dairy industry and is 
widespread across the country. The program defines minimum standards of process quality 
and documentation on milk production on farms, but does not contain any FAW requirements 
that would go beyond the public legal minimum. Thus, the significant positive coefficient 
from this regressor must be interpreted as the effect of farmers already being accustomed to 
working in accordance with a voluntary standard and being used to documenting routines and 
processes. Given that the WTA for the program is reduced by 6.7 euro cents/kg milk output 
among those farmers who already participate in the QM scheme, this may also indicate that 
adoption of a program itself is, from the farmers’ perspective, associated with high transaction 
costs. Once a program has already been adopted, these transaction costs are lowered, such that 
subsequent programs tend to be adopted more flexibly. 
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Furthermore, communication behavior (variable 33 in Table 3.3) and the number of peers for 
exchange (variable 32 in Table 3.3) revealed positive and significant coefficients. This finding 
showed that adoption of a FAW program among dairy farmers seemed to follow similar pat-
terns to the adoption and diffusion of other farm technologies. However, it was also an indica-
tion of the fact that social context had an influence on farmers’ decision-making when it came 
to FAW. Therefore there was a failure to reject hypothesis H5. 
Turning now to the estimated effect of the respondents’ set of personal values and attitudes 
about the wellbeing of their dairy cows (hypothesis H4), the following picture was revealed. 
The indicator for individual business orientation when dealing with animals showed that indi-
viduals who viewed their cows mainly as a means of doing business were less likely to adopt 
a FAW program than respondents who scored relatively low on this index of business orienta-
tion within the human-animal relationship. In turn, this implied that respondents who did not 
view the relationship with their dairy cows primarily under the aspect of profit maximization 
were more likely, all other things being equal, to adopt a FAW program. 
The estimated effect on the role of non-use existence values on the probability of adopting a 
FAW program was harder to interpret: respondents who scored relatively high on survey 
questions that intended to approximate the level of individual non-use values were significant-
ly less likely to adopt the program. At first glance, this did not appear plausible because it 
could be expected that individual benefits derived from adopting the program would be even 
greater if the personal level of perceived non-use existence values were high. This would 
mean that for two farmers with otherwise identical farms and levels of business orientation 
and use values, the farmer with a higher index of non-use values would derive additional utili-
ty gains from adopting the program compared to his or her counterpart with a lower index of 
this type of non-use values. 
However, the estimated negative coefficient could be explained by dividing respondents into 
the three subgroups of program adoption: out of N= 78 respondents, 12 farmers had never 
accepted a scheme (“never adopter”), 28 farmers had always accepted a scheme (“always 
adopter”) and 38 farmers had decided selectively (“selective deciders”).  
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Table 3.5 Correlation coefficients for selected variables according to program acceptance 
decision
11
 
  
NUV UV Herd size 
Milk 
yield 
Business 
orientation 
QM 
E
n
tire sam
p
le 
N
=
7
8
 
NUV - 0.1472 0.0005 -0.0534 0.1231 0.0733* 
UV  - -0.0164 0.1768 0.0545 -0.0129 
Herd size   - 0.1923* 0.2976** 0.0351 
Milk yield    - 0.2773** 0.0321 
Business orientation    - 0.0925** 
QM      - 
N
ev
er ch
o
o
se 
p
ro
g
ram
 
NUV - -0.3217 -0.0504 0.1961 -0.0513 0.1077 
UV  - 0.0448 0.2796 0.4234 0.1403 
Herd size   - 0.2975 0.5858** 0.1231 
Milk yield    - 0.6412** 0.1864 
Business orientation    - 0.1864 
QM      - 
S
o
m
etim
es p
ro
-
g
ram
 
NUV - 0.2991* 0.0693 -0.0670 0.0504 0.0718 
UV  - -0.1150 0.2248 -0.0787 0.0149 
Herd size   - 0.2740* 0.1542 -0.0029 
Milk yield    - 0.1617 0.0073 
Business orientation    -   0.0090 
QM      - 
A
lw
ay
s ch
o
o
se 
p
ro
g
ram
 
NUV - 0.0658 -0.0191 -0.0591 0.1886 0.1254 
UV  - 0.1700 0.0714 0.0576 -0.1006 
Herd size   - 0.0489 0.4057** 0.0508 
Milk yield    - 0.3664** 0.0643 
Business orientation    - 0.1647* 
QM      - 
T
y
p
e o
f co
rrela-
tio
n
 test 
NUV - Spear Spear Spear Spear Rank 
UV  - Spear Spear Spear Rank 
Herd size   - Pearson Spear Rank 
Milk yield    - Spear Rank 
Business orientation    - Rank 
QM      - 
  
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.5 demonstrates that perceived program use values and non-use existence values did 
not correlate in a statistically significant way for the overall sample. This was not the case 
either for the two groups of “never adopters” and “always adopters”. However, use values and 
non-use existence values showed a correlation in the group of those respondents who decided 
about their choice with regard to the new program according to the benefit of the specific 
choice situation.  
                                                 
11 For numerical variables, Pearson’s R (Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient) is a measure of 
linear correlation. Spearman’s rho (rs) computes the correlation between two ordinal, or ranked, variables. 
Point biserial is used when one variable is interval/ratio and the second is dichotomous. Rank biserial (Som-
ers D) is used when one variable is ordinal and the second is dichotomous. Significance levels refer to a test 
against the null hypothesis of insignificant correlation 
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The group of “never adopters” in particular scored surprisingly highly on the index of non-use 
values, as shown in Figure 3.1. Apparently, there is a group of farmers who derive a relatively 
high level of utility from their animals due to factors that are unrelated to use values, and at 
the same time this group of farmers seems to derive disutility from a FAW program scheme, 
regardless of its attributes. Interestingly, both “never adopters” and “always adopters” showed 
a significant positive correlation between their business orientation and herd size and milk 
yield. This implied that within these two groups the more productive and larger dairy farms 
also tended to have a higher business orientation, and for the group of “always adopters” 
business orientation was also positively related to the probability that the farm was participat-
ing in the voluntary quality assurance scheme (QM). 
Focusing further on the distribution of stated non-use existence values according to these 
three groups is facilitated by Figure 3.1. This figure shows that in the group of “never 
adopters” no observations occurred in the lower range of the non-use existence value index. In 
turn, the lowest values of this index were observed in the group of “always adopters”. Of 
course, both groups also revealed relatively as high values as those given by the group of “se-
lective deciders”. Furthermore, in all three groups there was a tendency for stated non-use 
existence values to be higher as the size of the dairy herd increases. 
  
Choice of a program versus status quo: 
 1= always stat.quo, 2= mixed, 3= always program
Number of cows per farm
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Figure 3.1 Stated NUV in relation to size of dairy herd, according to the groups of respondents. 
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Figure 3.1 makes it clear that the number of observations in this context was too small to draw 
general conclusions. However, this figure may help to interpret the finding of the negative 
estimated coefficient on non-use existence values in the random parameter logit (RPL) model 
in Table 3.4: the group of “never adopters” had relatively high non-use existence values and 
at the same time perceived an additional transaction cost when adopting the program. Thus, 
adoption of the program did not seem to be complementary to personal non-use values. This 
could be because this group of farmers were very well aware of their own high standards of 
animal treatment and therefore would perhaps prefer to have the public trust them without the 
need for a program. In other words, for this group the program could constitute an unneces-
sary administrative burden that addresses nothing more than these farmers feel is currently 
being addressed anyway. 
In contrast, the group of “always adopters” seemed to perceive an additional benefit from 
adopting the program, and this benefit was not captured by the explanatory variables in the 
RPL model in Table 3.4. Such a benefit could be identified based on the conceptual frame-
work of the theory of social interactions: adopting a program beyond perceived use values and 
stated relative practicability means an additional burden or forgone income from animal pro-
duction. Given that non-use existence values were rather low in that group, they failed to pro-
vide an explanation for it. However, the burden of program adoption paid off for the farmers 
in this group due to the additional utility gains they derived from enhancing their reputation 
among other members of the society. These paternalistic-altruistic non-use values were in line 
with the theory of social interactions and may refer to an increase in prestige or image among 
other farmers or among consumers and policymakers. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Based on a randomly selected sample of 78 German dairy farmers, several hypotheses were 
tested about the relationship between acceptance of a FAW program on the one hand and so-
cio-economic characteristics, approximation indices to individual levels of use values, non-
use values and business orientation on the other. Empirical results from a random parameter 
logit (RPL) model failed to reject all the hypotheses initially formulated, except for one: 
farmers with relatively high levels of individual non-use existence values regarding the well-
being of their animals turned out to be correlated with a group of farmers who never accepted 
any variant of the hypothetical FAW program, as presented to them in the corresponding 
DCE. This skepticism was not explained by program design or by possible difficulties in im-
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plementing the program on a specific farm. Furthermore, the subgroup of “never adopters” of 
the program did not reveal any significantly different socio-economic characteristics than the 
overall sample of respondents on average. 
These findings were therefore interpreted as evidence of a significant level of disutility that 
some farmers derived from a FAW program itself. Potential sources of this disutility could be 
the perceived loss of autonomy when handling their own dairy cows in accordance with a 
program or a lack of familiarity with voluntary quality programs per se. However, as one of 
the main findings, it was concluded that these results did not allow the rejection of a FAW 
program by individual farmers to be viewed as potential evidence of claims that these indi-
viduals do not value a FAW program. 
In turn, these findings on the estimated effects of use values showed that farmers who believe 
that FAW program attributes would increase the productivity and profitability of their dairy 
herd acted rationally when deciding to adopt a program.  
The theory of social interactions was used in order to motivate the farmers’ decision to adopt 
a new FAW program based on such use values that were explained by the incentive to max-
imize profits, but this concept was also used to argue that non-use values may affect the deci-
sion beyond plain profit maximization goals. Instead, these results showed that the decision to 
adopt a new FAW program was the result of a complex interaction of considerations that ul-
timately led to utility maximization of the farm household. Consequently, the commonly held 
belief that farmers provide FAW only insofar as it is profit maximizing is potentially too nar-
row and should, at least in the case of dairy farmers, be extended to farm household utility 
maximization. 
These results suggest in this context that further research is required in order to confirm the 
potential role of non-use existence values on the one hand, which may describe farmers’ in-
trinsic attitudes towards animals, and non-use values of paternalistic altruism, which in line 
with the theory of social interactions may describe farmers’ extrinsic attitudes towards their 
image or prestige among relevant peer groups (e.g. other farmers or consumers). 
Regarding private and public sector policies, these results suggest that farmers’ individual 
perception of FAW values may in the past have been too narrowly reduced to presumed eco-
nomic drivers. Instead the results of this study suggest that some farmers also reveal a sub-
stantial non-use valuation of FAW, either from an extrinsic or intrinsic motivation. These 
farmers may substantially contribute to the provision of certain public goods in relation to the 
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wellbeing of farm animals. However, some of these farmers seem at the same time to have a 
strong aversion to FAW programs in themselves.  
Future research should therefore determine whether this general program rejection is related 
more to a perceived loss of autonomy when handling their farm animals or is an expression of 
perceived high transaction costs when adopting a program in general.  
Future design and related extension work that seeks to increase the adoption of FAW pro-
grams could then potentially address these factors proactively, which may ultimately lead to 
higher adoption rates of FAW programs among dairy farmers.  
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Abstract 
This study relates pig farmers’ willingness to provide higher levels of farm animal welfare 
(FAW) with consumers’ willingness to pay for pork cutlets produced in compliance with 
higher standards. Discrete choice experiments (DCE) were employed using choice sets that 
only differ in the price variable for both, farmers and consumers. Based on preference esti-
mates from a random parameter logit (RPL) model, supply and demand curves were derived 
and market equilibria for varying levels of animal welfare pork in Germany were estimated. 
Data was collected from 140 pig farmers and 626 pork consumers in Germany using online 
questionnaires and personal interviews. The RPL model revealed that farmers who state a 
long-term planning horizon and who are selling pork directly to consumers are more likely to 
accept a FAW program. Furthermore, the analysis of consumers’ preferences for animal wel-
fare when buying pork cutlets showed that an increase in product price and increasing dura-
tion of transportation to abattoirs negatively affected the probability of purchase. Consumers 
who frequently purchase pork over the self-service counter, attach more importance to price 
than to brand, origin or taste of pork, are less likely to buy high-welfare pork. Moreover, indi-
viduals who prefer conventional to organic pork are less likely to buy high-welfare pork cut-
lets. Market simulations for high-welfare pork indicate increasing divergence in supply and 
demand with higher FAW standards. For a FAW program with standards only slightly above 
the legal minimum standard, a market share of 38% was predicted, whereas for a program 
with considerable higher requirements, market balance has not been achieved at all.  
Keywords farm animal welfare, discrete choice experiment, random parameter logit, market 
simulation  
 
4.1  Introduction  
The ongoing debate on farm animal welfare (FAW) at both the national and international lev-
el led to numerous initiatives aiming at enhancing animals’ wellbeing. Well known examples 
are the Welfare Quality
®
 standard in Europe, the chain-wide Quality and Safety (QS) certifi-
cation system in Germany, and a catalogue of above-minimum criteria developed by the 
German Farmers Union (DBV 2015). Although high-welfare meat is available on the German 
market, and some consumer groups are willing to pay a price premium (Meuwissen et al. 
2007; Schulze et al. 2008; Lagerkvist and Hess 2011), the consumption accounts for only two 
percent, including meat produced under organic schemes (Spiller et al. 2010). In contrast to 
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the reluctant demand for high-welfare meat, around 90% of the German population states to 
be concerned about the treatment of farm animals in livestock production (TNS Deutschland 
GmbH 2012). This discrepancy reflects the widespread opinion that attitudes expressed by 
consumers may not be related to their purchase behavior (Grunert 2006; Te Velde et al. 2002). 
In the literature on consumer behavior this phenomenon is often described as “citizen con-
sumer gap” or “attitude behavior gap” (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006; de Bakker and Dagevos 
2012; Harvey and Hubbard 2013). A citizen’s positive attitude towards animal welfare may 
not affect actual purchase behavior, but may provide some potential that can be tapped 
through marketing and communication activities (Verbeke 2009). To enable consumers to 
consciously purchase high-welfare meat, the Federal Government of Germany considers 
launching an animal welfare label. Animal welfare labelling can be used to indicate a desired 
quality to consumers. Moreover it can be used by producers as an instrument for product dif-
ferentiation. Franz et al. (2010) argue that the product differentiation has to start initially at 
the farm level. Thus, producers’ participation in such initiatives is a prerequisite for its suc-
cess. However, the implementation of stricter animal welfare requirements is a problematic 
issue as higher animal welfare standards likely imply additional costs for pig farmers 
(Liljenstolpe 2008) and a potential loss in productivity due to the constraints imposed on live-
stock husbandry. Thus, deciding the economically viable amount of FAW requires a trade-off 
between better animal wellbeing and productivity. The present study aims to ascertain the 
determinants of pig farmers’ participation in FAW programs as well as factors influencing 
consumers’ purchasing behavior towards high-welfare pork12. The analysis is based on data 
obtained from discrete choice experiments (DCE).  
Previous studies on preferences for FAW have only considered one side of the coin–either 
producers’ willingness to provide higher levels of animal welfare or consumers’ willingness 
to pay for food produced under animal-friendly conditions. The present study adds to the lit-
erature by assessing both consumer and producer preferences using a common elicitation 
format. This allows us to simulate the market for pork produced under different FAW pro-
grams. In the next Section (4.2), hypotheses are formulated reviewing the relevant literature 
on consumers’ preferences for high-welfare pork as well as farmers’ acceptance of FAW pro-
grams. Section 4.3 describes the experimental setup. Section 4.4 sets out the econometric 
model and the survey design. Section 4.5 presents the results of the random parameter logit 
                                                 
12
  The term high welfare pork (or meat) refers to production conditions above the legal minimum standard. 
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(RPL) model, estimated willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) values as 
well as the market simulation for high-welfare pork in Germany. Results from the estimated 
models and the market simulations are discussed in Section 4.6 followed by some concluding 
remarks. 
4.2  Literature review and hypotheses   
Previous consumer studies confirm that some groups are willing to pay for enhanced FAW in 
meat production. A comprehensive review on that issue is provided by Lagerkvist and Hess 
(2011), who emphasize that information on how farm animals are kept can alter purchase be-
havior. Meuwissen and van der Lans (2004) conducted a conjoint analysis (CA) among Dutch 
pork consumers and found that respondents were willing to pay a price mark-up for animal 
welfare attributes, although they are less important than price and taste. Lagerkvist et al. 
(2006) compared Swedish consumers’ preferences for immuno-castration of pigs, surgical 
castration and no castration. Their results suggest that consumers attach greater value to pork 
from immuno-castrated pigs than from those who are surgically castrated. In contrast, pork 
from intact boars was negatively valued because of the potential risk of boar taint. The au-
thors conclude that immuno-castration is a socially accepted alternative to surgical castration 
providing several potential advantages for the public and agribusiness, including animal wel-
fare improvements, potential cost savings in procedures and gains from higher growth rates 
for pigs. Similar results were obtained by Liljenstolpe (2008) who suggested that “no castra-
tion” should be considered as a food-safety oriented attribute due to the risk of boar taint. Fur-
thermore, it was found that Swedish consumers are willing to pay a supplement for mobile 
slaughtering to obviate transportation. In a study about product quality attributes from differ-
ent animal species, Carlsson et al. (2005) reported that consumers ranked allowing fattening 
pigs to be outdoors as the most important value and they oppose the fixation of sows. These 
studies demonstrate that nearly all of the investigated measures that are intended to provide 
higher levels of animal welfare are positively valued by consumers. Therefore, it is hypothe-
sized that: 
HC1: The requirements of a FAW program that are meant to provide higher levels of animal 
welfare have a positive impact on the likelihood of purchasing high-welfare pork cutlet. 
Meuwissen and van der Lans (2005) approached the investigation of consumers’ trade-offs 
between different pork by means of a conjoint analysis (CA). Although they could identify 
consumer segments that are more concerned about food safety and animal welfare, taste and 
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price were, on average, perceived as the most important characteristics. Also other studies 
support the assumption that the price weighs heavily on the purchase decision (Grunert 2006; 
Jonge and van Trijp 2013). This leads to the hypothesis that:  
HC2: An increasing price of high-welfare-pork cutlets reduces the likelihood of purchase.   
It is well known that socio-economic characteristics and attitudes, values and beliefs influence 
the purchase behavior. Specific characteristics that are associated with consumers of high-
welfare meat are assumed to affect the probability of purchase. For example, Enneking (2004) 
assumes that respondents who pay attention to animal-friendly production methods also prefer 
premium brands or organic products to cheap private labels and less known brands. Organic 
buyers are more likely to be concerned about food-related ethical issues like animal welfare 
and are thus motivated to buy high-welfare pork. 
HC3: People who buy organic products are also more likely to buy high-welfare meat 
Taking into account that in Germany the importance of supermarkets for meat sales is increas-
ing steadily up to a current share of 80%, Weinrich et al. (2015) investigated the attractiveness 
of alternative points of purchase. They revealed that high-welfare meat is not successfully 
sold over the self-service counter and they recommend placing it at the service counter to ad-
dress potential target groups.   
HC4: People who prefer to buy meat from the service counter are more likely to buy high-
welfare pork. 
According to Spiller and Schulze (2008), 70% of all grocery shopping is done by women, 
thus they are assumed to have more knowledge regarding food products and are generally 
more price sensitive than men. Therefore, it is assumed that the respondents’ gender, their 
expenditure on food and the frequency of consumption will affect the purchase of high-
welfare pork. Consumers living in urban regions often feel alienated from the way their food 
is produced and are increasingly critical of modern agriculture (Duffy et al. 2005). Products 
claiming better animal welfare conditions might be more likely purchased by people who live 
in urban regions, distant from animal production.       
Farmers’ preferences for FAW programs in pork production have rarely been investigated. 
Although an increasing number of studies deals with farmers’ general attitudes towards ani-
mal welfare (Austin et al. 2005; Bock and van Huik 2007; Lagerkvist et al. 2011; Franz et al. 
2012), little is known about farmers’ willingness to participate in FAW programs. Franz et al. 
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(2012) identified among 160 conventional German pig farmers three different groups who 
generally all showed a broad acceptance of the basic principles of the European initiative Wel-
fare Quality®. Differences between these groups were found in farmers’ understanding of 
FAW. While all farmers accepted the principles of good housing, good feeding and good 
health, the appropriate animal behavior is only important for a small group of pig farmers
13
. 
The authors argue that these varying attitudes might lead to different animal welfare levels 
farmers are willing to provide. To address these different preferences, they recommend estab-
lishing a gradated label starting from a lower quality level leading to higher levels with strict-
er requirements but also higher rewards. Also Vanhonacker et al. (2008) found a heterogene-
ous set of farmer’s interests influencing their perceptions of FAW: while some were more 
economically driven, other farmers were also interested to supply high-quality products, have 
a satisfying job and establish a more positive image of their profession among the public. In 
comparison to citizen perception, the highest discordance was found for aspects related to 
animal behavior 
Discrete choice studies on animal welfare have mainly been carried out with consumers in 
order to elicit their willingness to pay. In contrast, only few studies apply this technique to 
elicit livestock farmers’ preferences for quality system requirements. For example, Norwood 
et al. (2006) revealed information on cattle producers’ acceptance of voluntary checkoff pro-
grams both in Oklahoma and nationwide. Beef checkoffs were introduced to the U.S. in 1986 
to improve beef demand through research, advertising and promotion, consumer information, 
industry information foreign marketing and producer communication. The main objective of 
the study was to reveal the amount of fees producers are willing to pay. Furthermore, Nor-
wood et al. (2006) investigated producers’ preferences for different refund mechanism. The 
refunding could be either done by spending the fees on different business activities (advertis-
ing, promotion or research) or farmers could request the total amount of money back. Moreo-
ver, the authors addressed the problem of free-riding by including a provision point mecha-
nism: a minimum percentage is specified of producers, who do not request a refund. Results 
showed that cattle producers rated the option to spend funds on advertisement as the most 
attractive way to donate. If fees are spent on research, only 10% of farmers are willing to par-
ticipate in the checkoff. While producers responded to the provision point mechanism by in-
                                                 
13
  The Welfare Quality project developed a comprehensive approach for the assessment of FAW, which in-
cludes four dimensions: good housing, good feeding, good health and appropriate (species-specific) behavior 
(Keeling and Kjærnes 2009) 
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creasing their propensity to donate, the response was still too small to tackle the free-riding 
problem. Another study conducted by Schulz and Tonsor (2010) investigated US cow-calf 
producers preferences for voluntary tractability systems, managed either by the private sector 
or the government and varying in the level of information required. Simulated welfare effects 
showed significant losses when traceability options are removed, in particular for those pro-
ducers with strong preferences to avoid to collaborate with governmental entities or provision 
of additional information about their operations. In both studies, a premium paid to encourage 
farmers’ participation was highly valued. Therefore, it is expected that: 
HP1: The higher the price mark-up for enhanced animal welfare, the higher the likelihood of 
acceptance of a FAW program. 
The practicability of animal welfare enhancing measures depends on current farm structures 
such as space available per pig or access to daylight. Considering that the ease of implementa-
tion varies across farms, it is hypothesized that:   
HP2: The higher the effort necessary to comply with the FAW program, the less likely farmers 
will accept it. 
HP3: The more restrictive the requirements of the FAW program (barn space and duration of 
transport allowed), the less likely the farmer accept a program. 
Farmers use different marketing channels to sell their products. More traditional ways like 
direct marketing provide a possibility to communicate images of desirable animal welfare 
status directly to consumers.      
HP4: The marketing channel the farmer uses to sell his products affects the likelihood of ac-
cepting a FAW program. 
Considering a FAW program as a kind of innovation, it can also be assumed that less educat-
ed and older farmers are more reluctant accept such a program (Venkatesh 2003). 
4.3 Empirical implementation 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the welfare attributes included in the choice sets. Program 
attributes in terms of requirements farmers have to implement were selected based on existing 
FAW initiatives in Germany
14
 and comprise the barn area available per pig, supply of bedding 
                                                 
14
  The initiatives „Initiative Tierwohl“, Tierschutzlabel für mehr Tierschutz“ and „Aktion Tierwohl“ comprise 
different requirements for the keeping of pigs, the surgery and transportation to abattoirs. 
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straw, access to manipulable and rooting material, tail docking and castration (either avoiding 
castration or tail docking or using anesthesia) and the permitted for transporting pigs to the 
abattoir. The minimum level was defined by the actual legal requirements and the German 
quality and safety (QS) standard. The increment on the reference price (1.70€/kg) paid to 
farmers for participation was calculated applying a cost-engineering approach on the basis of 
actual costs arising from implementation of FAW requirements. For the consumer choice sets, 
a reference price of seven Euros per kilogram pork cutlet was assumed. The upper level for 
the consumer price was set twice as high as for conventional cutlets (14€/kg) which is similar 
to the price for organic pork. Table 4.2 shows an example of a choice set for pig producers. 
The choice set for consumers was identical in all aspects, safe for the price variable which 
was scaled in Euro per kilogram pork cutlet. 
Table 4.1 FAW attributes and levels used in the DCE 
Attribute Level 
Barn area per animal (m
2
 per animal) 1) 1.00*; 
2) 1.33;  
3) 1.66;  
4) 2.00  
Characteristics of piggery floor 1) Solid floor without bedding*;  
2) Bedding straw in part of barn area;  
3) Bedding straw in full barn area 
Manipulable materials 1) One piece of manipulable material* 
2) Three pieces of manipulable material 
3) One piece of manipulable material and material for rooting 
Surgery  1) Tail docking and castration without anesthesia* 
2) Tail docking and castration with anesthesia 
3) No surgery 
Duration of transportation to abattoir 1) 8 hrs.* 
2) 6 hrs. 
3) 4 hrs. 
Consumer price for pork cutlet in €/kg 1) 7.00* 
2) 8.40 
3) 9.80 
4) 11.20 
5) 12.60 
6) 14.00 
Producer price increment in €/kg carcass 
weight 
1) 0.00* 
2) 0.08 
3) 0.16 
4) 0.24 
5) 0.32 
6) 0.40 
*marks the minimum level (status quo) 
The orthoplan procedure of SPSS was used to generate an orthogonal design minimizing cor-
relation between attribute levels. The final choice design with a D-efficiency value of 97.1 
contained 81 choice sets, from which eight were randomly chosen and presented to 626 con-
74
4 Predicting supply and demand for high-welfare meat with DCEs: an application to the German pork market 
75 
 
sumers and 140 pig farmers. In a choice set respondents were asked to choose between two 
hypothetical FAW programs and a status quo representing the actual minimum standard (see 
Table 4.2). Moreover, consumers were asked to provide information on their consumption 
behavior, their attitude towards FAW and their socio-economic characteristics (e.g. household 
size, income, age). Pig farmers were asked to provide information about their farming struc-
ture, socio-economic factors, their general attitude towards animal welfare labels and if they 
are generally willing to participate in such a program.  
Table 4.2 Choice Set including two alternatives and the status quo 
 
FAW requirements 
 
QS standard 
(Status Quo) 
Label 1 Label 2 
Producer surplus €/kg carcass 
weight // Consumer price for 
pork cutlet in €/kg 
0.00 €/kg // 7.00€/kg 0.18 €/kg // 11.20€/kg 0.24 €/kg // 12.00€/kg 
Barn area per animal (m
2
 per 
animal) 
1.00 m
2
 1.00 m
2
 1.66 m
2
 
Characteristics of barn floor 
Solid floor without 
bedding 
Straw bedding 
 (full barn area) 
Straw bedding 
 (full barn area) 
Manipulable materials One piece One piece Three pieces 
Surgery Yes, without anesthesia Yes, without anesthesia Yes, with anesthesia 
Duration of transportation to 
abattoir 
8 hrs. 6 hrs. 8 hrs. 
 
I would choose: 
 
□ □ □ 
 
4.4  The Choice Model 
Based on McFadden’s (1974) Random Utility Theory, an individual 𝑛’s utility 𝑈obtained 
from a most preferred alternative 𝑗∗ consists of a deterministic observable part 𝑉𝑛𝑗 and a sto-
chastic part 𝜀𝑛𝑗 accounting for factors that are unobservable to the analyst.  
(4.1) 𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 
Assuming that respondents are utility-maximizers alternative 𝑗∗ will be chosen from a set of 
alternatives 𝐽 with a certain probability which can be simulated by means of Maximum Like-
lihood technique: 
(4.2) 𝑃𝑛𝑗∗ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛𝑗∗ + 𝜀𝑛𝑗∗ >  𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗) ∀ 𝑗 = 𝐽; 𝑗
∗ ≠ 𝑗 
The deterministic part 𝑉𝑛𝑗 can be described as an additive function of FAW requirements 𝑥𝑛𝑗 
providing different levels of utility. Additionally, it is assumed that the decision makers’ per-
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sonality (socio-economics characteristics or attitudes) and the farming system or the house-
hold structure 𝑧𝑛 affect the likelihood of choosing an alternative. 
(4.3) 𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝛼𝑐 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝑧𝑛𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1  
The constant 𝛼𝑐 captures the average effect on utility of all unobserved factors associated with 
the FAW program. Instead of creating a constant for each alternative, only one generic con-
stant was added because the alternatives were exclusively described by their attributes and not 
by an alternative-specific label. Estimated parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 (summarized under the designa-
tion 𝛾𝑛) provide information about the influence of alternative attributes and individuals charac-
teristic on the choice probability. To account for heterogeneity within the population (farmers 
as well as consumers), a random parameter logit (RPL) model was employed which over-
comes the limitations of a standard logit model by allowing for random taste variation, unre-
stricted substitution patterns and correlation in unobserved factors (Train 2003). The utility 
parameters 𝛾𝑛 vary across the population with density 𝑓(𝛾|𝜃) where 𝜃 are the true parameters 
of the distribution describing the mean and the variance of 𝛾’s. The attributes of the FAW 
program are included as random parameters into the model, and the characteristics of individ-
uals interacting with the constant because they do not vary over alternatives (Hanley et al. 
2001). From the estimation results marginal effects can be obtained and in turn WTP or WTP 
be calculated. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change of the outcome variable 
(here the likelihood of choice) due to an infinitesimal change of independent variables. For 
discrete variables it is not appropriate to calculate the marginal effect in terms of infinitesimal 
changes. Thus, as a preliminary step, the marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the 
sample and subsequently a discrete change of the variable of interest is simulated that leads to 
a change in the corresponding probability. The difference of both probabilities represents the 
marginal effect of the dummy variable or categorical variable.  
WTA or WTP estimates are obtained by setting the marginal effect of an explanatory variable 
(a program attribute 𝑥𝑗 or a socio-economic characteristic 𝑧𝑛) in relation to the marginal effect 
of the price premium (𝑝𝑗𝑛):      
(4.4) 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑇𝐴 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥𝑗 =
∆𝑊𝑇𝐴
∆𝑥𝑗
= (
∑
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
∆𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) / (
∑
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) 
These marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the sample. Instead, individual WTP and 
WTA values can be computed applying formula 4.6 at the end of Section 4.4. 
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4.5  Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Both surveys, with pork consumers and pig farmers were conducted in the winter 2013/2014 
using online questionnaires. Collecting consumer data was partly done by interviewing ran-
domly chosen pedestrians in Schleswig-Holstein. Although 779 respondents had participated 
in the survey, the data from only 629 consumers was used for analysis because the remainder 
stated that they usually never consume pork. Prior to the main survey, the questionnaire was 
pretested with consumers and farmers on an agricultural fair in the same region. The summary 
statistics for the two survey samples are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.   
Table 4.3 Summary statistics of surveyed consumers 
N = 629   
Variable Mean (SD) Explanation 
Age  43 (16.2) Age of respondent 
Gender  50% (50%) Dummy: 1=  respondent is female 
HH size 2.5 (1.2) Number of household members, incl. children 
HH children 28% (45%) Households with children 
Rural area 9% (29%) Dummy: 1= Community with less than 500 people 
Country town 19% (30%) Dummy: 1= Town with 500 to 5000 people 
Small town* 20% (40%) Dummy: 1= Town with 5,000 and 20,000 people 
Middle-sized town 22% (41%) Dummy: 1= Town with 20,000 and 100,000 people 
City 30% (46%) Dummy: 1= City with more than 100,000 people 
Secondary school 
46% (50%) 
Dummy: 1= Respondents who have secondary school 
leaving certificate 
Qualification* 
25% (43%) 
Dummy: 1= Respondents have an entrance qualification 
for technical college. 
College degree or higher 
29% (45%) 
Dummy: 1= Respondents have at least degree from tech-
nical college. 
Consumption-related variables   
2-3 days a month 26% (44%)  
Once a week 38% (48%)  
Several times a week 33% (47%)  
Daily 2% (13%)  
 
Outlets: 
  
Discounter 19% (39%) Dummy: 1= Pork purchase mainly in discounter 
Supermarket* 55% (50%) Dummy: 1= Pork purchase mainly in supermarket 
Butcher 24% (43%) Dummy: 1= Pork purchase mainly at the butcher’s 
Weekly market 2% (14%) Dummy: 1= Pork purchase mainly at the weekly market 
Note: Dummy variables with * were omitted from estimation as reference category 
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Table 4.3 continued    
Variable Mean (SD) Explanation 
Respondent purchases meat 56% (50%) Dummy: 1= Over 50 percent of pork is purchased by the 
respondent exclusively. 
Respondent partly purchases of 
meat* 
30% (46%) Dummy: 1= Purchasing of pork is equally shared with 
another household member.  
Another household member pur-
chases meat 
15% (35%) Dummy: 1= Another household member purchases over 
50% of pork. 
Fresh meat 58% (49%) Dummy:  1= Mainly purchase of fresh pork. 
Self-service counter 37% (48%) Dummy:  1= Mainly purchase of pork over the self -
service counter. 
Frozen meat* 3% (17%)  
Frequently organic 20% (40%) Dummy: 1= Respondent often purchases organic pork. 
Seldom organic* 53% (50%) Dummy: 1= Respondent rarely purchases organic pork. 
Never organic 28% (45%) Dummy: 1= Respondent never purchases organic pork. 
Priority price 28% (50%) Dummy: 1= Purchaser considers price as very important. 
Priority taste* 38% (49%) Dummy: 1= Purchaser considers taste as very important. 
Priority brand 14% (35%) Dummy: 1= Purchaser considers brand as very important. 
Priority origin 20% (40%) Dummy: 1= Purchaser considers origin as very important. 
FAW-related variables:   
Keeping conditions = novelty 3.1 (1,3) Item: Are the presented keeping conditions new to you?  
1-5; 1= not new at all; 5= completely new 
 
Critical attitude 3.5 (1,1) Item: I am critical of the conditions the farm animals are 
kept nowadays. 
1-5; 1=strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree 
 
Knowledge about pig farming  3.2 (1,1) Item: How would you assess your knowledge of pig farm-
ing? 
1-5, 1= not well informed, 5= well informed 
 
Discussion on animal welfare 2.9 (1,1) Item: I follow the public debate on animal welfare. 
1-5; 1=strongly agree; 5= strongly disagree 
 
Consumption increases 3% (17%) Dummy: 1= Increased consumption if prices for pork in-
crease due to higher FAW 
Amount of consumption remains 
the same* 
53% (50%) Dummy: 1= No changes in consumption if prices for pork 
increase due to higher FAW 
Consumption decreases 31% (46%) Dummy: 1= Decreased consumption if prices for pork 
increase due to higher FAW 
Note: Dummy variables with * were omitted from estimation as reference category 
 
The average age of consumers was 43 years and half of them were female. Around 30% of the 
respondents live in households with children and the average household size was 2.5 persons. 
The educational variables show that almost half of the consumers finished their secondary 
education and nearly 30% obtained at least a diploma from a technical college. One third of 
the sample consumes pork once a week, whereas only a minor part (2%) eats pork every day. 
Over half of the respondents are in charge of purchasing the meat among household members, 
and also 50 percent prefer supermarkets to discounters, butchers and weekly markets. The 
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majority of respondents prefer to buy fresh pork at service counters to self-service counters 
and 38% of the sample ranked taste higher than price, brand and origin. One third attached the 
greatest importance to price. A fifth of those interviewed stated that they consume organic 
food products frequently, while almost 30% never do. Consumers’ attitude towards FAW was 
measured using statements expressing a critical view on keeping conditions or if they follow 
the public debate on animal welfare. Furthermore, respondents were asked if the FAW 
measures described in the choice sets are new to them and how they assess their knowledge of 
pig farming. On average, consumers selected the mid-point of scales, indicating that they are 
only partly informed about the presented FAW measures and have limited knowledge of ani-
mal welfare in general. A notable exception makes their rather critical view on the conditions 
under which farm animals are kept nowadays. Interestingly, over half of the respondents stat-
ed that they would consume the same amount of pork even if prices increased due to higher 
levels of FAW.  
Table 4.4. shows the descriptive statistics of the sample of pig farmers. The average age of 
farmers is 43 years with nearly 40% having a university degree, and over half of them a de-
gree from a technical college. Although most of the farmers face unclear farm succession, 
they expect to continue farming on average for the next 20 years. The average land size is 99 
hectares, and the fattening capacity is on average 1462 fattening places; relatively high num-
bers compared to the average German farm
15
. A low share (4%) of surveyed farms also keeps 
dairy cows and suckler cows and 9% also keeps fattening beefs and poultry. A small minority 
of farmers takes part in agri-tourism and sells their products directly to consumers. A consid-
erable share of farmers is selling their fattened pigs to livestock traders or producers’ associa-
tions, whereas only a few of them conclude contractual agreements or sell pigs directly to a 
butcher. On average, farmers are neutral when asked about their plans to expand the pig fat-
tening capacity. In general, the surveyed pig farmers assess the public image of agriculture as 
negative. This might be a reason for the overall positive attitude towards a high-welfare label 
and high share of farmers who are willing to participate in a FAW program (65%).   
  
                                                 
15
  In 2013 only 12% of all pig keeping farms in Germany kept more than 1000 fattening pigs. The average farm 
size of pig keeping farms in 2013 accounted for 52 hectares per farm (BMELV 2014). 
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics of surveyed farmers 
N = 140   
Variable Mean (SD) Explanation 
Age 43.4 (11.3) Farmer’s age  
High education 37% (48%) Dummy: 1= Farmer holds a university degree or PhD 
Further education 56% (49%) Dummy: 1= Farmer holds a degree from a technical college 
Basic education 6% (25%) Dummy: 1= Farmer has vocational training 
Farm acreage 99 (68.2) Hectares of farm land  
Successor 31% (47%) Dummy: 1=  Yes, succession is secured; 0 = No successor 
Succession is unclear 54% (50%) Succession is unclear 
Time remaining farm manager 21 (10.9) Years planned to remain farm manager 
Fattening units 1462 (1161) Number of fattening places on farm 
Dairy cows 4% (20%) Dummy: 1=  Dairy cows kept on farm 
Keeping suckler cows 4% (19%) Dummy: 1=  Keeping suckler cows 
Cattle fattening 9% (28%) Dummy: 1=  Cattle fattening practiced on farm 
Piglet breeding 40% (49%) Dummy: 1=  Piglets breeding practiced on farm 
Piglet rearing 35% (48%) Dummy: 1=  Piglets rearing practiced on farm 
Pig fattening 93% (26%) Dummy: 1= Pig fattening practiced on farm 
Poultry 9% (29%) Dummy: 1=  Poultry kept on farm 
Tourism 3% (17%) Dummy: 1=  Farm offers agri-tourism 
Marketing of pigs   
Livestock traders 57% (50%) Dummy: 1=  Pigs are sold to livestock traders 
Short-term delivery contract 6% (23%) Dummy: 1=  Short-term delivery contract 
Long-term delivery contracts 9% (28%) Dummy: 1=  Long-term delivery contracts 
Producer organization 36% (48%) Dummy: 1=  Pigs sold through producer organization 
Direct marketing 4% (20%) Dummy: 1=  Pork is sold directly to consumer 
Butcher 11% (31%) Dummy: 1=  Pigs are sold directly to butcher 
Willingness to invest 2.8 (1.1) Item: Are you planning to invest pig fattening? 
1-5; 1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree  
Image of agriculture 4 (0.8) Item: How would you assess the public image of agriculture? 
1-5; 1= very positive; 5 = very negative 
Attitude towards animal welfare 
label 
2.8 (1.3) Item: What do you think about the introduction of an animal welfare 
label for pigs? 
1-5; 1= strongly like it; 5= strongly dislike it 
Willingness to participate 65% (48%) Dummy: 1= farmer is willing to participate in a FAW program if 
arising costs are covered. 
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4.4 Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results from the RPL model for both consumers and 
farmers. First, the estimation was done with all variables that might have an influence on the 
likelihood of purchase or, in the case of farmers, on the willingness to adopt a FAW program. 
Subsequently, a parsimonious model
16
 which only includes significant variables was estimat-
ed. Secondly, the marginal consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) and the marginal compensa-
tion that has to be paid to farmers to achieve program acceptance (WTA) were calculated 
from the marginal effects (see formula 4.4)
17
. A total of 5032 choice sets were included in the 
estimation of the consumer model. In 63% of choices, respondents preferred a higher welfare 
pork cutlet to the one produced in accordance with minimum standards. In total 339 (54%) 
consumers always chose a pork cutlet produced under enhanced animal welfare conditions, 
whereas 57 (9%) of them never chose such a product. The remaining 233 (37%) individuals 
chose a high-welfare cutlet only in some situations. Table 4.5 shows the regression results 
from the consumer model, with the upper section presenting the coefficients of the FAW pro-
gram measures and the lower section the behavioral variables as well as socio-economic char-
acteristics. As expected, a high price lowers the likelihood that consumers choose a high-
welfare pork cutlet (confirmation of HC2), so does the increasing duration of transport to the 
abattoir. One hour additional transportation time lowers the willingness to pay by 20 eurocent 
per kilogram pork cutlet. In contrast, confirming hypothesis HC1, all FAW program require-
ments that are assumed to enhance animals’ wellbeing are positively valued by consumers. 
The attribute “no surgery” increased the likelihood of choosing a high-welfare pork cutlet. 
This result is not in line with Lagerkvist (2006) and Liljenstolpe (2008) who argued that the 
risk of boar taint leads to a negative valuation of the attribute “no castration”. In our study, 
castration and tail docking are summarized under the term “surgery” hence the single effect of 
the avoidance of castration could not be clearly identified.  
  
                                                 
16
  The rich specification includes all exogenous variables whereas the parsimonious specification omits 24 
insignificant variables based on a robust Wald test (χ²-value is 30.86 with α= 0.1579). The McFadden pseudo 
R² of the parsimonious specification is 0.22916. A likelihood ratio test of the rich model against the parsimo-
nious model failed to reject the latter specification (χ²-value = 32.71; Prob > χ² = 0.1103). 
17
  The confidence intervals and significance levels of the WTA were computed using the delta method 
(Hensher and Greene 2003) which is a common approach in discrete choice modeling (Hole 2007). 
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Table 4.5 Estimation results from the RPL model, WTP and WTP confidence intervals  
Consumer Model N = 629 
Parsimonious model 
Log-Likelihood value:    -5094.0078 
 
Coefficient 
(SD) 
WTP 
[€/kg] 
WTP confidence 
interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
A
ttrib
u
tes o
f F
A
W
 p
ro
g
ram
 x
 
Price for pork cutlet 
-0.393*** 
(0.018) 
  
Barn area per animal (m
2
) 
0.857*** 
(1.574) 
2.18 [1.71; 2.65] 
Straw bedding (part of barn area) 
0.564*** 
(0.9509) 
1.43 [1.06; 1.81] 
Straw bedding (full barn area) 
0.582*** 
(0.922) 
1.48 [1.11; 1.85] 
Three pieces of manipulable material 
0.303*** 
(0.597) 
0.77 [0.41; 1.13] 
Manipulable material plus material for 
rooting 
0.186*** 
(0.250) 
0.47 [0.13; 0.81] 
Surgery with anesthesia  
1.085*** 
(1.525) 
2.76 [2.29; 3.22] 
No surgery 
0.305*** 
(1.749) 
0.78 [0.32; 1.23] 
Duration of transport (hrs.) 
-0.080*** 
(0.325) 
-0.20 [-0.31; -0.10] 
S
o
cio
-eco
n
o
m
ic v
ariab
les, co
n
-
su
m
p
tio
n
-related
 v
ariab
les an
d
 
F
A
W
-relate v
ariab
les z 
Frequency -0.288*** -0.73 [-1.05; -0.42] 
Self-service counter -0.480*** -1.22 [-1.87; -0.57] 
Priority price -1.141*** -2.90 [-3.59; -2.21] 
Critical attitude 1.253*** 3.19 [2.50; 3.87] 
Frequently organic 0.331* 0.84 [-0.07; 1.76] 
Never organic -0.985*** -2.50 [-3.20; -1.81] 
Consumption decreases -0.270* -0.69 [-1.34; -0.03] 
Gender  0.407*** 1.04 [0.40; 1.67] 
Interaction: Expenditure on food*two 
person household
18
 
0.116*** 0.30 [0.10; 0.49] 
Interaction: Expenditure on food*Family 
(>2 persons)
6 0.131*** 0.33 [0.15; 0.52] 
City 0.278* 0.71 [-0.01; 1.42] 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For cutlet from pigs which are kept in a barn with straw bedding, consumers are willing to 
pay a mark-up, ranging from 1.43€/kg to 1.48€/kg depending on the size of area that is straw-
bedded. Relatively high premiums are paid for an increase in barn area per animal (2.18€/kg 
for each additional square meter) and surgery with anesthesia (2.76€/kg). The higher WTP 
value for surgery with anesthesia compared to no surgery might be due to the increased risk of 
boar taint. Only a slight difference of 0.3 €/kg is shown between the mark-up for manipulable 
material with additional material for rooting and three different pieces of manipulable materi-
al.  
                                                 
18
  Expenditure on food was measured as categorical variable ranging from 1 to 6 with 1 = less than 100€ per 
month, 2 = 100 to 200€ per month, 3 = 200 to 300€ per month, 4 = 300 to 500€ per month, 5 = 500 to 700€ 
per month and 6 = more than 700€ per month. 
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Effects of consumer characteristics show a more nuanced picture. More frequent consumption 
of pork decreases the probability that consumers choose a high-welfare pork cutlet, reflected 
by a lower WTP of 0.73€ per kilogram of pork cutlet. As indicated by the negative WTP val-
ues, individuals who prefer to buy meat over the self-service counter, who attach a greater 
importance to price than to brand, origin or taste of a cutlet and never consume organic prod-
ucts (inverse of hypothesis HC3 and HC4) are less likely to buy a FAW pork cutlet. In con-
trast, high-welfare pork cutlets can be sold at a premium of 3.19€/kg to individuals who re-
gard the current conditions of animal husbandry more critical than the average consumer. In 
households with two persons and also family households with more than two persons, the 
increasing share of income spent on food results in a positive WTP of around 0.30€/kg pork 
cutlet.  
The choice experiment with the farmer sample yielded a total of 1120 choices between differ-
ent FAW programs or the QS minimum standard. From the 140 pig farmers, 12 (9%) were 
always willing to participate in a FAW program, whereas 32 (23%) farmers never chose one 
of the proposed programs. Ninety-six (68%) farmers chose a FAW program only in some sit-
uations, but not in all. Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of the producer model. In a first 
step, a model was estimated including all variables. Afterwards, insignificant variables were 
omitted step-wise
19
 from the model resulting in a parsimonious specification. Although not all 
of the remaining variables turned out to be significant, they were kept in the sparse estimation, 
since they contribute to the overall model fit.  
Of the attribute variables, only the price mark-up has a positive sign (confirming HP1). Con-
versely, additional barn area and bedding straw lowers the probability of choosing a FAW 
program (confirming HP2 and HP3). Regarding potential costs arising from reconstruction of 
farm buildings (e.g. straw storage area, manure tray), the relatively high compensation of 1.72 
€/kg carcass for covering the entire barn area with straw seems plausible. The use of straw is 
often associated with important disadvantages: it requires additional labor input, is often as-
sessed as less hygienic and is incompatible with manure drainage systems. 
Other program attributes had no effect on the choice probability. Requirements on surgery 
such as tail docking and castration, the provision of manipulable material and limited duration 
                                                 
19
  The rich specification includes all exogenous variables whereas the parsimonious specification omits 13 
insignificant variables based on a robust Wald test (χ²-value is 8.54 with α = 0.383). The McFadden pseudo 
R² of the parsimonious specification is 0,35419. A likelihood ratio test of the rich model against the parsimo-
nious model failed to reject the latter specification (χ²-value = 4.44; Prob > χ² = 0.8150). 
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of transports to abattoirs had no consequences on the likelihood of program adoption. Calcu-
lations based on data from the Chamber of Agriculture (LKSH 2013) showed that the required 
compensation exceeds the forgone profits due to requirements on stocking density and bed-
ding with straw
20
.  
From the lower section of Table 4.6 it can be seen that also farm and farmer characteristics 
have an impact on choices. Older farmers are ceteris paribus more likely to participate. It 
might be that those farmers are more experienced that their younger counterparts and thus 
adapt to changes in farm management more easily. The longer respondents expect to remain 
active farmers and the more they are willing to invest in the pig farming enterprise, the higher 
is the probability to join a FAW program. The increased likelihood of program participation 
for farmers who keep suckler cows is not easy to explain at a fist glance. In our sample only 
five farms keeping cows for feeding their calves. These farms are also active in other fields, 
such as beef fattening and crop growing, but they keep on average 1450 pigs and report a 
farm size of 74 hectares. Assessing the image of agriculture among the public as relatively 
negative, these farmers might be especially interested to participate in a FAW program to 
communicate that they are concerned about their animals. Direct marketing of meat to con-
sumers has also a positive effect on farmers’ program acceptance, indicating that those farm-
ers aim to present a good image of pig farming (confirming HP4). In contrast, the number of 
fattening units decreases the likelihood of participation. With every additional fattening place, 
farmers need to be compensated with 0.002 €/kg carcass weight. Furthermore, it is self-
evident, that farmers’ who are opposed to the introduction of a FAW label are less inclined to 
join such a program. 
  
                                                 
20
  These calculations are available on request. 
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Table 4.6 Estimation results from the RPL model, WTA and WTA confidence intervals  
Producer Model N = 140 
Parsimonious model 
Log-Likelihood: -715.09218 
Coefficient (SD) 
WTA 
[€/kg] 
WTA confidence 
interval 
(2.5%; 97.5%) 
A
ttrib
u
tes o
f 
F
A
W
 p
ro
g
ram
 x
 
Price premium  2.318*** -  
Barn area per animal (in m
2
) -3.079*** 1.33 [0.40; 2.25] 
Straw bedding (part of barn area) -1.845*** 0.80 [0.26; 1.33] 
Straw bedding (full barn area) -3.994*** 1.72 [0.53; 2.91] 
F
arm
 stru
ctu
re v
ariab
les attitu
d
in
al an
d
 
so
cio
-eco
n
o
m
ic v
ariab
les z 
Age  0.048*** -0.02 [0.04; 0.002] 
Farm acreage 0.002 - - 
High education -0.282 - - 
Basic education 0.360 - - 
Fattening units -0.0002* 0.0001 [-0.00002; 0.0002] 
Willingness to invest 0.009 - - 
Keeping suckler cows 1.933** -0.83 [-1.71; 0.05] 
Direct marketing 1.159* -0.50 [-1.12; 0.12] 
Willingness to participate in a program 0.017 - - 
Time remaining in business 0.062*** -0.03 [-0.05; -0.003] 
Attitude towards animal welfare label -1.105*** 0.48 [0.15; 0.80] 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Comparison of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) values 
For a comparison of consumers’ WTP and farmers’ WTA of enhanced animal welfare, a price 
that can be obtained by farmers is calculated under the assumption of constant mark-up pric-
ing. This means, that if consumers are willing to pay a mark-up about ten percent of the refer-
ence price (7€/kg), the producer price (1.70€/kg) consequently increases by ten percent (ceter-
is paribus). Furthermore, approximately only one third of the pork carcass is marketed as 
fresh pork and the rest is marketed to consumers in cured forms (as sausage, ham or luncheon 
meats) and for example used for the production of gelatin, where it is not possible to secure 
price mark-ups.  
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The producer price that can be paid to the farmer based on the additional consumers’ WTP is 
therefore calculated as: 
(4.5) 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 (
€
𝑘𝑔
) = 1 3⁄ ∗
1.70€
𝑘𝑔
∗
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
7€
𝑘𝑔
⁄ +
2
3⁄ ∗ 1.70 
Another assumption of this calculation is that consumers are also willing to pay a mark-up for 
FAW pork from other meat parts. A comparison of required producer prices and prices that 
can be obtained based on consumers’ WTP is presented in Table 4.7. For each FAW measure 
required producer prices and prices consumers are willing to pay are compared. Assuming 
that the additional price mark-ups (in percent) can be directly added to the producer price al-
lows the calculation of a “possible” producer price. From Table 4.7 can be seen that consum-
ers would pay on average the highest premium for a barn area of 2.00m
2
 per pig, whereas they 
are willing to pay a relatively low increment for a barn area of 1.33m
2
 per pig. It is particular 
notable that the prices pig farmers require exceed the prices calculated based on consumers’ 
WTP without exception. It has to be considered, that these prices are calculated at the mean of 
both samples and neglect varying WTA and WTP estimates. 
 
Table 4.7 Comparison of required compensation prices and possible producer prices 
Variable of FAW 
program 
Required producer 
price per kilogram 
pork[€/kg]21 
Possible 
producer 
price [€/kg] 
Additional 
WTP [%] 
Possible consumer 
price [€/kg] (WTPtotal) 
WTP 
[€/kg] 
Barn area of 1.33 
m
2
 per pig 
 
2.14      > 
 
1.87 10% 7.73 0.73 
Barn area of 1.66 
m
2
 per pig 
2.58      > 2.06 21% 8.45 1.45 
Barn area of 2.00 
m
2
 per pig 
3.03      > 2.33 31% 9.18 2.18 
Straw bedding 
(part of barn area) 
2.50      > 2.05 21% 8.44 1.44 
Straw bedding 
(full barn area) 
3.42      > 2.06 21% 8.48 1.48 
  
                                                 
21
  The required producer price is calculated by adding the reference price of 1.70 Euros per kilogram the re-
quired WTA for the corresponding FAW measure. The marginal WTP for an additional square meter of barn 
area was divided by three to obtain the marginal WTP for 0.33 m
2
 additional barn area. For example, the re-
quired producer price of keeping pigs on a barn are of 1.33 m
2
 per animal, the farmer wishes to obtain 
1.70€/kg + (1.33/3) = 2.14€/kg 
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To take heterogeneous preferences into account, individual WTP/WTA values are calculated 
according to Breustedt et al. (2013), as the sum of the marginal WTP/WTA (obtained from 
formula 4.4) values for a program attribute 𝑥 or a socio-economic characteristic 𝑧𝑛 multiplied 
by the level of the respective variables
22
.  
 
(4.6) 𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑜𝑟 𝑊𝑇𝐴 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑖 = ∑
∆𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑊𝑇𝐴
∆𝑥𝑗
∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑖 + ∑
∆𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑊𝑇𝐴
∆𝑧𝑚
∗ 𝑧𝑚𝑛
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝐽
𝑗=1  
Formula 4.6 allows estimating individual WTA for each pig farmer given the requirement of a 
clearly defined FAW program. As a result, for each pig farmer an individual WTA of a pro-
gram with defined requirements can be computed. Likewise individual consumer WTP esti-
mates can be derived for a pork cutlet produced in accordance with certain program require-
ments. These estimates were used to simulate supply and demand curves for different FAW 
programs. 
Market simulation of supply and demand for pork from a FAW program 
To simulate a market for pork produced in accordance with defined FAW program attributes, 
quantities of supply and demand the sample had to be extrapolated to cover the whole German 
market. The farms in the sample provide a total capacity of 204.713 fattening places (on aver-
age 1462 fattening places), indicating that they are managed intensively compared to the 
German average of 501 fattening places (DBV 2014). Assuming average numbers of 2.89 
fattening rounds per year and an average carcass weight of 95 kg (LWK SH 2013) a total pro-
duction of 18.7 million kilogram fresh meat is computed. Based on the annual consumption of 
738 million kilogram fresh pork in Germany (AMI 2013), the production quantity of the sam-
ple represents 2.5% of total demand. Neglecting foreign trade activities, the production quan-
tity of each farmer was multiplied by the factor 39.5 to approximate total production. A simi-
lar approach was applied to the consumer sample. From the information on consumption fre-
quency per month
23
, the sum of annual consumption days (66 days) was derived for each 
                                                 
22
  Dummy variables taking the values one or zero indicating the absence or presence of a certain attribute. In 
case of numerical variables the marginal WTP/WTA will be multiplied by the standard deviation 
23
  The frequency of meat consumption was surveyed in four categories (see Table 4.3). We approximated for 
each category a number of days per month: 2-3 days/month= 2 days/month; once a week = 4 days/month; 
several days a week = 12 days/month; daily = 20 days. 
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household. Taking into account the annual consumption of pork (9.01 kilogram per capita
24
), 
a quantity of 0.36 kilogram pork per capita per day was derived. By multiplying this quantity 
by the number of household members and consumption days per year, a total annual con-
sumption of 18249 kilograms for the whole sample of consumers was calculated. This number 
represents around 0.0025% of the total consumption in Germany. To predict the market equi-
librium for the total German market, the consumption quantities of pork (kg) for each house-
hold were multiplied by the factor 40440. Previous calculations led on one side to producer 
prices based on farmers’ individual WTA with corresponding production quantities and on the 
other side to producer prices derived from consumers’ individual WTP with corresponding 
consumption quantities for defined FAW programs. 
For the market simulation four different FAW programs were designed: 
 FAW program (entry level):  requires a barn area of 1.33m2 per pig 
 FAW program (medium level): requires a barn area of  1.33m2 per pig and straw bed-
ding in a part of barn 
 FAW program (high level): requires a barn area of  1.66m2 per pig and straw bedding 
in a part of barn 
 FAW program (organic level): requires a barn area of 2.00m2 per pig and straw bed-
ding throughout the barn 
  
                                                 
24
  A quantity of 738 million kilogram pork eaten by the German population (81.9 Million people), results in an 
average consumption quantity of 9.01 kilograms per capita per year.  
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Because other attributes (manipulable material, surgery and transport duration) had no signifi-
cant effect on producers’ willingness to accept, only requirements on stock density and bed-
ding were taken into account designing hypothetical FAW programs. 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1 market balance for an entry level program is estimated at 280 million 
kg of pork meat and a price of 1.80€/kg. This quantity represents 38% of total pork consump-
tion in Germany. Such a low price is only possible because some farmers stated that they are 
able to produce below the reference price of 1.70€/kg.  
In addition to the increased barn space of the entry level program, a medium-leveled FAW 
program (Figure 4.2) requires bedding straw to be spread in parts of the barn. For this pro-
gram, market equilibrium is estimated at 145m kg of pork meat, which accounts for 20% of 
the national pork consumption, and revenue of 2.10€/kg pork meat.  
Figure 4.1 Supply and demand for pork in accordance with entry level program  
89
4 Predicting supply and demand for high-welfare meat with DCEs: an application to the German pork market 
90 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Supply and demand for pork in accordance medium level program 
 
The third program (high-level FAW program) depicted in Figure 4.3 represents a higher 
standard, including 1.66m
2
 of barn space per pig and straw bedding in parts of the barn. The 
market balances at 90 million kilograms and a price of €2.25 kg pork meat. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.3 Supply and demand for pork in accordance with high level program 
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A FAW program with requirements similar to organic livestock standards is presented in Fig-
ure 4.4. Farmers who aim to participate in this program have to extend barn space to 2.00 m
2
 
per pig and cover the entire barn floor with straw.  
 
Figure 4.4 Supply and demand for pork in accordance with organic level program 
For this program (Figure 4.4), market balance could not been achieved. Producers require 
revenue ranging from 2.80€/kg to 7.00 €/kg pork meat, whereas prices derived from consum-
ers’ WTP were between 1.40€/kg and 2.60 €/kg pork meat. Comparing the pork markets in 
accordance with varying standards (Figures 4.1 to 4.4) it becomes obvious that supply and 
demand increasingly diverge with stricter program requirements. 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
It was found that estimates of consumers’ WTP for FAW attributes are all significantly posi-
tive. As expected, negative utility was derived for less restrictive limits on transportation time 
to the abattoir. Previous consumer studies show similar results. For example, Lagerkvist et al. 
(2006) found that Swedish consumers were willing to pay a 46% mark-up on the reference 
price when pigs are kept indoors with plenty of straw. The present study supports their result, 
although the price increment for straw flooring was only 20%. Furthermore, they reported that 
consumers strongly dislike a ban of castration due to increased risk of boar taint. The present 
study could not confirm this result, because requirements on castration and tail docking were 
combined into one attribute “surgery”. Pig castration under anesthesia led to a WTP of 39% 
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above the reference price. Exactly the same result was found by Liljenstolpe (2008). In con-
trast to the present study, Lagerkvist et al. (2006) reported that females are willing to pay less 
than men for the use of straw as bedding material, allowing pigs to be outside and fixing sows 
only at delivery or not fixing them at all. An opposite effect was found in the present study. 
Instead of gender effects on single attributes, the influence of gender on the probability pf 
purchase was predicted, and it was found that females are more likely than men to buy high-
welfare pork. Comparing the results of the producer model with existing studies is difficult. 
First, studies on farmers’ acceptance of farm animal welfare initiatives are more focused on 
their general attitudes towards such programs (Bock and van Huik 2007; Kirchner et al. 2014) 
and less on preferences for certain requirements. Second, existing discrete choice studies with 
livestock farmers deal with voluntary checkoff programs (Norwood et al. 2006), traceability 
systems (Schulz and Tonsor 2010) and marketing contracts (Roe et al. 2004) and thus investi-
gate different choice attributes. Nevertheless, some aspects found in previous studies can be 
confirmed by this research. For example, the impact of a positive attitude towards a farm ani-
mal welfare label on farmers’ participation in a program supports the findings of Vanhonacker 
et al. (2008). They found that some farmers are interested in establishing a more positive im-
age of agriculture among the public.  
The present study has shown that farmers, who are generally willing to accept a FAW pro-
gram, require on average a price increment above what consumers are willing to pay. To ac-
count for differences among respondents, individual WTP and WTA values were calculated. 
The market simulation based on these values showed a more differentiated picture of supply 
and demand relationships for pork produced under different hypothetical animal welfare pro-
grams. Standards that are slightly above the QS minimum standard (FAW entry level present-
ed in Figure 4.1) are well accepted and potentially cover a market share of 38%. Programs 
that are more restrictive on stock density and require straw bedding generate only smaller 
market potentials. This development can be explained by an increasing divergence between 
what farmers require for implementation of higher FAW standards and what prices consumers 
are willing to pay. It is emphasized that market simulations are made under restrictive as-
sumptions regarding the extrapolation of estimation results to the German pork market. An-
other drawback of the present study is that the empirical analysis is based on two samples that 
are not representative of the total population. This means that the conclusions drawn are tenta-
tive and must be regarded with caution.  
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This paper aimed to shed light on pig farmers’ acceptance higher FAW standards and fur-
thermore, on consumers’ willingness to pay for pork produced in accordance with such stand-
ards. Discrete choice experiments (DCE) using identical choice sets were carried out with 
both consumers and pig farmers in Germany. From the results it can be concluded that some 
consumers are indeed willing to pay a premium for FAW in pork production. Especially the 
use of anesthesia for surgery is highly valued. Immuno-castration might provide an alternative 
and should be considered as attribute in further preference studies. Furthermore, not all farm-
ers are equally responding to FAW programs. In particular, farmers who communicate their 
concern for animal welfare to consumers through direct marketing can draw some benefit 
from such programs. From both samples only a minor share of 9% were unwilling to consider 
trade-offs between attributes and, in turn, always refused to choose a FAW program over the 
minimum standard. Existing programs such as the oversubscribed Initiative Tierwohl show 
that, in practice, many farmers are ready to take part in animal welfare initiatives. It remains 
to be seen whether the increasing supply of FAW through such initiatives is met by consum-
ers demand. The low share non-purchases in the present study (21% of all choices) must be 
seen in the light the attitude-behavior gap, and time will tell whether this low share is only an 
artefact of the survey’s hypothetical nature.  
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Abstract 
Small dairy cooperatives can improve their economic performance through horizontal cooper-
ation, e.g., joint milk collection. The approval of such a strategy by cooperative members, 
however, is at risk given an increasing erosion of collective action commitment documented 
in the literature. This paper aims to explain members’ decision to approve or disapprove of 
dairy cooperatives’ joint milk collection. We draw not only on economic theory, but also in-
clude psychological and sociological logics. Farmers’ decisions are modeled by means of a 
discrete choice experiment. Relevant attitudes and relationship quality are measured using 
extant scales. The model is then tested on data collected from members of two dairy coopera-
tives. A multinomial logit (ML) regression is performed to explain farmers answering pat-
terns, where we distinguish between always supporter, selective deciders, and never support-
ers. The multinomial logit regression to explain farmers’ specific response behavior to the 
proposed alternative optimization models in the DCE reveals that especially the never- and 
always-supporters can be meaningfully distinguished by their levels of social interaction with 
other members, supplier relationship quality with the cooperative, and attitude towards the 
project. Frequent cooperative member interaction and supplier relationship quality are both 
associated with an increase in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to the group of never sup-
porters, whereas attitude towards project and attitude towards climate change are associated 
with a decrease in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to that group. Overall, the study high-
lights the necessity to take into account farmers’ attitudes towards proposed strategies, but 
also their relationship with the cooperative, in order to predict and influence their decisions. 
For the latter, this study provides insights as to the relevance of social interaction among 
members, which could be exploited through skillful member management.   
 
Keywords: trust, social interaction, spatial dispersion, member relationships, cooperatives 
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5.1 Introduction 
The European dairy sector is under pressure. Recent developments, such as changes in poli-
cies, high price volatility in global markets, new regulations, altering consumer preferences 
and an increasing demand for animal feed left European dairy farmers in a more competitive 
market with more volatile returns and increasing costs. To cope with this financial stress, 
dairy farmers need efficient and well-performing partners in the dairy processing industry 
easing their situation (Soboh et al. 2011).  
However, the dairy supply chain is often characterized by power imbalances (Jansik et al. 
2014). This holds especially for Germany. With a highly concentrated retail sector exerting 
bargaining power over upstream suppliers, cost pressure is high, resulting in ongoing structur-
al change at the processing and farm level (Jansik et al. 2014). Geographically, there are huge 
differences in the German dairy industry, with regard to the structure and overall strategy of 
processing companies. While the South is characterized by mainly privately owned processors 
producing higher-priced goods in smaller factories, dairy companies in the North-Western 
region are for the most part cooperative enterprises (Zieseniß 2014), often with a focus on 
larger processing quantities and bulk commodities such as milk powder, butter, or low-priced 
consumer goods such as UHT milk (Jansik et al. 2014). However, in the Federal State of 
Schleswig-Holstein, with about 5,000 dairy farmers, there are still 16 dairy processors, of 
which most have between 100 and 150 suppliers only. As shown by Zieseniß (2014) in an 
analysis of dairy companies’ earning indicators, cooperatives often have disadvantages when 
compared to investor-owned firms. Although this can be explained with the specificities of 
the legal form, it poses a general threat to cooperative enterprises that have difficulties financ-
ing long-term investments (Nilsson 2001). Since large cooperatives are able to realize econo-
mies of scale and scope, smaller cooperatives may face additional disadvantages compared to 
their large competitors. Cooperation among smaller cooperatives could remedy these draw-
backs (Pesämaa and Hair Jr 2007). However, such strategies must normally be approved by 
the cooperative members, who may neither be homogeneous in their individual interests nor 
agree with the management’s positions. Recent research has shown that there are increasing 
difficulties in aligning members’ and boards interests (Cook 1994; Österberg and Nilsson 
2009). These strains between processing cooperatives and their member bases have strongly 
increased in Germany in the past decade. A milk strike (delivery boycott) in 2008 underlines 
the tense situation. There is also empirical evidence from many countries, including Germany, 
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for the overall heterogeneity of farmers’ perceptions of their buyers’ strategies (Kalogeras et 
al. 2009; Hellberg-Bahr et al. 2011). This may thus be a crucial barrier to horizontal coopera-
tion of dairy processors, and particularly cooperatives, despite anticipated cost-reductions. 
The aim of this paper therefore is to gain a better understanding of determinants of farmers’ 
approval or disapproval of their cooperatives’ strategy. To this end, a theoretical model is 
developed which combines various research streams, including economics, psychology, and 
sociology. The model is tested in an exploratory empirical survey among dairy cooperative 
members in Northern Germany.  
Our approach is innovative both in the inclusion of measures of social interaction and spatial 
proximity, as well as in the methodological approach, employing discrete choice analysis to 
elicit farmers’ willingness to support their cooperatives’ strategy. We furthermore use an in-
novative empirical example, i.e., a project aiming at a joint optimization of dairies’ milk col-
lection logistics, where economic and ecological benefits are achieved simultaneously, but 
farmers may have to accept that their milk is collected and processed by another dairy compa-
ny of which they are not a member. In the next section, the project will be described in more 
detail, before we develop the research model, describe material, methods, and results and end 
with a discussion of and conclusions on theoretical and managerial implications. 
5.2 Cost reduction through collaboration in milk collection 
The food processing industry often faces high transportation costs in sourcing, due to the fact 
that suppliers are spatially dispersed and raw agricultural products often are bulky and/or per-
ishable (Sexton 1990). This holds especially for the dairy market with the perishable milk 
being collected with a relatively high collection frequency (in most cases every other day), 
resulting in catchment areas that allow an economically reasonable acquisition of the raw milk 
(BKA 2012). Boysen and Schröder (2006) state that the importance of transportation costs 
relative to other cost factors will increase in the future because of developments such as in-
creasing fuel costs, road charges or environmental regulations. Since farmers in Germany 
mostly receive the same price irrespective of their spatial location and thus irrespective of the 
relative costs of milk acquisition, processors bear the total costs of transporting the raw prod-
uct from the farmer to the processing site (BKA 2012). Thus, cost reduction in milk acquisi-
tion is desirable and could be achieved by cooperation among processors (BKA 2012). 
Boysen and Schröder (2006) describe relevant returns to scale with regard to growing proces-
sor sizes. The specific potential for smaller cooperatives located in the same area lies in joint 
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milk collection such that each farmer’s milk is transported to the closest dairy, instead of the 
dairy to which the farmer is associated as a member. As exemplified in Figure 5.1 for the case 
of two dairies A and B and their suppliers A1-5 and B1-4, this would mean that the milk of 
farmers A2 and A5 would likely be more efficiently collected by the milk truck of dairy B, 
while B3 and B4’s milk would be processed in dairy A. Membership and payment would not 
be affected by this logistics optimization, since the processors would settle the transfer be-
tween them without notice to the farmers. Cost savings would be shared according to the con-
tributions of each dairy. 
 
Figure 5.1 Exemplary case of dispersed member structures and individual milk collection 
Besides the organizational requirements, there is an additional challenge to the implementa-
tion of such cooperation, since the support of the members cannot be taken for granted, as we 
will explain in the following section.  
5.3 Farmers support of cooperative management strategies: Development of the re-
search model 
The cooperative model implies the role of farmers not only being patrons but also owners. 
With the democratic principle of one man-one vote, this demands farmers’ involvement in 
decision-making. Several studies have pointed at increasing difficulties of cooperative enter-
prises to make their members engage in active participation (Nilsson 2001; Nilsson et al. 
2009; Österberg and Nilsson 2009; Nilsson et al. 2012). Furthermore, there is evidence of a 
gap between managers, the board of directors, and members with respect to the evaluation of 
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strategies (Hellberg-Bahr et al. 2011). Consequently, members’ support of the cooperatives’ 
strategies as developed by the CEOs can be at stake. In this section, we first elucidate the ap-
proach to assess farmers’ overall propensity to support management strategies and thereby set 
the theoretical framework. We then explore the state of knowledge in the field of farmer par-
ticipation in cooperative decision-making, and develop our research model to explain farmers’ 
acceptance of a stronger collaboration among their cooperative enterprises. Hypothesized de-
terminants include the evaluation of the strategy, or project, the quality of the farmer-
cooperative relationship, and the local and social interaction among members, i.e., the farmer-
farmer relationship. 
Assessment of farmers’ propensity to accept management proposals 
Assuming farmers to be rational, utility maximizing actors, one would expect that farmers 
support those strategies that they await to lead to the best possible outcome. Since utility is a 
latent construct that cannot be measured directly, we make use of the discrete choice ap-
proach, based on Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value (Lancaster 1966), which allows 
us to assume that farmers’ acceptance of a proposed strategy depends on the evaluation of the 
“bundle” of measures and their consequences.  
From a set of mutually exclusive and finite milk collection schemes, farmer 𝑛 choose the 
most preferred one (𝑗∗) yielding the highest utility (𝑈𝑗𝑛). Following the random utility theory 
(McFadden 1974), farmers’ decision process is not observable by the researcher and therefore 
the utility function is understood to comprise two parts  
(5.1) 𝑈𝑗𝑛 = 𝑉(𝑥𝑗𝑛, 𝑧𝑛) + 𝜀𝑗𝑛 
with V being the deterministic part defined by a vector of attribute levels 𝒙, a vector 𝒛 defined 
by the farmers’ personal characteristics, and 𝜺 being the unobservable stochastic part account-
ing for information that is not captured by the model. The deterministic part gives us the 
framework for the research design.  
There are to date a number of studies employing discrete choice experiments (DCE) to ex-
plain farmers’ preferences. Examples include contract acceptance (Roe et al. 2004; Broch and 
Vedel 2012), acceptance of changes in production practices like the adoption of GM seeds 
(Breustedt et al. 2009) or the effect of abandoning the use of bovine growth hormones in milk 
production (Olynk et al. 2012). Previous studies have shown the use of DCE as a tool to in-
vestigate drivers for contract acceptance. For example Roe et al. (2004) investigated hog pro-
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ducers’ preferences for marketing contract attributes affecting the distribution of profits. Be-
sides the effect of contract elements on the likelihood of acceptance they revealed strong pref-
erences for a cooperative organizational form, in particular for producers who attach im-
portance to a trustful relationship with their contractors. In their study of participation in agri-
environmental schemes (AES) Ruto an Garrod (2009) identified a large group of farmers who 
require a lower incentive payment for acceptance of contracts that offer less flexibility and a 
higher administrative burden compared to a group of highly resistant adopters. In a study on 
afforestation contracts Broch and Vedel (2012) investigated farmers’ preferences for attrib-
utes composed of the purpose of afforestation, a cancelling option and monitoring of imple-
mentation as well as a compensation payment. They emphasized the importance of accounting 
for heterogeneity among the target population to design contracts efficiently. Overall, these 
studies highlight that information on farmers’ valuation of contract elements is key to achieve 
a higher level of acceptance.  
In the cooperative literature, however, we are not aware of any study employing discrete 
choice experiments to investigate farmers’ support for their cooperatives’ strategy conditional 
on the level of expected outcomes. For the logistics optimization presented above, we suggest 
that a DCE can be employed to measure farmers’ approval of the optimization scheme. We 
assume that farmers’ decision behavior depends on the expected savings, redistributed to the 
farmers as a mark-up on the milk price and a reduction in carbon emissions due to reorganiza-
tion of milk collection (Quinlan et al. 2012), and the need for a farmer to accept that his milk 
be collected and processed by another dairy. The following hypotheses are related to these 
attributes (𝑥): 
H1: The higher the economic gain from the scheme, the more likely a farmer will approve it. 
H2: The higher the reduction in carbon emission associated with the scheme, the more likely 
a farmer will approve it. 
H3: If the optimization scheme requires a farmer to accept his milk being processed in anoth-
er dairy plant, he will be less likely to approve of the scheme. 
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In the following, we explore the personal characteristics (𝑧), which we assume to additionally 
shape farmers’ preferences.  
Evaluation of the strategy 
Hellberg-Bahr et al. (2011) use a psychometric approach to measure farmers’ evaluation of 
particular cooperative strategies. They find, based on attitudinal measures, that there are basi-
cally two groups of farmers: those who are rather short-term oriented, and those who support 
investments of their dairy cooperative which will pay-off in the longer term. Although a link 
to the actual decision-making of farmers is not made, one can assume, following the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991), that such attitudes are strongly related to intentions to act. 
We therefore hypothesize that  
H4: The more positively a farmer evaluates the proposed strategy of cooperatives’ managers, 
the more likely he will support it with his vote. 
In addition to the economic benefits which can be derived from the cooperation, in the specif-
ic case of logistics optimization, there are further positive effects relating to a reduction in 
CO2-emissions (Sheane et al. 2011; Thoma et al. 2010). We therefore hypothesize that 
H5: The more a farmer fears the consequences of climate change, the more he will be willing 
to support the logistics optimization. 
Quality of the farmer-cooperative relationship 
Reasons for the differences in perceptions, expectations, attitudes and actions among mem-
bers as well as between members and management, or the board of directors, respectively, 
have been extensively described in the literature. Specific aspects to be noted are: common 
ownership (free-rider), horizon, portfolio, follow-up, and decision-making problems, which 
are fundamentally based in member heterogeneity and diluted property rights (Nilsson 2001; 
Cechin et al. 2013). Large cooperatives often also suffer from an increasing social alienation 
from their members, when personal relationships become difficult to maintain with a growing 
member base. This might cause additional problems in the relationship between members and 
their cooperatives. Empirical evidence in the relationship management literature underlines 
that specifically trust and commitment have a positive impact on, among others, willingness 
to cooperate (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wilson 2000; Kleinaltenkamp et al. 2006; Cechin et al. 
2013) Such effects have been proven in many empirical studies also in the dairy sector 
(Schulze et al. 2008; Schulze-Ehlers et al. 2014).  
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Relationship quality is generally understood to comprise satisfaction, trust, and commitment, 
although many studies also include other variables such as communication (Athanasopoulou 
2009). Some studies exclude satisfaction (Obadia and Vida 2011; Leonidou et al. 2014), while 
others only retain satisfaction out of the three core variables and include other measures in-
stead (Lages et al. 2005). Hellberg-Bahr et al. (2011) find that relationship quality plays an 
important role in explaining farmers being in the cluster of “investment supporters” in a coop-
erative context. Österberg and Nilsson (2009) as well as Hansen et al. (2002) and Cechin et al. 
(2013) also provide evidence for the positive effects of trusting member-cooperative relation-
ships on loyalty. 
In the specific case of milk collection optimization, where the actual savings occur at the pro-
cessor level and may strongly differ based on the regional conditions (Quinlan et al. 2012), 
farmers have to trust their cooperative to honestly reveal the financial gains and redistribute it 
to them as members. Put differently, the lack of transparency of the monetary effects and con-
sequently the lack of means to fully appropriate the savings requires members to either trust 
their dairy or disapprove of the measure (Schulze-Ehlers et al. 2014). On the other hand the 
strategy might imply that a member is required to accept his milk being processed in another 
dairy. For this case, it can be assumed that a very trusting and committed member also would 
disapprove. It could thus be anticipated that  
H6: There is an inverse U-shaped effect of relationship quality on farmers’ propensity to sup-
port milk collection optimization, with very high and very low relationship quality leading to 
disapproval of the optimization project. 
Local social interaction as a determinant of group cohesion and cooperation orientation 
It is straightforward to assume that factors such as communication between member and coop, 
or the behavior of the management and the board of directors can have a direct effect on rela-
tionship quality (Wilson 2000; Hansen et al. 2002). Another, more sociological perspective, 
lets us introduce also member-member-interaction into our empirical model explained below 
in this section. Hansen et al. (2002) explored the effect of trust among members of two agri-
cultural marketing cooperatives on their perceived cohesion, and consequently willingness to 
stay with the group, i.e., the cooperative. A major finding is that trust varies depending on the 
complexity of services offered and the geographical dispersion of the cooperative members. 
They hypothesize that the latter might be an indicator of the infrequency of social interactions 
among members and between members and management, which results in lower levels of 
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affective trust as compared to cognitive trust (Hansen et al. 2002). The main justification is 
that geographical dispersion leads to less frequent interactions and thus fewer personal rela-
tionships among members or between members and management, which are a prerequisite for 
the formation of affective trust. The cooperative therefore cannot represent a means to fulfill 
social goals if its membership is strongly dispersed (Hansen et al. 2002) and cognitive param-
eters determine loyalty or switching, cooperation or defection.  
Theoretically, besides these empirical findings, justification for the inclusion of social interac-
tion is straight-forward. In general, economic agents and their interactions are the core of eco-
nomics. The actions of one agent potentially affect the preferences, expectations and con-
straints of other agents (Manski 2000). Therefore, social interaction may shape farmers’ pref-
erences, expectations and constraints with regard to the optimized milk collection.  
The inclusion of social interaction seems even more reasonable in a cooperative setting, be-
cause the cooperative is a network organization by design (Hong and Sporleder 2007), com-
prising social interaction and clan-like structures (Ouchi 1980). Whereas the outcomes of so-
cial interaction, such as social capital in cooperatives, are commonly considered (for example 
Nilsson et al. 2012), direct inclusion of social interaction in agricultural research is rare. Ex-
ceptions include the examination of social effects influencing the learning and adoption of 
new technologies and practices (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010; Yu et 
al. 2014). Doing so, however, requires defining the group of people (peers) somebody is in-
fluenced by with regard to a certain issue. In a cooperative setting, this may be rather com-
plex, since one may consider social interaction with different groups, e.g. cooperative mem-
bers, non-cooperative members, the cooperative management and others.  
Taking up the consideration that frequent social interaction between cooperative members 
results in higher levels of affective trust, leading to higher levels of group cohesion (Hansen et 
al. 2002), one may assume that members interacting mostly with other members will be more 
reluctant to approve cooperative measures they fear to threaten that structure. On the other 
hand, if someone is characterized by high levels of interaction with the members of other co-
operatives, his social network is less associated with the cooperative, leading to less perceived 
dependence of the cooperative as a means to fulfill social goals.  
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This leaves one with the next hypothesis: 
H7: Frequent interactions with coop members result in a lower willingness to support the 
cooperatives’ measure.  
Furthermore, the conclusions by Hansen et al. (2002) are based on the assumption of spatial 
proximity as an indicator for the frequency of social interaction. This link has been empirical-
ly tested in various networks and contexts (Sohn et al. 2013), but, to our knowledge, not in the 
framework of agricultural cooperatives. The last hypothesis therefore is:      
H8: Social interaction is associated with spatial proximity in an agricultural cooperative con-
text. 
Figure 5.2 summarizes the theoretically evaluated determinants of the approval of horizontal 
cooperation. 
 
Figure 5.2 Proposed Research Model 
The next section describes the data collection, employed measures, and explains how a dis-
crete choice experiment (DCE) is used to elicit farmers’ willingness to support cooperative 
policies. 
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5.4 Material and Methods  
Data Collection 
The distribution of the written questionnaire was managed by two dairy cooperatives in Octo-
ber 2014. Fifty-three questionnaires were returned completed, accounting for 19 % and 21 % 
of the respective cooperatives’ members. Fifty of the 53 respondents indicated being the head 
of the farm operation. Thirty-six percent of the farmers stated there was another dairy closer 
to their farm. Fifty-four percent of the participants have been members of the respective coop 
for more than 20 years, 34% have been members for less than 10 years. The majority (58 %) 
has a milk quota endowment between 300,000 and 700,000 kilograms, 23 % have more, and 
19 % have less than that. 
Measures 
The attitude towards the proposed logistics optimization was measured with four items asking 
whether farmers deemed the measure as making sense, the cooperation to be realistic, the 
opinion of peers with respect to the optimization, and the extent to which the measure is actu-
ally relevant for achieving the expected goals, in this case, the contribution of transportation 
to the carbon footprint of milk. The measures of relationship quality are based on the supplier 
relationship quality (SRQ) items from Schulze et al. (2008), Hansen et al. (2002) and Bijman 
and Verhees (2011). To measure supply chain orientation, two items were taken from 
(Schulze-Ehlers et al. 2014), reflecting vertical cooperation orientation, and common goal 
orientation. For the empirical case study, attention was also paid to studies dealing with con-
cern for climate change. Arbuckle et al. (2013) recently provided evidence of the heterogene-
ous attitudes of farmers with respect to climate change. We therefore expect that a farmer will 
be more willing to support the proposed logistics optimization the more he is concerned about 
climate change. Four items reflecting concern about climate change and willingness to con-
tribute to climate change mitigation were taken from Arbuckle et al. (2013). The attitudinal 
and the SRQ items were all measured on 7-point scales. To reduce the complexity and test for 
the unidimensionality of the included constructs, a principal component analysis (PCA) with 
an orthogonal (varimax) rotation was employed, with an Eigenvalue of 1 as cut-off criterion. 
Beforehand, a substitution of missing values by the mean was performed. A maximum of four 
values per variable were substituted, indicating a maximum share of substituted values per 
variable of 7.5 %. Table 5.1 presents an overview of the results. The Cronbach’s Alpha values 
of above 0.7 for the factors indicate a sufficient reliability of the factors.  
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Table 5.1 Results of the PCA 
N = 53 
Construct/ item 
Mean SD 
Factor  
Loading 
Supplier Relationship Quality 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=0.95; contribution to variance explained=36.4%) 
   
How much do you trust the dairies’ management?25 6.06 1.18 0.922 
There is no factual reason to doubt the managements’ abilities.24 6.21 1.03 0.887 
My dairy is economically well positioned.
24 
6.10 1.10 0.865 
How much do you trust the cooperatives’ board?26 5.90 1.11 0.845 
I feel well represented by the board.
24 
5.92 1.11 0.829 
The dairy respect their commitments.
24 
6.15 1.06 0.787 
My sense of intuition tells me that the cooperative’s management 
can be trusted.
24 6.02 1.22 0 .754 
If I could choose a new buyer, I would choose the same again.
24 
6.13 1.02 0.695 
I feel committed to my dairy.
24 
6.09 1.15 0.677 
The prices paid by my dairy are reasonable considering the different 
market situations.
24
   
5.75 1.19 0.670 
In case of problems my dairy and I come to an accommodation.
24 
6.10 0.99 0.654 
Attitude towards Project 
(Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.85; contribution to variance explained 
=14.7%) 
   
An optimization of milk collection in Schleswig-Holstein is useful.
24 
5.23 1.98 0.904 
The cooperation of farms in Schleswig-Holstein is reasonable.
24 
4.55 1.59 0.852 
The majority of my peers believe that an optimization of milk collec-
tion in Schleswig-Holstein is useful.
24 4.31 1.92 0.833 
Transportation has an impact on the carbon footprint of milk. 4.72 1.78 0.684 
Satisfaction with Dairy 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=0.87; contribution to variance explained=14.1%) 
   
I am … with the milk collection of  my dairy.25 5.71 1.50 0.830 
I am … with the collaboration with my dairy.25 6.09 1.35 0.757 
Compared to other dairies I am … with my dairies’ milk price.2 5.87 1.36 0.748 
Attitude towards Climate Change 
(Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.72; Variance explained = 8.6%) 
   
The possible influence of climate change on our local agriculture 
worries me.
24 4.21 1.88 0.877 
I believe that extreme weather events will occur in the future.
24 
4.92 1.73 0.850 
                                                 
25
  Scale from 1= Not at all to 7= Entirely 
26
  Scale from 1 Absolutely dissatisfied to 7= Absolutely satisfied 
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The overall perceived supplier relationship quality includes ten items covering the sub-
dimensions: commitment as well as cognitive and affective trust. The employed items for this 
construct were adapted from Schulze et al. (2006), Hansen et al. (2002) and Bijman and 
Verhees (2011). The satisfaction with the relationship however was found to form a separate 
factor comprising three items relating to the collaboration in general, the milk price and milk 
collection, as proposed by Schulze et al. (2008). Trust includes both a cognitive and an affec-
tive dimension. In the cooperative context, trust in the managers as well as in the board of 
directors and representatives has to be distinguished. Farmers’ attitude towards the proposed 
project was measured with four items asking whether farmers deemed the measure as sense 
making, the cooperation to be realistic, the positive opinion of peers with respect to the opti-
mization, and the extent to which the measure actually is relevant to achieve the expected 
goals, in this case, the contribution of transportation to the carbon footprint of milk. Two 
items reflecting farmers’ concern about climate change were adapted from Arbuckle et al. 
(2013). All utilized attitudinal and SRQ items were measured on 7 point scales. 
As shown by reported means and standard deviations in Table 5.1, perceived relationship 
quality and satisfaction are quite high in the sample. Also, the evaluation of the project is 
overall positive, but farmers are rather neutral as to the impacts of future climate change. The 
7-point scale is fully exploited by the participants only in the case of project evaluation and 
climate change perceptions. For satisfaction, the items on overall satisfaction and price satis-
faction exhibit a minimum value of 2, thus the most negative answer has not been selected by 
any of the respondents, and most of the relationship quality items have a minimum value of 3 
(exemption: for trust in management the minimum is 2).  
Spatial dispersion is measured by the share of neighbors being members of the same coopera-
tive. Measures for social interaction with respect to dairy farming are based on Bijman and 
Verhees (2011), Conley and Udry (2010) and Yu et al. (2014), distinguishing neighborhood 
and cooperative membership, respectively. Descriptive statistics of these Likert type items are 
reported in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Results for spatial and social interaction 
Items for spatial and social interaction Mean SD Min Max 
How many peers (dairy producers) with who you discuss issues regard-
ing milk production and marketing at least once a month live in your or a 
neighboring municipality? (N=47)
*
      
4.28 1.56 1 7 
How many peers (dairy producers) with who you discuss issues regard-
ing milk production and marketing at least once a month are members of 
your cooperative? (N=48)
*
    
 
4.10 1.57 1 7 
*Scale from 1= None to 7= All 
Those two variables show no tendency, since the mean is close to 4 and the full scale is ex-
ploited.  The third variable was measured as a binary variable and the respondents had to indi-
cate, whether most of their neighboring dairy producers are a member of their cooperative. It 
thus indicates the spatial proximity to other cooperative members. Twenty-nine respondents 
indicated that most of their neighboring dairy producers are a member of their cooperative, 
whereas 19 respondents negated this question. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of this binary 
variable in relation to the variable indicating the share of peers being members of the same 
cooperative.  
Table 5.3 Cross table of spatial membership structure and social interaction 
“Most neighboring dairy 
producers are members of the 
same cooperative.” 
“How many peers (dairy producers) with who you discuss issues regarding 
milk production and marketing at least once a month are members of your 
cooperative?” 
None      All Total 
No 3 2 7 5 0 0 2 19 
Yes 0 1 3 11 7 4 3 29 
Total 3 3 10 16 7 4 5 48 
 
The cross table suggests that farmers who are mostly surrounded by other cooperative mem-
bers seem to have more social interaction with cooperative members. Given that a Shapiro-
Wilk test failed to reject normality and a Bartlett’s test for equal variances failed to reject ho-
mogeneity of variances we carried out a t-test. This indeed supports H8, i.e., we found signifi-
cant differences in the central tendency (mean: 4.66 vs. 3.26; t-value: -3.295).    
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Since we hypothesized that frequent interaction with cooperative members has an impact on 
the willingness to support the cooperative measure, we dichotomized the variable measuring 
the share of peers being members of the same cooperative. Respondents that quoted higher 
values than the neutral position (4) are thus grouped by the dummy variable. In doing so, we 
are cautious of incorporating single-item measures with regard to complex constructs and 
assume that by means of the dichotomization, the true scale of social interaction is measured 
with more validity. This new variable indicates a more frequent interaction with cooperative 
members compared to non-cooperative members and was labeled as frequent coop member 
interaction. 
Discrete Choice Experiment 
To investigate acceptance behavior and identify determinants of the decision process prior to 
project implementation, we employed a discrete choice experiment (DCE). The assumptions 
underlying this model have already been detailed in Section 5.3. The experiment to elicit the 
implicit utility of single measures combined in the optimization strategy was set up in close 
cooperation with two dairy managers. The relevant issues regarding the optimization of milk 
collection and consequences that might affect the approval by the farmer were carefully dis-
cussed. Primarily, the cooperation serves the purpose of efficiently planning the milk collec-
tion routes. To achieve cost savings, the collection may be done by a shipping company or by 
the cooperating firms depending on the distances between farm and processor. The decision 
parameters relevant for farmers’ approval or disapproval of a joint logistics optimization were 
defined to relate to (1) the potential increase in milk prices due to cost savings, which range 
between 1 and 10 eurocent/100 kilograms of milk, (2) the consequence for the individual 
farmer, which could be that a farmer’s milk would be collected by an external shipping com-
pany or processed by another firm, and (3) the potential reduction of CO2-emissions, which 
were estimated to be between 1 and 3 %.  
In the DCE framework, different versions of a logistic optimization model are presented to 
members of the cooperatives. Each choice set comprised two possible optimization models 
and an “opt-out” alternative if the farmer does not approve the cooperation. Due to the volun-
tary character of approval the inclusion of the status quo option is deemed realistic. The D-
efficiency of the orthogonal design after exclusion of three unrealistic combinations is still 
high at 98.6 with regard to a value of 90 indicating a satisfactory design (Kuhfeld et al. 1994). 
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The alternatives were divided into six blocks with four choice sets each. Table 5.4 exemplifies 
a choice set. 
Table 5.4 Example for a Choice Set 
Attributes Model 1 Model 2 Opt-out 
Milk collection and pro-
cessing 
Milk is collected by a ship-
ping company and processed 
by the cooperating firm. 
Milk is collected and pro-
cessed by the cooperating 
firm. 
None of the models is attrac-
tive to me. Reduction of emission  2% 1% 
Compensation (eurocent per 
100 kg milk) 
1.0 2.0 
I agree to: □ □ □ 
 
Unfortunately, the number of questionnaires per block was not returned equally distributed, 
implying an unbalanced distribution of choice options in the sample. A first overview of the 
returned questionnaires indicated a specific response pattern distinguishing three different 
groups: “never supporters (1)”, comprising ten farmers who never chose one of the proposed 
models presented in the four choice-sets in their version of the questionnaire, ten “selective 
deciders (2)”, who supported some, but not all models, choosing at least once to opt out, and 
33 highly supportive farmers classified as “always supporters (3)” who always chose one of 
the proposed models. Following the rationale of Lancaster’ characteristics theory, we can as-
sume that for the always supporter, even the lowest attribute level would suffice to convince 
them of the project. For the never supporters, on the other hand, even the highest mark-up 
proposed in the experiment would have not been enough to compensate them for the introduc-
tion of the new milk collection scheme. Given that there is no actual cost incurred by the 
farmers with respect to the implementation of the project, we assume that the decision behav-
ior of the never supporters is driven by other than economic incentives. For the selective de-
ciders, finally, we can assume that there is a threshold in economic and environmental, or 
social attributes. Given the small sample size, a further investigation seems not reasonable, 
however.  
Instead, we will explore potential mechanisms of the data generating process. To further in-
vestigate this particular response behavior, we employ a multinomial logit regression to ex-
plain farmers’ likelihood of belonging to one of the three above described groups.  
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Multinomial Logit Estimation 
The three groups can be assumed as three dichotomous variables, taking the value 1 when a 
farmer belongs to this group and 0 otherwise. Following (Greene 2008) the model for the 
probability that a decision maker 𝒊 with characteristics 𝒙𝒊 belongs to one of those groups is: 
(5.2) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒
𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖
𝐽
𝑘=1
 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝐽 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐽 = 3 
The probabilities sum to one, therefore only 𝐽 − 1 can be specified. To obtain model identifi-
cation a convenient normalization was done by setting  𝛽3 = 0. This means that the remaining 
coefficients 𝛽𝑗 measure the change relative to a reference group, or base category. In this case, 
we define the largest group, y =  3  (always supporter)27 as the reference group. Hence, the 
coefficients of the multinomial model are interpreted in comparison to this base category. The 
parameters are not directly interpretable, thus the relative risk ratio has to be computed in-
stead. The exponential value of a coefficient is the relative-risk ratio for a change in the re-
gressor 𝑥𝑖. In this specific case, the regressors relate to the above derived hypotheses on de-
terminants of farmers’ approval of cooperative logistics optimization models, i.e., evaluation 
of the optimization idea, relationship quality, social interaction and attitudes towards climate 
change.  
5.6 Results 
Despite the small sample size, we find significant differences between the three groups of 
never supporters, selective deciders, and always supporters. Nevertheless, the findings have to 
be treated cautiously, due to the relatively small sample size. Note that due to missing values 
in the variable for social interaction, five observations were excluded from the analysis. Table 
5.5 displays the results of the multinomial logit estimation with the group declared as always 
supporters representing the base category.  
  
                                                 
27
  The codes for the outcomes 1 to 3 are arbitrary, i.e. no value is placed on a specific category.   
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Table 5.5 Results of the ML estimation: relative-risk ratios 
Variables Never supporters Selective deciders 
Attitude towards project (H4) 
0.0609*** 0.373* 
(0.978) (0.576) 
Attitude towards climate change (H5) 
0.163* 0.966 
(1.045) (0.460) 
Supplier relationship quality (H6) 25.47* 0.984 
 (1.764) (0.374) 
Satisfaction with dairy (H6) 
1.176 1.990 
(0.606) (0.510) 
Frequent coop member interaction (H7) 13.28* 2.932 
 (1.515) (0.892) 
Constant 
0.0141** 0.228*** 
(1.869) (0.555) 
 
Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base category: always supporters 
Pseudo R²: 0.33 
Observations: 48  
Standard errors of log coefficients in parentheses 
 
For the propensity of belonging to the group of never supporters, four variables have a statis-
tically significant impact. First, the relative-risk ratio estimators for attitude towards project 
and attitude towards climate change are both statistically significant and below one. This in-
dicates that an increase of either constructs is related to a decline of the relative odds for the 
group of never supporters compared to the group of always supporters. These findings are 
consistent with hypotheses 4 and 5. For the group of selective supporters only the attitude 
towards the project is significant in distinguishing the group from always supporters. With a 
value below one, it indicates, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the likelihood of belonging to the 
group of selective deciders compared to the group of always supporters. The significance of 
this factor in both groups underlines the importance of the attitude towards the project for the 
approval of cooperation among dairy processors. 
Second, supplier relationship quality is positively associated with an increase of the relative 
probability of belonging to the group of never supporters relative to the base category. We 
thus do not find the hypothesized inverse U-shape relationship, but a negative relationship 
between SRQ and project support.   
Finally, we find frequent coop member interaction being associated with an increase in the 
relative probability of belonging to the group of never supporters. Thus, the relative probabil-
ity of belonging to the group of never supporters as compared to the group of always support-
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ers is ceteris paribus higher for farmers characterized by frequent interaction with other 
members of the same cooperative than for farmers frequently interacting with dairy producers 
not being members of the cooperative. This is in line with hypothesis H7.  
Discussion  
The empirical findings revealed in the multinomial logit estimation support by and large our 
proposed framework of factors influencing farmers’ decisions. Despite the necessary change 
in the empirical strategy due to unbalanced distribution of choice set blocks, we obtain mean-
ingful results for the remaining hypotheses 4-8. The multinomial logit regression to explain 
farmers’ specific response behavior to the proposed alternative optimization models in the 
DCE reveals that especially the never- and always-supporters can be meaningfully distin-
guished by their levels of social interaction with other members, SRQ with the cooperative, 
and attitude towards project. Frequent coop member interaction and SRQ are both associated 
with an increase in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to the group of never supporters, 
whereas attitude towards project and attitude towards climate change are associated with a 
decrease in the relative-risk ratios of belonging to that group. Hypotheses 4, 5 and 7 thus are 
supported by this study, while for H6, we do not find a u-shape, but a negative link between 
member-cooperative relationship and strategy approval. We argue that this latter finding, 
which may seem contradictory to the literature in relationship marketing, is due to the specific 
strategy analyzed in this study. 
Theoretically, we contribute to the cooperative literature in presenting experimental evidence 
for the relevance of horizontal and vertical relationships in cooperative member decision-
making. Given the specific logistics focus, the results with respect to the negative impact of 
SRQ may not be generalizable. Studies focusing on other cooperative strategies should there-
fore take into account the specific implications a measure has for the relationship between a 
farmer and the other members as well as the cooperative, and formulate their hypotheses re-
spectively. The directions of influence indicate that never supporters are more strongly driven 
by relational factors in their decision-making than always supporters. The better the relation-
ship with the own cooperative, the less ready a farmer is to accept models which might lead to 
an erosion of this relationship. The same holds for social interaction with cooperative mem-
bers.  
Furthermore, we add to the literature by examining the spatial embeddedness of social inter-
action in a cooperative setting. At first glance, the results in the descriptive section did not 
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directly support hypothesis H8, since the variable measuring the interaction with other coop-
erative members at the community or neighboring community, level showed no tendency. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the spatial distribution of peers may have a wider radius 
than indicated by communities or neighboring communities on average. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of the share of cooperative social interaction conditional on the extent of coopera-
tive members surrounding the farmer supports this hypothesis.   
The practical implications for preparing decisions in a cooperative context are twofold. First, 
a selective strategy for the communication of new management measures seems reasonable. 
Social interaction among cooperative members may be associated with spatial dispersion of 
cooperative members. A selective, regionalized strategy, with a special emphasis on those 
regions with high member density, can thus be appropriate. Second, the relevance of the atti-
tude towards the project indicates that communication of the advantages and measures of a 
project is crucial. Communication of environmental effects may be an additional argument for 
farmers to support the program, as shown by the significance of the respective coefficient 
(attitude towards climate change) in the group of never supporters.  
Conclusion 
All in all, the paper proposes a theoretical model and obtains first evidence for factors shaping 
farmers’ approval or disapproval of horizontal cooperation among cooperative processing 
firms. Awareness of that may ease the implementation of such measures and may give a com-
petitive advantage for small and medium-sized cooperatives. However, despite the response 
rate of about 20 %, one may criticize the results as being biased due to the small sample size, 
and we emphasize that the empirical results should be interpreted with caution. A larger sam-
ple size and balanced distribution of choice sets would give the opportunity to understand the 
relevance of the different attributes describing the choices of optimization schemes, i.e., to 
estimate the marginal effects each attribute has on the likelihood of support. On the other 
hand, since this research focused on small and medium-sized cooperatives, it may be difficult 
to obtain much larger samples.  
The heterogeneity in farmers’ decision-making could be analyzed in more detail with more 
degrees of freedom. Some omitted variables might challenge our results and should be includ-
ed in future studies. These include the financial situation of a farmer and the perceived impact 
of the strategy on the own situation, and an evaluation of the other dairy which is expected to 
collect the milk. For farmers with low liquidity, it might simply be unaffordable to reject a 
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proposal which delivers even the slightest mark-up. Questions on the financial situation, how-
ever, are difficult to include in surveys. Further, while the personal concern is to some extent 
covered by the evaluation of the strategy, there could be some other measures to capture the 
full picture, such as the expectation of being personally affected or not. The evaluation of the 
other dairy is useful to control for barriers residing in a negative reputation of this company as 
compared to the current cooperative. Nevertheless, the scenario for the choice experiment is 
quite realistic, creating unique favorable conditions for the observation of behavior in that 
context. 
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6. Conclusion  
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present dissertation was to investigate farmers’ willingness to provide spe-
cific food qualities that do not necessarily have an impact on the properties of the final prod-
uct, but are related to the way they are produced. During the last decade, consumers have be-
come more and more concerned about food production processes, especially in European 
countries. Organic production, animal welfare and products manufactured in a “natural” way 
are three broad areas of consumers’ interest (Grunert et al. 2004). To some extent, increasing 
consumers’ awareness and demand are the reason why farmers face changing production re-
quirements affecting their farming activities. Production programs introduced by the private 
sector, as well as the implementation of regulations, are possible ways to enforce those 
changes. Discrete choice experiments (DCE) can be used to inform private companies or poli-
cy makers about farmers’ preferences for new technologies, policies or alternative contract 
designs. Case studies were carried out using this method to reveal farmers’ preferences for 
production programs aiming to enhance process quality. The first study investigates dairy 
farmers’ valuation of support schemes offered by dairy companies to encourage adoption of 
GM-free milk production. A second study deals with farmers’ willingness to participate in a 
farm animal welfare (FAW) program for dairy cattle. A central question was how the per-
ceived importance of animal wellbeing affects farmers’ decision behavior. A third study ap-
plied DCEs to both pig farmers and pork consumers using identical choice sets describing 
hypothetical FAW programs in pig farming. Consumers’ willingness to pay for enhanced an-
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imal welfare and farmers’ requested monetary compensation were combined in order to simu-
late a market for pork produced in compliance with higher standards. The fourth study deals 
with a rather different topic. Unlike previous studies, determinants of farmers’ willingness to 
support dairy cooperatives’ joint milk collection were investigated. Farmers were asked under 
what circumstances they would approve of management strategy with the goal to reduce the 
costs of milk collection and carbon emission introduced by dairy cooperatives. A summary of 
the main finding of each case study related to existing literature is followed by a critical ap-
praisal of the empirical data and the DCE method. The final section derives implications for 
policy and industry and makes suggestions for further research.  
6.1 Consideration of results in the context of existing literature 
Many studies exist on consumers’ willingness to pay for process quality attributes like organ-
ic production (Van Loo et al. 2011), animal welfare (Lagerkvist et al. 2006; Carlsson et al. 
2007; Liljenstolpe 2008) or food that is produced without genetically modified organisms 
(Burton et al. 2001; Henseleit et al. 2009). In the field of agriculture, this methodology has 
rather been applied to topics like farmers’ acceptance of AES (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espi-
nosa-Goded et al. 2010; Breustedt et al. 2013), their willingness to adopt or to give up a tech-
nology such as cultivation of GM crops (maize or oilseed rape) or the use of hormones in 
milk production (Birol et al. 2009; Breustedt et al. 2008; Olynk et al. 2012). However, studies 
to assess farmers’ willingness to participate in production programs that target specific pro-
cess quality aspects are rare in literature. Some comparable work has been provided by Schulz 
and Tonsor (2010) who investigated how cow calf producers decide about participating in a 
voluntary traceability system, and by Norwood et al. (2006) analyzed under what circum-
stances farmers’ would accept a voluntary beef checkoff, where they either have to donate a 
fee that is spent on different business activities (advertising or research) or can request a re-
fund of money.  
The first case study in Chapter 2 deals with farmers’ willingness to participate in a milk pro-
duction scheme that requires them to use exclusively feedstuffs deemed GM-free. Results 
show that farmers who are more reliant on fodder purchased from external sources are less 
likely to accept such a program. Furthermore, a latent class (LC) model estimation was used 
to profile farmers who are more or less likely to adopt a GM-free production scheme. Two 
distinct classes of “adopters” and “non-adopters” were identified- with significant differences 
in their characteristics. Bavarian farmers are more likely to disapprove of a program as are 
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farmers with a less critical view on GM-soy cultivation and those who are less convinced of 
consumers demand. A similar study was conducted by Olynk et al. (2012) who surveyed 
Michigan dairy farmers to estimate welfare losses when the option to use recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rbST) was eliminated from the set of applicable technologies. The authors fo-
cus on the economic consequences and neglect potential alternatives of marketing the milk 
under a hormone-free label. Neither did they account for the fact that farmers might have a 
negative view on that technology which, according to Bradford et al. (2004), had a significant 
influence on adoption choices of rbST. Olynk et al. (2012) admittedly employed a random 
parameter logit (RPL) model to account for heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences, but their 
results refer basically to a “representative” producer. A further study on farmers’ willingness 
to use exclusively GM-free fodder could usefully explore the role of social interaction among 
peer groups in spatial proximity. As shown by Läpple and Kelley (2015) for the case of or-
ganic farming, such interdependencies potentially influence farmers’ adoption behavior.   
The studies in chapter 3 and 4 analyze dairy and pig farmers’ willingness to participate in a 
farm animal welfare (FAW) program. Furthermore, the latter case combines farmers’ willing-
ness to accept estimates with consumers’ willingness to pay in order to simulate supply and 
demand curves for high-welfare pork. The specific focus of Chapter 3 was to investigate how 
values relate to the perceived knowledge that the animal “feels good” and enhanced prestige 
among relevant peer groups steer dairy farmers’ participation. It was found that some farmers 
always reject such programs as proposed in the choice experiment and at the same time, state 
high levels of non-use existence values. This result is not in line with Bock and van Huik 
(2007) who argue that farmers’ readiness to implement stricter animal welfare regulations 
depend strongly on their definition of animal welfare and the importance they attach to it. 
Farmers who are interested in taking part in specific animal welfare schemes view the provi-
sion of higher levels of animal welfare as their moral obligation and regard higher welfare 
levels as important for the animal itself. In contrast, our analysis has shown that a critical 
view on FAW program does not necessarily equate with lack of interest in animal welfare. In 
fact, the potential disutility those farmers derive from such programs is probably caused by 
perceived loss of autonomy (Key 2005) or lack of familiarity with voluntary programs. Rea-
sons why farmers are opposed to participating in FAW programs should be addressed by fu-
ture investigations. The study in Chapter 4 explores the acceptance of enhanced levels of farm 
animal welfare from both sides of the market: pig farmers and pork consumers. Findings sug-
gest that farmers’ willingness to participate in a FAW program strongly depends on program 
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requirements. Compared to other attributes, straw bedding on the entire barn floor requires the 
highest compensation. In the literature reviewed, no information was found on the necessary 
compensation famers wish to obtain for providing higher levels of farm animal welfare. One 
exception is a staff paper by Wolf et al. (2015) who investigated which animal welfare prac-
tices are adopted by dairy farmers in return for a producer price increment. They compared 
the shares of farmers who are willing to adopt animal-friendly practices before and after offer-
ing compensation payments. The largest percentage change occurred for the requirement of 
having a consistent training program on cow care, third party verification and access to pas-
ture. The authors neglected the potential advantages of a discrete choice study, which are, 
firstly, to reveal the trade-offs that farmers make between different practices, and secondly, to 
estimate welfare impacts of certain FAW programs. The study in Chapter 4 further revealed 
that less intensively managed farms operated by farmers with a long-term planning horizon, 
and who are selling their products directly to consumers are more likely to adopt animal-
friendly practices on their farms. These results corroborate the findings of Bock and van Huik 
(2007), who concluded that farmers who comply with specific animal welfare schemes oper-
ate in a niche market in which it naturalness is perceived to add to quality. Estimations of 
consumers’ willingness to pay for high-welfare pork are for the most part similar to those ob-
served by Lagerkvist et al. (2006) and Liljenstolpe (2008). However, the authors did ascertain 
whether the demand for high-welfare pork can be met by willing farmers. Based on prefer-
ence estimates obtained from a consumer and a producer survey, market simulations for dif-
ferent scenarios of farm animal welfare were carried out. From the results, it can be conclud-
ed, that stricter standards of FAW lead to diverging supply and demand. A market potential 
exists for pork with slightly higher standards than the legal minimum, but not for standards 
that are considerably higher. The study in Chapter 5 uses psychological as well as sociological 
factors to explain dairy farmers’ willingness to support a horizontal cooperative strategy 
among dairy companies to reorganize milk collection. By means of a multinomial logit (ML) 
estimation, groups of never-supporters and always-supporters could be distinguished and 
characterized by their levels of social interactions with other cooperative members, the per-
ceived quality of their relationship with the dairy company and their attitude towards joint 
milk collection. This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence for the 
importance of relational factors for cooperative member decision-making. Moreover, using a 
DCE to measure dairy farmers’ approval of an optimization scheme combined with psycho-
logical factors is a relatively novel approach. 
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6.2 Critical appraisal of empirical data 
The articles presented in this dissertation are based on five surveys. Data used for analyses in 
Chapter 2 are collected from 138 dairy farmers in two key milk production regions in Germa-
ny. Bavaria represents an area with small-scale farms and reduced availability of grazing area, 
while Schleswig-Holstein represents a region with favorable natural conditions for dairy farm-
ing. The concept of GM-free milk is more popular among the farmers in the southern part of 
Germany than it is in Schleswig-Holstein. Looking at the descriptive statistics of the samples, 
differences between the regions in arable land as well as in herd size are obvious and appear 
plausible
28
. However, the sample sizes are limited and account for only 2% in Schleswig-
Holstein and 0.15% in Bavaria. Conclusions for other regions of Germany cannot therefore be 
drawn. Another critical point is the fact that all the surveyed farmers in Bavaria are members 
of the same cooperative. However, the survey yielded a number of 987 choice sets which is 
sufficient to provide reliable estimates in a choice analysis (Louviere et al. 2000). All in all, 
our results give hints as to how dairy companies can support and encourage milk producers 
not to use GM fodder factoring in regional aspects. 
The sample size in Chapter 3 was more restrictive than in the other chapters. The model esti-
mation was based on 78 dairy farmers, who were randomly surveyed at trade fair in Hannover 
in the autumn of 2014. Farmers had to choose between two different animal welfare programs 
or to continue business as usual. Each questionnaire contained four choice situations, hence 
312 choice sets in total. Compared to other discrete choice studies, this sample size is very 
small. Once a short introduction to the purpose of the study was given, the famers were sur-
veyed in personal interviews. Face-to-face interviews appear to have practical advantages: 
when conducting choice experiments, it is possible for the respondent to ask questions regard-
ing the choice task, and it is more likely that questionnaires are filled in completely. Although 
some farmers viewed the topic “animal welfare” as critical, it was possible to persuade them 
to participate in the survey. Around 46% of respondents are located in the northern part of 
Germany, representing one of the most important milk producing regions. Other farm charac-
teristics such as average milk yield and average herd size were higher than the numbers for all 
dairy farms in Germany, indicating that the sample were above the German average, indicat-
ing that the sample rather represents modern, productivity-oriented farms.  
                                                 
28
  In Schleswig-Holstein a number of 4418 farms keep on average a number of 88 cows per holding 
(Statistikamt Nord 2015). In Bavaria a total number of 35148 farms keep on average 35 cows per farm 
(Verband der Milcherzeuger Bayern e.V. 2014)  
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A scrutinizing look at the datasets analyzed in Chapter 4 showed that, although a notable 
sample size of 140 pig farmers and 646 pork consumers was achieved, it must be doubted that 
the samples are representative of the German population. The average land size of 99 hectares 
per farm is way above the German average, and so is the capacity of 1462 fattening units
29
. A 
low share (4%) of surveyed farms also keeps dairy cows and suckler cows, and 9% also keep 
fattening beefs and poultry. Only the minority of farmers takes part in agri-tourism and sells 
products directly to consumers. A considerable share of farmers is selling their fattened pigs 
to livestock traders or producer associations, whereas only a few of them conclude on contrac-
tual agreements or selling pigs directly to butchers. In the choice experiment, a remarkable 
number of 1120 choice tasks were answered by farmers and 5032 by consumers. Question-
naires were partly administered by sending a link to farmers using online boards and by plac-
ing it on the faculty’s homepage. Although nowadays only few farmers do not have access to 
internet, this might lead to a biased sample. Consumers were surveyed using different means. 
One way was to carry out personal interviews with people who were randomly approached in 
public. Moreover, an online version of the questionnaire was distributed using flyers, and a 
market research institute encouraged consumers to take part in the survey. Because the survey 
was mainly conducted in the northern part of Germany, representativeness cannot be as-
sumed. Moreover, it has to be noted that individuals were asked if they would like to take part 
in the survey. Probably, only individuals who already have a rather animal-friendly attitude 
took part in the survey.  
The study in Chapter 5 was based upon information obtained from dairy farmers who are 
members of two different cooperatives. From the distributed questionnaires a limited number 
of 53 returned completed, accounting for 19 % and 21 % of the respective cooperative’s 
members. In the survey, farmers were asked to choose their preferred milk collection scheme 
in a sequence of four choice situations. Hence, a relatively small number of 212 choice sets 
were analyzed. This is too little information to estimate advanced choice models such random 
parameter logit (RPL) models or latent class (LC) models. Instead, the farmers’ response pat-
terns were investigated. More precisely, it was studied why some farmers never approve an 
optimization model and others supported some, but not all of the models. A better data basis 
could have allowed for modelling approaches that lead to more valid determinants of farmers’ 
decision behavior. Another critical point that has to be considered is that the object of choice 
                                                 
29
  In 2013 only 12% of all pig keeping farms in Germany kept more than 1000 fattening pigs. The average of 
arable land in 2013 accounted for 59 hectares per farm BMELV (2014). 
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is a very specific example of a horizontal cooperation. Hence, no transferability of results to 
other cases is guaranteed. All in all, the datasets used for analyses are not representative of all 
German farmers, but rather for specific regions. Limited sample sizes and a potential selection 
bias due to data collection methods cannot be denied. Nevertheless, testing for overall good-
ness of fit, showed a satisfying accuracy of model specifications. Since the selected produc-
tion programs under study are representing niche markets rather than mass markets, the small 
sample sizes are, however, acceptable. 
6.3 Critical appraisal of the Discrete Choice method 
A discrete choice experiment is an attribute-based stated preference method assessing the val-
ue and characteristics of goods by using individuals’ stated behavior in a hypothetical setting. 
Compared to revealed-preference techniques, this approach allows the analyst to elicit utility 
respondents derive from public goods or new products that have not yet available. Asking 
respondents to answer a sequence of choice sets, it is possible to apply advanced statistical 
analyses with only a limited number of respondents. Discrete choice experiments (DCE) can 
be employed to investigate complex choice situations that are realistic, because respondents 
face similar alternatives but are asked to choose only one, as is the case like in many purchase 
situations. In agriculture farmers often have to decide between different technologies, con-
tracts and production schemes. Therefore, DCE are framed in a way that is similar to actual 
decision-making on farms. In a choice experiment, alternatives are described by their attrib-
utes. This setting has important consequences for the modelling of decision behavior. First, it 
is in line with consumer theory, which postulates that preferences for goods are a function of 
the attributes possessed rather than the good per se. Second, by comparing alternatives, deci-
sion makers are forced to consider trade-offs between different attribute levels according to 
their preferences. The appropriate selection of attributes and corresponding levels is funda-
mental for the DCE design. Besides statistical properties, also realism and complexity have to 
be balanced. To some extent there is a risk of non-responses or protest zero responses if the 
choice task is too complex. Another way to elicit individuals’ tastes or preferences is conjoint 
analysis (CA), where a person ranks or rates several alternatives described by a number of 
attributes (Backhaus et al. 2008). The main drawback of this technique is that it may place a 
cognitive burden on respondents, since they are asked to assess several alternatives and to 
rank them afterwards. Another possibility to get information about preferences, using a CA, is 
to ask respondents to rate alternatives individually on a scale. Although this approach is the 
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most popular one, it constitutes very strong assumptions about human cognitive abilities. Rat-
ing alternatives does not allow direct comparison between other choices, because there is no 
theory available to interpret the meaning of a difference between ratings. Instead, it is sug-
gested to transform the rating into a preference ranking, resulting in a “weakly ordered” rank-
ing (Louviere et al. 2000). Compared to other approaches, numerous factors motivate the use 
of a DCE to infer information on farmers’ and consumers’ preferences. For example, one ad-
vantage of DCEs over conjoint analysis (CA) is the consistency with economic theory, name-
ly Random Utility Theory (RUT). This concept was put forward by Thurstone (1927) and was 
further developed by McFadden (1974). It says that choice behavior is intrinsically probabilis-
tic (compare Chapter 8). Moreover, DCEs are more robust to strategic responses than the 
open-ended format often used in contingent valuation studies (Adamowicz et al. 1998). In the 
open-ended format, respondents are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) 
for a change (for example an increase in barn area per pig)
30
, whereas in the closed-ended 
format first a sum is specified and then people are asked to choose whether or not they are 
willing to pay it (Kealy and Turner 1993). Often respondents are tempted to state a WTP or 
WTA value that does not represent their true preference. There is a variety of reasons for such 
behavior. For example, individuals attempt to influence the provision of a good or to comply 
with a presumed expectation. Especially for ethical issues, like farm animal welfare, there is a 
risk of stating preferences that are socially desired and thus biased (Lusk et al. 2007). Howev-
er, the implicit valuation of single attributes contributes to the robustness of preference esti-
mates (Louviere et al. 2000). Also, other studies confirm that preferences from hypothetical 
choice experiments often match with real choices (Carlsson and Martinsson 2008). To miti-
gate hypothetical bias, there are two distinct ways: the calibration of the survey instruments 
and statistical calibration. The former includes the use of a “cheap talk” script, directly en-
couraging subjects to avoid hypothetical bias. The latter approach is to estimate a bias func-
tion by comparing responses to a hypothetical survey with a set of calibrated responses that 
the same subjects would have made if asked to make a real economic commitment (Hess and 
Daly 2014). Other biases may arise from the price level that is presented in the first choice set 
(starting point bias) or a relationship of an object of choice to other commodities (relational 
bias). A starting point bias may occur if respondents have no clue about their true WTP or 
WTA and assume the initial payment as an approximate value of the goods’ real value 
                                                 
30
  Or the amount of money farmers request to accept the change (WTA).  
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(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Researchers who investigated a starting point bias do not 
agree on how to solve this problem (Carlsson and Martinsson 2008; Ladenburg and Olsen 
2008). In the context of methodological strengths and weaknesses, it might be beneficial to 
combine stated preferences with real market data (revealed preferences) in future investiga-
tions. Unfortunately, there is no data available on participation rates and price premiums for 
niche production programs like GM-free milk or FAW programs. In conclusion, DCEs pro-
vide an adequate method to predict farmers’ willingness to provide specific process qualities 
demanded by consumers. Furthermore, they are an effective tool for investigating farmers’ 
willingness to support a strategic decision of their buyers. Information about farmers’ prefer-
ences, in advance to the actual implementation of changes in farm business or management, is 
useful to enhance acceptance among them. In the next section, implications for policy and 
business management are drawn from the results of the case studies presented in the present 
dissertation.    
6.4 Implications for policy and business  
The objective of this dissertation was to investigate farmers’ willingness to provide specific 
process quality attributes in dairy and pig farming. Furthermore, famers’ willingness to sup-
port a horizontal cooperation between dairy companies was an issue addressed in this disserta-
tion. Preference estimates, obtained from DCEs, can inform companies or policy makers how 
such programs or regulations should be designed in order to achieve better acceptance. The 
study in Chapter 2 suggests several courses of action for dairy companies wishing to supply 
GM-free dairy products. First, not all farmers are in favor of the scheme, but still a notable 
share of farmers in the north of Germany is actually willing to abandon GM-fodder. Second, 
on average farmers require a mark-up of 0.80 eurocent per kilogram milk. Besides the price 
premium, feed monitoring and to some extent technical advice, are positively valued by farm-
ers and should be offered by dairy companies. The role of soft factors, like farmer’s attitude 
toward GM-crop cultivation and expectations on consumers’ demand, turned out to be of sig-
nificant importance for the likelihood of adoption. An effective marketing strategy could be 
used as a tool to convince farmers to collaborate. Useful information for dairy companies 
wishing to set higher standards in animal welfare can be derived from the study in Chapter 3. 
Previously to the data analysis it was hypothesized that farmers who care for their animals are 
more likely to participate in a farm animal welfare (FAW) program. We expected that indi-
vidual benefits derived from adopting a program would be greater if the level of perceived 
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non-use existence values are higher compared to farmers with lower levels. Instead, we found 
that farmers who are generally opposed to FAW programs state consistently high levels of 
non-use existence values. Those farmers rejected all the programs regardless of their require-
ments and compensational payments. Thus, it appears that such programs provide a relevant 
amount of disutility that might arise from loss of autonomy or lack of familiarity with volun-
tary quality programs. Although concrete implications cannot be drawn from our findings, 
they indicate that farmers who are generally critical toward FAW programs are not necessari-
ly less animal-friendly than farmers who are willing to participate. Dairy processors should 
therefore seek the dialogue with milk producers and communicate how such programs can 
contribute to farmers’ business benefit. The findings of the study in Chapter 4 have some 
practical implications for the future design of animal welfare programs in pig fattening. De-
spite the fact, that pig farmers are generally willing to participate in a FAW program, they 
require an increment on the price per kilogram carcass weight that exceeds arising implemen-
tation costs. In particular, the provision of straw bedding that covers the entire barn floor is 
strongly disliked. Farmers who sell their products directly to consumers and run less intensive 
farms are more likely to adopt animal-friendly practices in order to present a good image of 
pig farming. Results from the analyses of consumer data showed that consumers are generally 
willing to pay more for better conditions in pig farming. Especially women and persons who 
frequently consume organic products have a higher preference for welfare pork. However, the 
findings have to be assessed carefully, because they might be biased by social desirability 
effects. Market simulations for high-welfare pork showed that with higher standards supply 
and demand curves diverge increasingly. Hence, a welfare program that imposes considerably 
high requirements did not result in a market balance. Probably, consumers perceive very high-
welfare standards equal to organic livestock practices and would rather buy organic pork at a 
similar price. Moreover, farmers who prefer a conventional farm system might not be willing 
to implement standards that are almost as high as organic standards and thus require a com-
pensational payment that is above the average. It is difficult to derive implications from the 
last case study in Chapter 5, because the choice task was related to a very specific issue: co-
operation between dairy processors related to the milk acquisition. Moreover, the estimation 
was based upon a very small sample. In this case, recommendations can only be made for the 
dairy companies involved in this project. However, our findings, while preliminary, suggest 
that the cooperatives should carefully communicate new management measures to farmers 
taking into account that interaction between members might influence their view on the pro-
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posed strategy. Therefore it is recommended, that regionalized communication strategies 
should be developed with a focus on communicating the environmental benefits of an opti-
mized milk collection.   
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7. Zusammenfassung 
Chapter 7 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Bewertung prozessbezogener Qualitäts-
konzepte bei der Produktion tierischer Lebensmittel unter Anwendung von Discrete Choice 
Experimenten (DCE). Die Gesellschaft interessiert sich zunehmend dafür, in welcher Art und 
Weise Lebensmittel hergestellt werden und verlangt nach Produkten, die unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen produziert wurden. Um diesen Bedürfnissen nachzukommen, reagieren sowohl 
Privatwirtschaft als auch Agrarpolitik mit der Einführung neuer Standards und Produktions-
programmen, die wiederum neue Anforderungen an die Landwirtschaft stellen (z. B. in Form 
von veränderten Haltungsverfahren, Verzicht auf gentechnisch veränderte Futtermittel). Für 
deren erfolgreiche Umsetzung ist die Akzeptanz der Primärproduzenten maßgeblich. Im 
Rahmen dieser Dissertation wurden Fallstudien durchgeführt, anhand derer die Bereitschaft 
zur Übernahme von Programmen, sowohl zur Produktion von Gentechnik-freier Milch, als 
auch zur Verbesserung des Tierwohls in der Milchvieh- und Schweinehaltung, untersucht. 
Überwiegend wurden die DCE mit Landwirten durchgeführt, um die Akzeptanz für genannte 
Programme zu evaluieren. Ergänzend wurde in einer Studie (siehe Kapitel 4) aus einem DCE 
ermittelte Zahlungsbereitschaften von Konsumenten hinzugenommen, um eine Marktsimula-
tion für Schweinefleisch, das unter erhöhten Tierwohl-Standards produziert wird, durchzufüh-
ren. Zusätzlich zu der Akzeptanz von Produktionsprogrammen, wurde auch die Bereitschaft 
von Milchviehhaltern untersucht, eine Kooperation zwischen Molkereien in Form der ge-
meinsamen Milchsammlung mitzutragen, um die Produktion kosteneffizienter und umwelt-
freundlicher zu gestalten. Die Ergebnisse der einzelnen Studien zeigen, dass nicht nur öko-
nomische Kennzahlen in die Bewertung von Produktions-Programmen bzw. Kooperationen 
135
7 Zusammenfassung 
136 
 
durch die Landwirte einfließen, sondern auch „soft factors“, wie beispielsweise die generelle 
Einstellungen zu Tierwohl und Gentechnik oder auch die Einschätzung der Geschäftsbezie-
hungsqualität zwischen Molkerei und Landwirt eine Rolle im Entscheidungsprozess spielen. 
Des Weiteren ist die Entscheidung für oder gegen ein Produktionsprogramm oder eine strate-
gische Maßnahme seitens der Molkerei nicht nur von den resultierenden Änderungen im be-
triebswirtschaftlichen Ablauf abhängig, sondern auch von der Struktur des jeweiligen Betrie-
bes, sowie den sozio-ökonomischen Eigenschaften der Landwirte. Im Folgenden werden die 
Fallstudien zusammenfassend beschrieben und relevante Ergebnisse wiedergegeben.  
Die Bewertung von Anreizen zur Produktion von Gentechnik-freier Milch: Erkenntnis-
se eines Discrete Choice Experimentes in Deutschland 
Dieser Artikel basiert auf einem DCE mit 151 Milchviehhaltern aus zwei unterschiedlichen 
Regionen Deutschlands, genauer aus Schleswig-Holstein und Bayern. Dabei wurde unter-
sucht, unter welchen Bedingungen Landwirte bereit sind auf Gentechnisch-veränderte Fut-
termittel in der Milchproduktion zu verzichten. Eine Besonderheit gegenüber anderen DCE-
Studien ist, dass nicht nur kostenwirksame Auflagen, wie die Dokumentation der Futtermit-
telbeschaffung durch Lieferscheine oder zusätzliche Futtermittelkontrollen einbezogen wurde, 
sondern auch unterstützende Maßnahmen, die den Landwirten die Umstellung auf Gentech-
nik-freie Produktion erleichtern sollen. Dazu wurde seitens der Molkerei beispielsweise ange-
boten, die Beschaffung entsprechender Futtermittel zu übernehmen, eine Liste mit Lieferanten 
aus der Region bereitzustellen, eine kostenlose einmalige oder regelmäßige Futtermittelbera-
tung durch einen Mitarbeiter der Molkerei oder eine dritte Institution (zum Beispiel Bera-
tungsringe) durchzuführen. Hinzu kommt das Angebot, Futtermittel zusätzlich auf den Ein-
trag von gentechnisch veränderten Bestandteilen zu kontrollieren. Durch die Schätzung eines 
konditionalen Logit-Modells wurde getestet, inwieweit die einzelnen unterstützenden Maß-
nahmen der Molkerei einen motivierenden Einfluss auf die Akzeptanz des Programms haben 
und in welcher Höhe ein Aufschlag auf den Milchpreis zu zahlen ist, um die Teilnahme der 
Landwirte zu erwirken. Die Schätzergebnisse zeigen, dass neben dem monetären Anreiz, das 
Futtermittel-Monitoring durch die Molkerei die Übernahmewahrscheinlichkeit erhöht. Da die 
Landwirte einen Aufschlag nur erhalten, wenn die verwendeten Futtermittel nachweislich 
Gentechnik-frei
31
 sind, ist diese zusätzliche Absicherung als Instrument des Risikomanage-
                                                 
31
  Nach EU Verordnung 1829/2003/EG sind Lebens-und Futtermittel, die weniger als 0,9% gentechnisch 
veränderte Bestandteile enthalten von der Kennzeichnungspflicht ausgenommen. 
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ments zu verstehen. Weiter zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Bereitschaft zur Produktion Gen-
technik-freier Milch sinkt, sollte die Molkerei die Beschaffung der Futtermittel übernehmen 
wollen. Einen vergleichbaren Effekt hat eine vertraglich vereinbarte Umstellungsberatung. 
Diese Reaktion ist vermutlich auf die Einschränkung unternehmerischer Freiheit zurückzufüh-
ren. Die angebotene Beratung wird jedoch teilweise von denjenigen Landwirten positiv be-
wertet, die zuvor bereits Beratung in anderen Bereichen in Anspruch genommen haben. Im 
Entscheidungsprozess spielen auch die Eigenschaften des Landwirtes und seines Betriebes 
eine relevante Rolle. Beispielsweise die allgemeine Einstellung zur grünen Gentechnik, die 
Erwartung der zukünftigen Verbrauchernachfrage nach Gentechnik-freier Milch, die prospek-
tive Einschätzung von Soja-und Ölsaatenpreisen, das Bildungsniveau der Landwirte und das 
derzeitige Fütterungsregime weisen einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Übernahme eines 
Programmes auf. Ein Vergleich der Stichproben nach Region ergab eindeutige Unterschiede 
in den Präferenzen. Während Landwirte aus Schleswig-Holstein im Schnitt eine grundsätzlich 
höhere Bereitschaft zeigen auf Gentechnik-Futtermittel zu verzichten, reagieren Milchvieh-
halter aus Bayern ceteris paribus stärker auf eine Erhöhung des angebotenen Kompensations-
preises. Ein weiterer Analyseschritt, um die Einflüsse der unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften 
und Betriebsstrukturen zu erfassen bestand in der Schätzung eines Latent Class Modells, 
durch das zwei Gruppen, „Annehmer“ und „Ablehner“, identifiziert werden konnten. Über die 
Hälfte der befragten Landwirte konnten der Gruppe der „Annehmer“ zugeordnet werden. 
Zwar verlangen Landwirte aus dieser Gruppe ceteris paribus einen höheren Kompensations-
preis, doch führt das Angebot der kostenlosen Beratung und eines Futtermittel-Monitorings 
durch die Molkerei zu einer möglichen Senkung der notwendigen Ausgleichszahlung. 
Die Rolle nutzungsunabhängiger Werte für die Akzeptanz von Tierwohl-Programmen 
in der Milchviehhaltung 
Die Bedeutung nutzungsunabhängiger Werte (NUV) für die Teilnahme von Milchviehhaltern 
an einem Tierwohlprogramm wurde in Kapitel 3 eingehend untersucht. Nutzungsunabhängige 
Werte sind in diesem Zusammenhang als Werte zu verstehen, die allein aufgrund des Wissens 
um die Existenz des Wohlergehens der Tiere bestehen können (non-use existence value). 
Weiter wird untersucht, ob und inwieweit die Meinung von Individuen außerhalb des land-
wirtschaftlichen Betriebes (paternalistic altruism-related NUV) die Übernahme von Tierwohl-
Programen beeinflusst. Hypothetische Tierwohlprogramme, variierend in ihren Anforderun-
gen, von erforderlichem Weidegang bis hin zu Zellzahl-Grenzwerten der Milch, wurden 
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Milchviehhaltern zur Wahl gestellt. Es wurde angenommen, dass die Umsetzbarkeit der ge-
forderten Maßnahmen, die Auswirkungen dieser auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit des Betriebes z.B. 
auf Milchleistung, Milchqualität, sowie Produktionskosten und Arbeitsaufwand, und nut-
zungsunabhängige Werte die Akzeptanz bestimmen. Als weiterer Einflussfaktor wurde sozia-
le Interaktion, abgeleitet von der Haushaltsproduktionstheorie nach Becker (1974), in die dem 
Verhalten des Landwirts zugrunde liegende Nutzenfunktion aufgenommen. Die Theorie pos-
tuliert, dass ein Haushalt seinen Nutzen maximiert, indem er Güter konsumiert, die er teilwei-
se selbst im Rahmen seiner Produktionsmöglichkeiten (verfügbare Inputs und Zeitallokation) 
herstellt (z. B. Milch). Die notwendige Zeit, die für den Produktionsprozess aufgewendet 
werden muss, wird dabei zu den Haushalts-spezifischen Opportunitätskosten (z.B. Verdienst 
außerhalb der Landwirtschaft) bewertet. Die Entscheidung über den Einsatz von Inputs und 
Zeit und damit über die Menge der produzierten Milch hängt annahmegemäß von den Eigen-
schaften des Landwirtes ab. Weiterhin wir angenommen, dass auch Eigenschaften derjenigen 
Personen, die sich außerhalb des Haushaltes befinden vom Entscheidungsträger wahrgenom-
men und bewertet werden. Dies bedeutet, dass die gesellschaftliche Meinung über Tierwohl 
oder auch die Meinungen und der Kenntnisstand anderer Landwirte (Peergroup) in diesem 
Bereich einen Einfluss auf das Verhalten des Landwirtes haben. Wie erwartet haben alle Ko-
effizienten der Programmanforderungen ein negatives Vorzeichen, da die Umsetzung der 
Auflagen ceteris paribus zusätzlichen Aufwand bedeutet. Je restriktiver die geforderten Maß-
nahmen ausfallen, desto höher ist der vom Landwirt geforderte Kompensationspreis, z.B. wird 
für die Einhaltung eines Zellzahl-Grenzwertes von 150.000 10
3
 mg Zellen eine Kompensation 
von 2,8 Eurocent pro Kilogramm Milch verlangt und für eine Zellzahlgrenze von 125.000 10
3
 
mg Zellen eine entsprechend höhere Zahlung von 4,8 Eurocent pro Kilogramm. Die Ergebnis-
se zeigen weiter, dass die nutzungsunabhängigen Werte negativ mit der Akzeptanz eines Ti-
erwohlprogrammes korrelieren. Wichtige Treiber für die Übernahme eines Programms sind 
dagegen, erwartete positive Effekte erhöhten Tierwohls auf die Leistungsparameter der Kuh, 
sowie reduzierter Aufwand (Produktionskosten, Arbeitsaufwand etc.). Sowohl die Größe der 
Peergroup, als auch die Intensität des Austausches über Themen in Bezug auf Tierwohl erhö-
hen die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Annahme eines Programmes. Das weist darauf hin, dass so-
ziale Interaktion Diffusionsprozesse von Tierwohlprogrammen fördern kann. Der Einfluss der 
nutzungsunabhängigen Werte auf die Übernahme eines Tierwohlprogrammes ist auf den ers-
ten Blick nicht eindeutig zu interpretieren. Landwirte, die einem Tierwohlprogramm ableh-
nend gegenüberstehen, bekunden interessanterweise durchweg hohe nutzungsunabhängige 
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Werte. Erwartungsgemäß sollte die Wertschätzung von Maßnahmen, die das Tierwohl erhö-
hen zunehmen, wenn Landwirte angeben auch einen persönlichen Nutzen aus dem Wohlerge-
hen der Tiere zu ziehen. Eine Analyse des Entscheidungsmusters ergibt eine Aufteilung der 
Probanden in drei Gruppen: Landwirte, die immer eines der vorgeschlagenen Tierwohlpro-
gramme gewählt haben, welche die in einigen Situationen eines der Programme akzeptierten, 
in einigen anderen Situationen wiederum nicht; und Milchviehhalter, die nie ein Tierwohlpro-
gramm angenommen haben. Innerhalb der Gruppe derjenigen Landwirte, die nie eines der 
Programme angenommen haben, werden die nutzungsunabhängigen Werte vergleichsweise 
stark gewichtet. Offenbar gibt es eine Gruppe von Landwirten, die einen hohen Nutzen aus 
dem Wohlergehen ihrer Tiere ziehen, aber gleichzeitig einen negativen Nutzen aus der Teil-
nahme an einem Tierwohlprogramm. Innerhalb der Gruppe derer, die immer ein Programm 
akzeptierten, variieren die nutzungsunabhängigen Werte sehr stark. Es ist möglich, dass be-
stimmte Landwirte eher eine positive Außenwirkung bzw. eine Imageverbesserung durch die 
Teilnahme anstreben, als tatsächlich das Wohlergehen der Milchkühe zu verbessern. Dass die 
Teilnahme an Tierwohlprogrammen kein eindeutiger Indikator dafür ist, in wie fern Landwir-
te bereit sind das Tierwohl auf ihrem Betrieb zu erhöhen, ist eine wichtige Botschaft, die aus 
diesen Ergebnissen abgleitet werden kann. 
Eine Prognose des Angebotes und der Nachfrage nach Tierwohl-Schweinefleisch in 
Deutschland. 
Diese Studie verbindet die Bereitschaft von Schweinemästern, Tierwohl-Programme anzu-
nehmen mit der Zahlungsbereitschaft für Schweinefleisch, das eben unter diesen Bedingungen 
produziert wurde. Hypothetische Tierwohlprogramme, die sich lediglich in der Preisvariablen 
unterscheiden, wurden sowohl 140 Landwirten als auch 629 Konsumenten zur Auswahl in 
einem DCE vorgelegt. Anhand der dadurch ermittelten notwendigen marginalen Kompensati-
onszahlungen und Zahlungsbereitschaften wurden eine Angebots- und Nachfragefunktion für 
spezifische Tierwohl-Szenarien simuliert. Eine Analyse der Discrete Choice Daten ergab ei-
nerseits, dass Landwirte mit längerfristigem Planungshorizont als der Durchschnitt und dieje-
nigen, die Schweinefleisch direkt an die Verbraucher vermarkten eher bereit sind ein Tier-
wohl-Programm zu akzeptieren. Die Anzahl an Mastplätzen und die Abneigung einem Tier-
wohl-Label gegenüber verringert dagegen die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Teilnahme signifikant. 
Eine Gegenüberstellung der tatsächliche Kosten, die aus der Umsetzung der Auflagen entste-
hen, und den geforderten Erlösen der Landwirte zeigt auf, dass Landwirte durchschnittlich 
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höhere Kompensationen verlangen, als zur Deckung der Kosten notwendig sind. Aus der 
Schätzung des Konsumentenmodells konnte ermittelt werden, dass die Konsumhäufigkeit von 
Schweinefleisch, die Abneigung Bio-Lebensmittel zu kaufen, und die Präferenz Fleisch so-
wohl preisgünstig, als auch an der Selbstbedienungstheke im Supermarkt zu beziehen, die 
Zahlungsbereitschaft der Verbraucher verringert. Positiv auf die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit nach 
Tierwohlfleisch wirken sich dagegen eine kritische Grundeinstellung den Haltungsbedingun-
gen landwirtschaftlicher Nutztiere gegenüber, der regelmäßige Konsum von Bio-
Lebensmitteln, das weibliche Geschlecht, ein Anstieg der Konsumausgaben für Lebensmittel, 
sowie das Wohnen in einer Großstadt aus. Aus den berechneten individuellen Kompensati-
onspreisen und Zahlungsbereitschaften wurden mögliche Schlachtpreise für Tierwohl-
Schweinefleisch kalkuliert und auf den gesamtdeutschen Markt hochgerechnet. Ermittelte 
Marktanteile für unterschiedliche Standards, die von einer Einstiegsstufe bis hin zu erhöhten 
Standards reichen, ergaben ein differenziertes Bild. Fleisch, das nur zu geringfügig höheren 
Anforderungen (Platzanspruch pro Tier: 1,33 m
2
) als dem Mindeststandard produziert wird  
deckt einen Marktanteil von 38% zu einem Gleichgewichtspreis, der nur 10 Eurocent über 
dem Referenzpreis (1,70 €/KG) liegt. Bei einem Programm, das hohe Platzanforderungen 
stellt und Einstreu im gesamten Stall erfordert, konnte kein Marktgleichgewicht ermittelt 
werden, da der geforderte Erlös der Produzenten stetig über dem möglichen Schlachterlös aus 
den Zahlungsbereitschaften der Konsumenten lag. Die Analysen dieser Studie zeigen, dass 
nur wenige Landwirte zur Teilnahme an einem Tierwohl-Programm bereit sind. Die geforder-
ten Schlachterlöse liegen in der Durchschnittsbetrachtung bei allen Programmen über dem 
möglichen Schlachtpreis aus der Zahlungsbereitschaft der Verbraucher. Der Großteil der 
Konsumenten war bereit eine Preisprämie für Schweinfleisch aus tierfreundlicher Produktion 
zu zahlen. Im Hinblick auf die Marktsimulationen wird deutlich, dass mit ansteigenden An-
forderungen, die Präferenzen zunehmend auseinander gehen. Folglich bestimmt die Ausge-
staltung dieser Programme deren Markterfolg und sollte bei der Entwicklung von Program-
men berücksichtigt werden.  
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Unterstützen Landwirte horizontale Kooperationen zwischen Molkereien? Empirischer 
Test eines konzeptuellen Modells 
Durch horizontale Kooperationen können klein- und mittelständische Molkereien Kapazitäten 
besser nutzen, um kosteneffektiver produzieren. Strategische Entscheidungen dieser Art sind 
innerhalb kooperativer Strukturen nur realisierbar, wenn die Organisationsmitglieder diese 
auch mittragen. Diese Studie untersucht daher Determinanten der Ablehnung oder Befürwor-
tung einer strategischen Entscheidung am Beispiel der Zusammenlegung der Milchsammlung 
und Routenoptimierung. Dabei werden dem Modell nicht nur ökonomische Prinzipien zu-
grunde gelegt, die das Verhalten der Akteure erklären, sondern auch psychologische und sozi-
ale Faktoren untersucht. Um die Akzeptanz von Landwirten der gemeinsamen Milchsamm-
lung zweier Molkereien gegenüber zu messen, wurden DCE durchgeführt, die alternative 
Modelle vorstellen. Dabei kann einerseits die Milchabholung, wie bisher, durch die eigene 
Molkerei erfolgen, aber auch andererseits durch eine konkurrierende Molkerei, wenn sich der 
Betrieb im Einzugsgebiet befindet. Eine weitere Möglichkeit ist die Abholung der Milch 
durch ein Speditionsunternehmen. Darüber hinaus variieren die vorgeschlagenen Alternativen 
in einer möglichen Reduktion der CO2-Emmission, sowie einer Kosteneinsparung, die über 
den Auszahlungspreis an die Milcherzeuger zurückgegeben wird. Weiterhin werden Einstel-
lungen der Landwirte zur Umwelt, Supply-Chain-Orientierung und die Einschätzung der Ge-
schäftsbeziehungsqualität anhand bereits bestehender Skalen abgefragt. Das abgeleitete Mo-
dell wird anhand empirischer Daten von 53 Milcherzeugern zweier norddeutscher Molkereien 
geprüft. Das Antwortmuster wird mittels eines multinomiales Logit Modells untersucht und 
differenziert zwischen Landwirten, die immer ein kooperatives Modell gewählt haben, denje-
nigen, die nur in einigen Situationen eine Kooperation wählten, und denjenigen, die nie ein 
kooperatives Modell akzeptieren. Signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den Landwirten aus 
den unterschiedlichen  Gruppen bestehen vor allem im Hinblick auf sozialer Interaktion mit 
anderen Mitgliedern der Molkerei, der Einschätzung der Geschäftsbeziehungsqualität und die 
generelle Einstellung der Zusammenlegung der Milchsammlung gegenüber. Die Wahrschein-
lichkeit in der Gruppe der Ablehner zu sein steigt mit zunehmender Frequenz der Interaktion 
mit anderen Mitgliedern und einer hohen Bewertung der Geschäftsbeziehungsqualität zwi-
schen Landwirt und Molkerei. Eine positive Bewertung des Projekts der gemeinsamen Milch-
abholung und eine kritische Einstellung bezüglich des Klimawandels verringern den Wahr-
scheinlichkeits-Quotienten der Landwirte dieser Gruppe anzugehören. Bei der Untersuchung 
der Akzeptanz von Kooperationen als Resultat strategischer Entscheidungen sind nicht nur die 
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Ansichten des Landwirts bezüglich des Projektes von relevanter Bedeutung, sondern auch, 
den Ergebnissen nach zu urteilen, die generelle Beziehung zum Management der Molkerei 
und zu anderen Mitgliedern der eigenen Kooperative. Die Bedeutung der sozialen Interaktion 
zwischen den Mitgliedern sollte durch das Management der Molkerei bei der Kommunikation 
strategischer Maßnahmen genutzt werden, um eine positive Übereinkunft mit den Mitgliedern 
zu erreichen. Um die Lieferantenbindung zu stärken empfehlen Spiller und Wocken (2006)
32
 
beispielsweise ein aktives Beschwerdemanagement mit einem klar definierte Ansprechpart-
ner, sowie einer Schulung aller lieferantennahen Mitarbeiter. Solche Kommunikationskonzep-
te könnten regionalen Gegebenheiten angepasst werden, um die Vorteile der optimierten 
Milchsammlung für jeden betroffenen Lieferbezirk herauszustellen.  
                                                 
32
 Spiller, A. und C. Wocken (200) Supplier Relationship Management: Konzepte zur Verbesserung der Ge-
schäftsbeziehung zwischen Milcherzeugern und Molkereien. In Deutsche Milchwirtschaft 3(57): 108-110.  
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8. Methodological Appendix 
Chapter 8 
Methodological Appendix 
8.1 Introduction 
Only a few remarks on the methodological focus were given in the previous case studies. To 
give a deeper insight into the theory behind discrete choice experiments (DCE), this chapter 
presents the theoretical underpinnings as well as details on the econometric models that are 
employed to analyze choice data. Since the case studies focus on analyzing heterogeneous 
preferences among respondents, special attention is given to model specifications that are able 
to capture varying preferences.  
First, fundamental principles and theoretical foundation of the method will be presented, fol-
lowed by an explanation of how to conduct a DCE including the necessary steps from the 
efficient design of choice sets to techniques of data collection. Subsequently, the different 
model specifications will be elucidated using examples of case studies presented in previous 
chapters. Measures of model fit will be explained in addition to underpin the selection of a 
certain model specification.   
In the case study Farmers’ valuation of incentives to produce GM-free milk: insights from a 
Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany (compare chapter 2) a latent class model was applied 
to account for varying preferences between different groups of farmers. Results confirmed the 
model fit as two groups of adopters and non-adopters of a GM-free production scheme could 
be significantly identified. Moreover, interaction terms between the attributes of the produc-
tion scheme and farm characteristics accounted for heterogeneity and resulted in significant 
differences in farmers’ openness for technical support. In the case studies in chapter 3 (The 
role of non-use values in dairy farmers’ willingness to accept a farm animal welfare pro-
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gram) and chapter 4 (Predicting supply and demand for high-welfare meat with Discrete 
Choice Experiments: an application to the German pork market) a random parameter logit 
(RPL) model was employed to capture varying preference among farmers and consumers. The 
RPL model allows for heterogeneity across respondents and results therefore in more accurate 
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) estimates than the standard logit 
model. By means of a multinomial logit model (also referred to as conditional logit (CL) 
model) a further investigation of response patterns was conducted in chapter 5 (Dairy farm-
ers’ support of horizontal cooperation among dairy processors: conceptual model and empir-
ical testing). Farmers were allocated into groups according to their response behavior to opti-
mization models regarding a joint milk collection proposed by dairy processors. Meaningful 
differences between the group of farmers who have never supported the cooperative strategy 
and farmers who have always chosen an optimization model were found.  
8.2  Theoretical framework for Discrete Choice Experiments 
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are employed to examine decision makers’ choices 
among alternatives, so called choice sets, under the assumption of utility maximizing behav-
ior. The decision makers can be people, households or firms, and the alternatives might repre-
sent competing products, courses of action, or any other options or items over which choices 
must be made (Train 2003). Although the theoretical foundation of DCE originates from con-
sumer theory, this method is applied to a broad range of scientific fields, for example on  is-
sues related to policy design in agriculture, natural resources, food and energy (Birol et al. 
2008), in environmental valuation (Hoyos 2010) or health economics (Bekker-Grob et al. 
2012).  
The theory behind DCE is mainly based on consumer theory developed by Lancaster (1966) 
and the Random Utility Theory (RUT), a concept originated from psychology (Thurstone 
1927) and further developed by Marschak (1960) who transferred the concept to economics 
and provided the derivation for utility maximization. Another extension of the concept was 
provided by McFadden (1974). The core idea of Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value is 
that utility is derived from the attributes or characteristics of the good, rather than from the 
good itself. This approach breaks away from the assumptions of traditional consumer theory 
implying that goods are the direct objects of utility. Furthermore the theory says, that con-
sumption is an activity in which goods, singly or in combination are inputs and in which the 
output is a collection of characteristics. Changes in attributes might cause changes in utility 
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and hence result in a discrete switch from one bundle of goods to another that will provide the 
most beneficial combination of attributes. Lancaster’s approach enriched the conventional 
model of consumer behavior in heuristic explanatory and predictive power. In contrast to 
conventional consumer theory assuming a continuous space of alternatives, discrete choice 
theory applies a discrete representation. This implies that the consumption of a good can be 
zero such that the maximization problem may have a corner solution, a point where the first 
order condition for an optimum do not hold. Because of this property it is impossible to use 
maximization techniques of calculus to derive demand functions and therefore utility func-
tions are applied instead (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 2000). Based on the discrete character of 
alternatives, Train (2003) indicated three prerequisite characteristics of a choice set. First, the 
alternatives must be mutually exclusive from the decision makers’ perspective, i.e. choosing 
one alternative means not choosing any of the other alternatives. Second, the choice set must 
be exhaustive in that all possible alternatives are included. The decision maker necessarily 
chooses one of the alternatives. Third, the number of alternatives must be finite i.e. countable. 
The first two conditions are not restrictive and can usually be satisfied. On the contrary, the 
third condition is actually restrictive and represents the defining characteristic of discrete 
choice models, distinguishing the realm of application from that for regression models with an 
infinite number of possible outcomes for the dependent variable (Train 2003).  
In the context of Lancaster’s theory, decision behavior is deterministic and therefore models 
would not hold if decision behavior is assumed to be stochastic. Neglecting latent constructs, 
for instance individuals’ attitudes and beliefs, as well as influences of attributes that are not 
observed may result in biased interpretation of choice behavior. Those inconsistencies are 
addressed by the Random Utility Theory (RUT). A framework that provides a more appropri-
ate approach for analysis of choice behavior by taking uncertainty into account that arises 
from researchers’ lack of knowledge about the individuals’ decision process. The theory pos-
tulates that choice behavior is intrinsically probabilistic and as such random. Decision makers 
may have perfect information about their preferences in mind, whereas analysts cannot ob-
serve all factor influencing individuals’ utility. To capture uncertainty utility is seen as a latent 
construct being composed of two components, a systematic (explainable) part and a random 
(unexplainable) part. The inclusion of a random term captures deviations in repeated choice 
situations, effects of unobserved taste variations among individuals, unobserved attributes of 
alternatives and measurement errors (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 2000). Decision makers are as-
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sumed to always choose the utility-maximizing alternative. This implies that the actual choice 
of an individual is the manifestation of its underlying utilities.  
The utility U the decision maker n obtains from choosing the 𝑗𝑡ℎ alternative can be thus writ-
ten as: 
(8.1)   Unj = Vnj +  εnj 
According to Lancaster (1966) the deterministic part Vnj is modelled as an additive function 
of observable attributes of the alternatives xnj and characteristics of the decision maker zn; 
εnj is unknown and treated as random capturing all idiosyncrasies indicated above. Following 
Lancaster (1966), the representative part of the utility function is modelled as the sum of in-
fluences of 𝐼 attributes of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ alternative and 𝑀 characteristics of the 𝑛𝑡ℎ individual: 
(8.2)  𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝑧𝑛𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1  
 
The constant 𝛼0 is specific to the alternative and captures the average effect on utility of all 
factors that are not included in the model. Estimated parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 provide information 
about the impact of alternative attributes and individuals characteristic on the choice probabil-
ity. This expansion of the representative utility 𝑉𝑛𝑗 shows that the relative importance of al-
ternative attributes is homogeneous across the population under study since the utility pa-
rameters 𝛼𝑖 are not subscripted 𝑛 (Louviere et al. 2000). Assuming utility-maximizing behav-
ior, the decision maker will choose the alternative 𝑗∗ providing the highest utility over all oth-
er alternatives. Thus the equation above can be written as: 
(8.3)  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 𝑈𝑛𝑗 ⇔ Vnj∗ +  εnj∗ ≥ Vnj +  εnj   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
Therefore the probability that the decision maker 𝑛 chooses the most preferred alternative 𝑗∗ 
from a finite set of discrete alternatives 𝐽 is: 
(8.4)  P(𝑗∗|  𝐽) = Pr(Unj∗ > Unj) ∀ j ∈ J ;  𝑗
∗ ≠ j 
(8.5)           = Pr(Vnj∗ +  εnj∗ > Vnj +  εnj) ∀ j ∈ J ;  𝑗
∗ ≠ j 
(8.6)                 = Pr(εnj −  εnj∗ > Vnj∗ − Vnj) ∀ j ∈ J ;  𝑗
∗ ≠ j 
Taking into account an unobservable random part εnj (see equation 8.1 ff.), the researcher can 
only analyze decision behavior up to a probability of event selection (Louviere et al. 2000). 
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Consequently, the researcher has to establish a way to handle information associated with the 
random term, that is, distributional assumptions on ε have to be made (Hensher et al. 
2005).With a proper model specification utility weights can be obtained from the estimated 
function and the probability of choice for a specific alternative depending on attributes and 
the characteristics of the decision maker can be predicted as outcome. Furthermore the will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) can be calculated as described in Sec-
tion 8.4. 
8.3  Conducting a Discrete Choice Experiment 
A discrete choice experiment (DCE) is a widely used, attribute-based stated preference meth-
od assessing individuals’ preferences for characteristics of goods or services. In most applica-
tions each responded faces several choice in one survey. The choice sets consists of alterna-
tives that are described by a number of characteristic, so called attributes, for which in turn 
varying levels have to be defined. Normally, choice sets are presented to the respondents in a 
sequence that can be chosen randomly, usually applied in online surveys, or the choice sets 
are previously divided into blocks as it is mostly the case in paper-based surveys.  
After formulating the decision problem and deciding on the target population, the next step in 
conducting a choice experiment is the decision about the type and number of alternatives that 
are presented to each individual in a choice set. It is possible to use a generic form; i.e. alter-
natives are simply marked with numbers or letters (for example A, B, C) or to label the alter-
natives with an alternative-specific description. It is recommended to use a generic labelling if 
individuals’ focus should be more on attributes of alternatives than on the alternative in gen-
eral. In contrast, labelled alternatives are often valued in context with the label. As a result, 
trade-offs are not only made between single attributes, because the label itself conveys infor-
mation and may be used to infer missing information about the alternatives (Louviere et al. 
2000). The number of alternatives within a choice set depends on the research question. Aus-
purg and Liebe (2011) propose not to include more than four alternatives to avoid cognitive 
burden and in turn biased choices resulting in unreliable estimates. Another important issue to 
optimize the amount and quality of information obtained from the choice experiment is 
whether to include a base case scenario (status quo) or an opt-out alternative. This decision 
has to be made when the current situation and /or non-participation is a relevant alternative 
and more in accordance with the respondents’ choice option in real life (Amaya-Amaya et al. 
2008). For example in the study The Role of NUV for farmers’ acceptance of dairy cattle wel-
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fare scheme (chapter 3), respondents face two possible animal welfare schemes and a status 
quo alternative stating “no participation”. Some farmers might have preferences not to take 
part in a scheme, regardless of the required measures or the price premium payed to them. 
Due to the voluntariness of participation it seemed to be appropriate to include the status quo 
option to ensure the choice to be more realistic.  
The next step of identifying relevant attributes and attribute levels that affect respondents’ 
choices is of particular importance. According to Amaya-Amaya et al. (2008) “[…] A good 
experiment is one that has a sufficiently rich set of attributes and choice contexts, together 
with enough variation in the attribute levels necessary to produce meaningful behavioral re-
sponses in the context of the strategies under study.”. Nevertheless it has to be considered that 
the number of possible choice sets increases with the number of attributes and corresponding 
levels. In most application four to six attributes are selected (Birol et al. 2006; Breustedt et al. 
2008; Broch and Vedel 2012). For example in the case study Farmers’ valuation of incentives 
to produce GM-free milk: insights from a Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany (chapter 
2), we used four scheme attributes (feedstuff monitoring, advice, feed procurement and a 
price premium) to keep complexity within limits. Based on comprehensive experience in con-
ducting discrete choice studies, Auspurg and Liebe (2011) recommend to select not more than 
nine attributes to construct alternatives. The selection of attributes is often fraught with many 
challenges and involves extensive inquiry to the analyst. Focus group discussions, comprising 
literature review and consultation of experts are common ways to identify what is generally 
accepted as appropriate attribute. In the above mentioned case study discussions with dairy 
companies aiming to implement a scheme for GM-free milk production were carried out to 
confirm if the attributes derived from literature are practical. Once attributes are identified, a 
researcher must assign them levels to express a range of variation in the context being studied. 
Alike the attributes also the levels have to be realistic and practically achievable. To measure 
linear effects, a number of three levels are at least required. Generally, the number of attribute 
levels does not necessarily be equal for all attributes, but it might be that a relative higher 
number of levels lead to a higher significance of the corresponding attribute (Wittink et 
al.1982). Different numbers of levels are used in the presented case studies. For example, the 
price for the pork cutlet in consumer choice sets (see chapter 4) varied between six levels to 
capture the price range between conventional reference price and a maximum price for organ-
ic pork cutlet. The use of qualitative and quantitative levels is convenient, but qualitative lev-
els imply a rising number of parameters to be estimated. In some cases the use of qualitative 
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levels is not avoidable with regard to the research question, e.g. the characteristics of piggery 
floors have to be included as “solid floor without bedding”, “straw in part of barn area” and 
“straw in full barn area”.  
Having determined the number of alternatives within a choice set, selected the attributes and 
identified the number of corresponding levels, the researcher has to combine the components 
into alternatives in an efficient way. Since experimental designs are fundamental for discrete 
choice experiments and furthermore for the quality of data obtained from its application, a 
number of authors emphasize the importance of design efficiency. In general, a factorial de-
sign (also known as full factorial design) is the enumeration of all possible combinations of 
attribute levels and such a design guarantees that all attributes and thus all parameters of in-
terest are truly independent from one another implying zero correlation between them (Louvi-
ere et al. 2000). A full factorial design allows the estimation of all main effects, two-way in-
teractions and higher order interactions. The choice experiment designed in chapter 1 com-
prises four attributes, three of them with three levels and one with four levels combined into 
two alternatives per choice set yielding a total of 11664 combinations [(3*3*3*4)
2
]. Obvious-
ly it is not useful to confront survey participants with all combinations; hence the use of a full 
factorial design is only practical for problems with restricted numbers of attributes and levels. 
Instead, strategies are employed to reduce the number of choice sets, such as using fractional 
factorial designs and/or blocking the design without sacrificing relevant information. Ran-
domly chosen fractions of the full factorial design might cause correlation between attributes 
and produce inefficient designs. However, design efficiency is determined by four properties, 
namely level balance, orthogonality, minimal overlap and utility balance (Huber and Zwerina 
1996). Level balance is the requirement that each level occurs equally often within each fac-
tor, which means that for example one level of a three-levelled attribute should occur in one-
third of all cases. Orthogonality is satisfied when the attributes are uncorrelated, thus the mul-
ti-collinearity of levels is as small as possible. This property is crucial, since the absence of 
correlation allows identifying and measuring precisely which attribute drives the change in 
utility independent from each other. Minimal overlap means that the levels of attributes 
should be the same within a choice set only to a minimum since the contrasts between attrib-
ute levels are only meaningful as differences within a choice set. If the criteria of level bal-
ance, orthogonality and minimal overlap are satisfied, utility balance should be achieved. A 
utility balanced choice set means that the choice options are almost equally attractive to the 
decision maker (Huber and Zwerina 1996). Louviere et al. (2000) stated that an orthogonal 
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fractional design is not always optimal from a statistical point of view. Orthogonal designs 
reduce the correlation between attributes whereas optimal designs aim to maximize the 
amount of information obtained from a design and be statistically efficient. In the present dis-
sertation the orthogonal design was created by means of the software SPSS 19 using the 
command orthoplan. After generating the fractional factorial design the yielded combinations 
of alternatives have to be checked for dominance of one alternative over the other in the same 
choice set. Furthermore the goodness of the orthogonal design has to be determined by calcu-
lating design efficiency. The most prominent measures to evaluate design efficiency are pro-
vided by Kuhfeld et al. (1994). It is common to calculate the D-efficiency value, which is a 
function of the geometric mean of the eigenvalue. Maximizing the D-efficiency criterion is 
similar to minimizing the variance of coefficient estimates in a linear model, or the inverse of 
the information matrix (𝑋′𝑋)−1. D-efficiency values above 90 indicating a satisfying experi-
mental design compared to the value of 100 obtained from a full factorial design (Kuhfeld 
2004). Other measures (A-efficiency or G-efficiency) can be used alternatively, but the D-
efficiency has the advantage of being invariant under different codings (Kuhfeld et al. 1994). 
The case studies in the previous chapters achieved D-efficiency values from 95.3 (chapter 3) 
to 99.2 (chapter 4). 
To keep the survey effort within limits, each respondent is confronted with a number of 
choice sets yielded from the fractional design. Presenting decision makers with all possible 
choice sets from a full factorial is not practical since this may place a cognitive burden on 
respondents and lead, in turn, to unreliable estimates. In literature different numbers for the 
optimal number of choice sets can be found. Backhaus et al. (2008) recommend not confront-
ing respondents with more than 12 to 15 choice sets. A study carried out by Johnson and Or-
me (1996) showed that it does not increase the error term asking at least 20 choice tasks in a 
choice-based conjoint analysis (CA). A number of six choice sets per respondent were rec-
ommended by Chung et al. (2011) who conducted several tests to reveal the optimal number 
of choice sets in a questionnaire. The authors emphasize the importance of pre-testing since 
the optimal number changes according to data and model specification. The number of choice 
sets used in the present case studies ranged from four choice sets in “Dairy farmers’ support 
of horizontal cooperation among dairy processors: conceptual model and empirical test” 
(chapter 4) to seven and eight sets per respondent in the study “Farmers’ valuation of incen-
tives to produce GM -free milk: insights from a Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany” 
(chapter 2). It is either appropriate to select choice sets randomly from the total number of 
150
8 Methodological Appendix 
151 
 
choice sets yielded by the orthogonal design or to break down the design into different blocks, 
where each block is then given to a different respondent (Auspurg and Liebe 2011). The use 
of a choice experiment in a survey should be accompanied by a precise introduction to the 
choice task and an ex-ante explanation of attributes. A so-called cheap-talk script is one at-
tempt to avoid hypothetical bias (inconsistency between hypothetical behavior and behavior 
under real economic consequences) and in turn increase validity of survey data. The benefi-
cial effects on reliable preference estimates were among other confirmed by Tonsor and 
Shupp (2011). The appropriate sample size for a choice experiment is not clearly defined in 
literature. Although theory exists as to the calculation of the sample size requirements for 
stated choice data, it does not address the issue of minimal sample size requirements in terms 
of statistical power of hypothesis tests on the coefficients (Bekker-Grob et al. 2015). Bennet 
and Adamowicz (2001) recommend answering each block of a choice design by 50 respond-
ents, whereas Lancsar and Louviere (2008) mentioned that “one rarely requires more than 20 
respondents per questionnaire version”. Bekker-Grob et al. (2015) reviewed 69 studies relat-
ed to health care employing DCE and showed that a limited sample size prevents detection of 
smaller effects. Not all of the case studies in the present dissertation achieved a desired sam-
ple size due to low response rates, non-completion of questionnaires or protest responses33. 
For example the survey for the case study The Role of NUV for farmers’ acceptance of dairy 
cattle welfare scheme (chapter 3) yielded only a limited number of 78 sufficiently completed 
questionnaires for analysis of farmers’ acceptance of a farm animal welfare scheme. Although 
studies exist that rely on smaller sample sizes (Garrod and Willis 1998), results have to be 
interpreted with caution. 
8.4  Evaluation Methods 
The conditional logit (CL) model  
To make discrete choice models operationally tractable, a number of axioms have been devel-
oped to condition the interpretation placed on the empirically identified selection probabili-
ties. The conditional logit model is the most basic model with strong assumptions and a 
closed form solution resulting in a simple estimation and is thus widely used (Hensher et al. 
2005).  
                                                 
33
  Protest responses are responses with no variance, i.e. the same choice occurs independent of attribute level or 
in all situations the status quo is chosen.   
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Respondents face different choice sets including a number of distinct alternatives from which 
they are asked to choose the most preferred one. Based on the actual choices obtained from a 
sequence of choice situations, the likelihood to select a certain alternative can be computed. 
Following the RUT approach explained in 8.2. the utility obtained from the chosen alternative 
𝑗 in situation 𝑡 has the general form: 
(8.7) Unjt = 𝛾𝑛V𝑛𝑗𝑡 +  ε𝑛𝑗𝑡 
where Vnjt is the vector of observed variables that include the attributes of alternatives, for 
example requirements of farm animal welfare schemes (FAW), and further farm and farmer 
characteristics. The corresponding coefficient 𝛾𝑛 is assumed to be constant over all respond-
ents, implying that only variances in preferences with respect to observed variables can be 
incorporated into the model. The random term 𝜀 of this model is assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 (Gumbel distribution). The Gumbel 
distribution is usually used to model the maximum of a number of samples of various distri-
butions and can be defended as an approximation to the normal density (Ben-Akiva and Ler-
man 2000). This IID condition implies that the variances of the random components of utili-
ties and all covariances are set to zero since the alternatives are independent. An important 
restrictive property is reflected by the IID condition, namely the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) axiom (Louviere et al. 2000). This axiom states that the relative odds of 
choice for any alternative are the same independently of the absence or presence of other al-
ternatives available
34
. In other words, if some alternatives are removed from a choice set, the 
relative choice probabilities from the reduced choice set are unchanged (Ben-Akiva and Ler-
man 2000). For the set of attributes that are not observed, this amounts to assuming that all 
the information in the random components is identical in quantity and relationship between 
pairs of alternatives and across all alternatives; hence the IID condition (Hensher et al. 2005). 
In the case that the IIA assumption reflects reality, considerable advantage is gained, that is, 
the estimation of parameters consistently on a subset of alternatives. A well specified model 
                                                 
34
  Train (2003) explains this assumption with the blue bus / red bus problem: Individual 𝑖  has to choose be-
tween a car and a blue bus with the similar probability 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑃𝑏𝑏 = 0.5  such that the ratio of probabilities is 
equal to one. Suppose a red bus is introduced and the individual behaves totally indifferent towards the two 
types of busses (𝑃𝑐 = 0.5; 𝑃𝑏𝑏 = 0.25; 𝑃𝑟𝑏 = 0.25). According to the IIA assumption the probabilities had to 
be 0.33 for each, the car, the blue bus and the red bus. IIA implies that the ratio of probabilities remains at 
one, whether or not the red bus exists. 
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capturing for all sources of correlation between alternatives, that only white noise remains, 
can therefore be seen as a positive outcome (Train 2003).  
To test the IIA property Hausman and McFadden (1986) suggest a specification test, namely, 
the Hausman test. Under the assumption of IIA no systematic change in coefficients would be 
expected if one alternative will be excluded from the model. In a first step an unrestricted 
model is estimated comprising all alternatives, afterwards a model is estimate synonymous 
with the alternative hypothesis on a subset of alternatives. If the Hausman test displays a neg-
ative result due to a small sample size a “Suest” test procedure
35
 can be used. In case of vio-
lated IIA assumptions, it is possible to alternatively apply a probit model (see Breustedt et al. 
2008). Further the assumption of linearity for linear specified attributes has to be tested. To 
this end, the highest and the lowest level of attribute variables with three levels in total are 
incorporated effects-coded into the model
36
. The assumption of linearity holds if the ratio of 
estimated parameters associated with the lower level and the higher level is equal to the ratio 
of the actual level values (Hensher et al. 2005). This ensures that the change of an attribute by 
one unit, indifferent in its direction, implies a change in choice probability of choice with the 
same magnitude. 
The IIA property is an important disadvantage of the conditional logit model. Another short-
coming is the assumption that all respondents have the same preferences for attributes and 
that individuals’ tastes are explained by their means only. Over the last decade a number of 
evaluation techniques for DCE have been developed to overcome the IIA restriction. For ex-
ample, generalized extreme value models (GEV) constitute a class of models that exhibit a 
variety of substitution patterns (Train 2003). A widely used type of such models is the nested 
logit model, where alternatives are placed into nests with unobserved factors having the same 
correlation for all alternatives within a nest and no correlation of alternatives in different 
nests. Other group of models relaxing the IIA assumption are probit models and mixed logit 
models. Depending on the research question and complexity of the choice situation, exten-
sions of the standard logit model can be applied. Usually the employment of mixed logit 
models is appropriate to capture heterogeneity across members of the observed population. 
  
                                                 
35
  The SUEST test is a more general version of the Hausman test. 
36
  According to Hensher et al. (2005) the test of linearity requires to set the medium level as base level equal 
to minus 1 and the other levels as  zero (low level) and one (high level). 
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Mixed logit models 
Accounting for heterogeneity is useful to explain choice behavior, since preferences vary due 
to individual characteristics, experiences, contexts and many more. Neglecting preference 
heterogeneity when it is actually existent leads to biased parameter estimates, and as such to 
misleading predictions of attribute valuation resulting in unreliable demand, marginal welfare 
and total welfare estimation (Greene 2008). The source of preferences varies according to the 
target population as object of investigation. For instance, consumers’ purchase decision on 
food products, which is an extensively investigated issue, are often influence by many other 
factors than the products attributes, such as socio-economic factor e.g. gender and income, 
attitudes towards quality, production processes etc. or other information about the product that 
is available to the consumer. Farmers’ preferences are additionally determined by different 
farming systems, different production objectives or market segments, but an increasing num-
ber of studies aim to shed light of the influence of farmers’ attitudes on their choice behavior 
(Davies and Hodge 2006; Ruto et al. 2008; Ruto and Garrod 2009). Controlling for influences 
of this type can be done by incorporating explanatory variables into the deterministic part of 
the utility function (compare formula 8.2.). However, it is very likely that preference hetero-
geneity will remain even after accounting for differences in observed individual characteris-
tics (Bhat 2000). Therefore model specifications that are able to capture unobserved heteroge-
neity are most suitable to increase explanatory power of models applied to heterogeneous 
samples.  
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) Model  
The random parameter logit (RPL) model is highly flexible i.e. it can approximate any ran-
dom utility model that has the general form of function already introduced in 8.5. Unlike the 
conditional logit model this specification allows for random preference variations and does 
not impose the IIA assumption. Differentiating the RPL model from other specifications is the 
assumption that the unobserved taste coefficient vector (𝛾𝑛) varies in the population with den-
sity 𝑓(𝛾𝑛|𝜃). The population parameters 𝜃 describe this distribution of individual parameters 
(e.g. mean and covariance of the 𝛾’s). Thus two sets of parameters have to be taken into ac-
count. Conditional on 𝛾𝑛 the logit specification for farmer 𝑛 choosing the most preferred al-
ternative 𝑗∗ in choice situation 𝑡 can be written as: 
(8.8) 𝐿𝑛𝑗∗𝑡(𝛾𝑛) =
𝑒𝛾𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗∗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝛾𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
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Given that 𝛽𝑛 is unknown to the researcher, the unconditional probability has to be employed 
which is the integral of conditional probability over all possible values of 𝛽𝑛(Train 2003). 
(8.9)  𝑃𝑛𝑗 = ∫ 𝐿𝑛𝑗∗𝑡 (𝛾𝑛)𝑓(𝛾𝑛|𝜃)𝑑𝛾𝑛 
The distribution of 𝛾𝑛 has to be specified by the analyst with regard to the expectations about 
the individuals behavior. In most applications the specification of the distribution for the coef-
ficients follows a normal [γ~ N(b, W)]or lognormal distribution [ln γ~ N(b, W)] if it is desir-
able to restrict the sign of the coefficient to be either positive or negative for all individuals 
(Hole 2007). In particular for the price variable the assumption of normal distributed coeffi-
cients implies that some share of the population actually prefer higher prices or lower com-
pensation payments. A normal distribution is also inappropriate for the part-worth of a desira-
ble attribute that is valued by all decision makers or an undesirable attribute that is disliked 
(or ignored) by all of them (Train and Sonnier 2005). In several empirical applications of the 
mixed logit (ML) model, for example Anastassiadis et al. (2012), the price coefficient is as-
sumed to be fix since identification is empirically difficult if all coefficients are allowed to 
vary (for further explanation see Ruud (1996)). The fixation of the price coefficient implies 
that the WTP or WTA, which is the ratio of the attribute’s coefficient to the price coefficient, 
is thereby distributed the same way as the attributes coefficient (Revelt and Train 1998). The 
mixed logit model also allows efficient estimation if each individual evaluates several choic-
es. Given that case, it is assumed that tastes vary across decision-makers but not across re-
peated choices. The only difference to a model with only one choice is that the integrant in-
volves a product of logit formulas, one for each choice situation. The probabilities do not ex-
hibit the IIA property of the standard logit model and different substitution patterns are may 
be obtained by appropriate specification 𝛽𝑛 as having both a mean and a standard deviation. A 
statistically significant parameter estimate for the standard deviation of random parameters 
suggests the existence of heterogeneity. Given that, the integral does not have closed form 
solution it cannot be calculated exactly and therefore the probability has to be approximated 
through simulation. Although the random parameter logit (RPL) model accounts for unob-
served heterogeneity, it fails to explain the sources of it. Introducing interaction terms be-
tween individuals’ characteristics and choice attributes is a way to trace existing heterogene-
ous preferences (compare chapter 2). However, this might be a limitation since multicollinear-
ity is a common problem arising from too many interactions. Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) 
suggest the usage of latent class models to investigate the source of heterogeneity. 
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Latent Class (LC) Model 
McFadden (1986) recognized the importance of incorporating latent variables into choice 
models to understand respondents’ behavior. He emphasized that the critical constructs in 
modelling cognitive decision processes are perceptions of beliefs regarding the objects of 
choice, generalized attitudes or values, decision protocols that map preferences into choices 
and further behavioral intentions for choice. The technique of creating interactions between 
attributes of alternatives and characteristics of the decision maker is restrictive because the 
key characteristics have to be identified a priori and thus have to be observable by the analyst 
(Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). More appropriate to explain heterogeneity among decision 
makers are latent class models (compare chapter 2). In contrast to the RPL model, which 
specifies the parameters to follow a continuous joint distribution, the mixing distribution 
𝑓(𝛾𝑛|𝜃) in a latent class model is assumed to be discrete, with 𝛽𝑛 taking a finite set of distinct 
values (Train, 2003). Heterogeneity is captured by sorting population members into distinct 
classes 𝑐  (𝑐 = 1, … , 𝐶), each of which is associated with a corresponding parameter vector in 
the corresponding utility. Within a class the taste of the members is homogenous but hetero-
geneous preferences between the classes. Since the classes are latent, they are not observable 
by the researcher. The central behavioral model is a logit model with independent choice 
probabilities. Given that farmer 𝑛 belongs to class 𝑐 the probability of choosing alternative 𝑗∗ 
in choice situation t is therefore: 
(8.10)  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 ((𝑛, 𝑗∗𝑡|𝑐)) = ∏
𝑒
𝛾𝑐𝑥𝑛𝑗∗𝑡
∑ 𝑒
𝛾𝑐𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑇
𝑡=1   
In this formulation 𝛽𝑐 is a class specific coefficient vector included to capture heterogeneity in 
preferences across classes. In contrast to the random parameter logit (RPL) model, which al-
lows the parameters to vary across farmers, the latent class model assumes parameters to vary 
across classes. The class membership depends on the characteristics of the decision maker. 
For example, the membership of farmers belonging to a class of adopters or non-adopters of a 
GM-free scheme depends on e.g. the attitude towards the cultivation of GM crops and expec-
tation about consumers’ WTP for GM-free milk (see chapter 2). Regarding these membership 
variables, there exists a certain probability that an individual 𝑛 belongs to a specific class 𝑐 
(Greene and Hensher, 2003). For farmer 𝑛 a latent membership likelihood function can be 
described using the conditional logit (CL) form. 
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(8.11)  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(c) = 
𝑒Γ𝑐𝑍𝑛
∑ 𝑒Γ𝑐𝑍𝑛𝐶𝑐=1
 Γ𝑐 = 0 
where the vector  𝑧𝑛 contains both, farm and farmer characteristics as well as latent attitudinal 
variables that are assumed to explain the decision behavior and Γ𝑐 is a vector of parameters. 
The probability for farmer 𝑛 belonging to a specific class ranges between zero and one and 
sums up to one for all possible classes the farmer might belong to. The parameter estimates of 
each class have to be evaluated in relation to the 𝑐𝑡ℎ parameter vector, thus it is normalized to 
zero (Greene 2008). 
The latent segmentation model represents a model locate within a range of approaches. On the 
one end of the range is the single segment case which assumes perfect homogeneity of prefer-
ences, and at the other end is the case where each individual is considered a segment (Boxall 
and Adamowicz 2002). While one expects improvement in the log likelihood values as addi-
tional classes are added to the model, the model fits must be penalized for the increase in the 
number of parameters that in turn increase due to additional classes. The optimal number of 
classes is achieved when additional classes provide only little information.  
The adjusted R
2 
penalizes the loss of degrees of freedom that occurs when a model is expand-
ed. There is, however, some question about whether the penalty is sufficiently large to ensure 
that the criterion will necessarily lead the analyst to the correct model as the sample size in-
creases. The fit measures Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and minimum Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) decline as R
2
 increases, but degrade if the model size increases. These 
measures place a premium on achieving a given fit with a smaller numbers of parameters per 
observation.  
Among others Swait (1994) recommends the AIC and the BIC to which are calculated as fol-
lows: 
(8.12)   𝐴𝐼𝐶 = {−2(𝐿𝐿 − 𝑘)}  
(8.13)   𝐵𝐼𝐶 = {−𝐿𝐿 + (
𝑘
2
) ln(𝑁)}  
where 𝐿𝐿 is the log likelihood value of the model and k the number of free model parameters. 
Unlike the AIC the formula shows that the BIC accounts additionally for the sample size 𝑁, 
i.e. gives a larger model size penalty. To avoid an overestimation of the optimal number of 
classes it is recommended to evaluate the number of classes based on both information crite-
ria. Some authors are questioning the discrete approach and suggest latent class models to 
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understate the extent of heterogeneity in choice data (Elrod and Keane 1995; Allenby and 
Rossi 1999). 
Goodness of model fit  
To evaluate the overall model fit usually measures for coefficient determination are applied. 
Usually 𝑅2 is calculated in linear regressions, a measure for the proportion of variance ex-
plained by the model. However, for models estimated by means of Maximum Likelihood es-
timation this measure is not appropriate, since estimates drawn from an iterative process are 
not calculated to minimize variance. Nevertheless, several pseudo-𝑅2 s have been developed 
to evaluate the goodness of fit of logistic models. The pseudo-𝑅2 according to McFadden 
(1974) is defined by one minus the ratio of the Log-Likelihood (LL) functions of the estimat-
ed model (𝐿𝐿𝑣) and a base model (𝐿𝐿0) only including the constant: 
 (8.14)  𝑀𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 − 𝑅2 = 1 −
𝐿𝐿𝑣
𝐿𝐿0
 
Other approaches for pseudo-𝑅2 s were developed by Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke 
(1991). Being the most popular goodness of fit measure for logistic models, the McFadden 
pseudo-𝑅2 was employed to evaluate the model fit in the previously presented case studies. 
Referring to Louviere et al. (2000) a value between 0.2 and 0.4 are considered as indicative 
for an extremely good model fits. Hensher et al. (2005) suggest that a pseudo-𝑅2 value that 
ranges between of 0.3 and 0.4 can be interpreted as an 𝑅2 of a linear model between 0.6 and 
0.8. 
Besides the Pseudo 𝑅2  other statistical tests are usually applied to assess the goodness of fit of 
a model. A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test can be used as a device for testing a model restriction. 
More precisely, the LR-test is based on a comparison of the estimated model with a model 
where one or more parameters are fixed to zero, i.e. omitted from the model specification. 
Following Greene (2008) the test statistics is given by: 
(8.15)  𝐿𝑅 = −2(𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐿1 − 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐿2) 
with 𝐿𝐿1 depicting the likelihood value for the model including only significant variables and  
𝐿𝐿2 represents the likelihood value of the full model including all relevant variables. The test 
statistic follows a 𝜒2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of required 
restrictions. Additionally a Wald test (𝜒2-distributed) can be employed to test the H0 hypoth-
esis that a single coefficient equals zero and thus has no influence on the probability of choice 
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(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). The precondition for the use of a Wald test instead of a likeli-
hood ratio test is the estimation of robust standard errors, which are according to White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
Estimation of willingness to accept (WTA) or willingness to pay (WTP) 
Increasingly, discrete choice models are used to derive the amount of money an individual 
requires for acceptance (or is willing to pay) to put up with something that might produce 
disutility (to obtain some benefit in terms of utility). In a model where each attribute in a utili-
ty expression is associated with single taste weight, the ratio of two utility parameters, where 
one of them is measured in monetary units, is an estimate of WTA (or WTP).  
The WTA estimates reflect the price premium requested to compensate farmers for the loss of 
utility from implementing the production requirements. The marginal effects can be interpret-
ed as the change of the outcome variable (here the likelihood of choice) due to an infinitesi-
mal change of independent variables. For discrete variables it is not appropriate to calculate 
the marginal effect in terms of infinitesimal changes. Thus, as a preliminary step the marginal 
effects are calculated at the mean of the sample and subsequently a discrete change of the 
variable of interest is simulated that leads to a change in the corresponding probability. The 
difference of both probabilities represents the marginal effect of the dummy variable or cate-
gorical variable. By setting the marginal effect of an explanatory variable (𝑥𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑧𝑛) in rela-
tion to the marginal effect of the price premium (𝑝𝑗𝑛), the WTA for that variable is denoted in 
monetary terms.  
The formal expression of the WTA for a scheme attribute  𝑥𝑗  is:      
 (8.16)   𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑇𝐴 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥𝑗 =
∆𝑊𝑇𝐴
∆𝑥𝑗
= (
∑
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
∆𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) / (
∑
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑛
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
) 
The calculation of the willingness to accept using the ratio of attribute coefficients is frequent-
ly used in discrete choice studies. Since attribute variables are random in a mixed logit (or 
random parameter) model, the WTA estimate is a random variable itself. In their paper Scarpa 
et al. (2008) comparing two different approaches to estimate consumers’ WTP in discrete 
choice models. The standard approach to estimate respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) or 
willingness to accept (WTA) is to assume a distribution for the coefficients and derive WTP 
for an attribute as the ratio of attribute coefficient and the marginal utility of the monetary 
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variable (e. g. compensation payment or product price). Values of the price coefficient that are 
close to zero cause the ratio to be exceedingly large such that the mean and the variance are 
raised artificially. Assuming the price coefficient to be constant, allows the distribution of 
WTP to be calculated easily from the distribution of the attribute of interest, since both distri-
butions take the same form. Providing accurate results, confidence intervals for the estimated 
WTP and WTA values were calculated using the delta method according to Greene (2008). 
Following Hole (2007) the confidence intervals can be computed based on the estimated coef-
ficient 𝛼𝑥 of the observed variable 𝑥, the price coefficient  𝛼𝑝 of the monetary variable and 
their variances and covariances.  
(8.17)  
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑥) = 
[(−
1
𝛼𝑝
)
2 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑥) + (𝛼𝑥/𝛼
2
𝑝) 
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑝) + 2(−
1
𝛼𝑝
)(𝛼𝑥/𝛼
2
𝑝) 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑥 , 𝛼𝑝)]  
 
(8.18)  𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑥  ±  𝛼𝑥/2 √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑥) 
The application of the delta method is a common procedure to obtain confidence intervals of 
marginal WTA values (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Liljenstolpe 
2008). 
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